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ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF WIM VAN OORSCHOT
This Liber Amicorum for Wim van Oorschot is published at the occasion of his retirement 
as Professor of Social Policy at the Centre for Sociological Research, KU Leuven (Belgium). 
It is a collection of chapters written by his former and current students and colleagues. 
The different chapters cover a broad array of societally relevant topics but are all -each 
in their own unique way- related to Wim van Oorschot’s academic oeuvre. The first part 
of the book reflects on Wim’s remarkable career and his contributions to the social policy 
discipline. In the second part, different types of social policies, as well as their causes and 
consequences are analysed. The third part focuses on popular attitudes towards such social 
policies. Taken together, the book demonstrates the impressive width and depth of Wim’s 
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As the editors, we are grateful to everyone who helped us to 
realize this Liber Amicorum in honour of Wim van Oorschot. First 
and foremost, we wish to thank all of the authors for their 
thought-provoking chapters that will stimulate many lively 
discussions in the years to come, and for their commitment in 
responding to our editorial comments. We are also tremendously 
grateful to Kees Boos, for taking care of the layout editing with an 
unparalleled eye for detail. Credit is also due to Marina Franckx, 
for trying to organize Wim’s retirement ceremony in the midst of 
a pandemic. And last but certainly not least, we want to thank 
Wim himself. With this book, we pay tribute to his impressive 
achievements over the years. We are extremely grateful for the 
many insights he has given us and for the privilege to work with 
him. Hopefully, this book can be the basis for continued 
discussions. We wish Wim the very best in this new stage of his 
career. 
 
Tijs Laenen, Bart Meuleman, Adeline Otto, Femke Roosma and 


























1. Leading Social Policy Analysis from 
the Front 
Tijs Laenen, Bart Meuleman, Adeline Otto, Femke Roosma and 
Wim Van Lancker 
This Liber Amicorum is a tribute to the manifold contributions 
Wim van Oorschot made to the field of Social Policy. At the 
occasion of Wim’s retirement, 45 colleagues eagerly accepted the 
challenge to write a chapter explaining how Wim influenced their 
way of thinking and working. 
Describing the influence and career of an academic giant of 
Wim’s caliber is for sure no easy task. To characterize Wim’s role 
as a scientist, colleague and friend, it is compelling to resort to 
cycling terminology1 (which is quite fitting for the avid cyclist 
Wim is). Wim clearly stands out as a leader in the peloton, who 
guides his team with great vision and strategy. Yet, he is not the 
team leader who wants to be served by a handful of domestiques. 
Instead, he takes the lead in the paceline, reducing wind resistance 
for his team members. Wim is more concerned about the success 
of the team than about his personal achievements. In the finale of 
a race, he is not afraid of leading out, so that a teammate can finish 
the sprint. Whenever he is triggered by a scientific problem, he 
becomes a true baroudeur, who goes à bloc on a breakaway and 
paves the road for the rest of the pack. In short, Wim is a colleague 
hors catégorie. 
This book is organized in three main parts, each referring to a 
particular area of influence, and ends with an epilogue by Wim. 
Notwithstanding the tremendous importance of Wim’s writings, 
the book starts by shedding light on his outstanding service to the 
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front 
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academic community (Part II, The academic career of Wim van 
Oorschot). Wim has shown great dedication in mentoring and 
socializing several generations of social policy analysts. On top of 
passing on scientific knowledge, he continuously showed future 
generations of researchers how to be productive, balanced and 
generous academics (Chung, Chapter 2; van Gerven, Chapter 3). 
Yet as a policy analysist, he understood very well that there is an 
institutional dimension to changing academic practice. Without 
any doubt, Wim’s most impactful contribution in this regard is his 
pioneering role as co-founder of ESPAnet (Clasen and Kvist, 
Chapter 4) and the important role he played in various other 
scientific co-operative networks, such as the European Social 
Survey (ESS) and the European Data Center for Work and 
Welfare (EDAC). Wim also left an important mark as a teacher. 
He won several ‘best teacher’ awards, and both in Tilburg and in 
Leuven he was cherished and revered by his students and by his 
colleagues.  
The remainder of the chapters in Part III and IV engage with 
the wide array of theoretical and empirical contributions Wim has 
made to the field of social policy analysis. Broadly speaking, 
Wim’s scientific work can be categorized in two interrelated 
subdomains, namely the study of welfare institutions and the 
analysis of public attitudes towards welfare. Part III (Social policies, 
their causes and consequences) highlights the lessons Wim has taught 
us regarding the character of European social policies; processes 
of policy formation; and the consequences these policies have for 
the economic conditions and wellbeing of populations. A key 
contribution of Wim has been his suggestion to study benefit 
recipiency as a central dependent variable in comparative welfare 
analysis, rather than merely relying on social expenditure or social 
rights data (Nelson, Chapter 6). The attention for benefit 
recipiency was already present in Wim’s PhD thesis (entitled 
Realizing rights), in which he shows that the issue of benefit non-
take-up should be understood as a multi-level problem, taking 
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front 
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factors at the level of claimants, administrators as well as policy 
makers into account (Schols and Peeters, Chapter 9). His 
theoretical, multilevel model of non-take-up remains hugely 
influential to date. Moreover, attention for the bottom-up 
implementation of policies by street-level bureaucrats has created 
interesting opportunities to bridge the fields of social policy and 
social work (Hermans, Chapter 8). Focusing on benefit recipiency 
– arguably the dimension of social policy that shapes the everyday 
experience of citizens most strongly – has shown to be an 
insightful approach in addition to the popular welfare regime 
paradigm (Arts, Chapter 5).  
Characteristic for the ‘van Oorschot-approach’ is that, besides 
structural contexts and the emergence of new social risks 
(Cantillon, Chapter 7), cultural ideas are conceived as an 
important driver of policy change (Pfau-Effinger, Chapter 16). 
Such a cultural analysis of the welfare state warrants a multi-level 
approach that pays attention to the interplay between micro 
(individual) and macro (institutional) factors (Pulignano and 
Doerflinger, Chapter 12). From this vantage point, Wim has been 
among the pioneers studying trends such as increased welfare 
targeting and means-testing, the Europeanisation of social policy 
(Schoukens and Pieters, Chapter 10), or increasing labour market 
flexibility (Bekker and Pop, Chapter 11). The importance of this 
work is evidenced by the fact that the concepts Wim developed 
over the years are well-suited to understand new evolutions, such 
as the use of automated decision-making processes in social policy 
(Van Lancker and Van Hoyweghen, Chapter 13) or universal basic 
income (Muffels, Chapter 14; Houtman, Chapter 15).  
Part IV, Popular attitudes towards social policies, deals with a second 
focal point in Wim’s research: the normative beliefs, cultural 
values and preferences citizens have with respect to welfare 
policies and their target groups. By meticulously studying notions 
of solidarity (for a conceptual clarification, see Vandevelde, 
Chapter 31) and the legitimacy of welfare arrangements, Wim 
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contributed to a veritable cultural turn in social policy (Taylor-
Gooby, Chapter 17; Staerklé, Chapter 18). Among many 
contributions, Wim’s theory of welfare deservingness is the one 
that has resonated most powerfully in the field. This framework 
stipulates that citizens employ five criteria – Control, Attitude, 
Reciprocity, Attitude and Need – as heuristics to decide who should 
get what and why (Bonoli, Chapter 20). The key concepts in Wim’s 
deservingness theory show relevant linkages to processes of 
stereotyping (De Tavernier and Draulans, Chapter 21) and explain 
why certain welfare arrangements are more popular than others. 
Yet, various chapters in this book illustrate that this efficient and 
versatile framework offers levers to understand attitudes towards 
migration (De Coninck, Swicegood and Matthijs, Chapter 23; 
Reeskens and Van der Meer, Chapter 25), diversity (Meuleman, 
Chapter 24), eco-social policies (Otto and Gugushvili, Chapter 27) 
and perhaps even other-than-human subjects (Hannes, Chapter 
22).  
However, his work on deservingness is by no means Wim’s 
only contribution to the literature on welfare attitudes. Wim 
systematically elaborated the idea that individuals’ welfare attitudes 
are multi-dimensional (Laenen and Roosma, Chapter 19), in the 
sense that they, for example, can support the goals of the welfare 
state, but take a more critical stance towards the concrete 
implementation or the beneficiaries (see Abts and Achterberg, 
Chapter 26, for an elaboration of the notion of welfare populism). 
The various dimensions are, to a certain extent, rooted in social 
structural positions (Lux and Mau, Chapter 28) and ideological 
worldviews. Besides focusing exclusively on individual differences, 
Wim’s work contains a strong comparative component, studying 
welfare attitudes cross-nationally (Halman and Sieben, Chapter 
30) and across welfare regimes (Gelissen, Chapter 29).  
Taken together, the book demonstrates the impressive width 
and depth of Wim’s academic work, which will continue to inspire 
many researchers in the years to come. 




1. Readers who are less familiar with the glossary of cycling can look up the 
italicized words on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glossary_of_cycling 
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2. How to be a Great Academic 
Heejung Chung 
2.1 Introduction 
When I was asked to write up a short essay celebrating Wim’s 
academic career and the influences he had on myself as well as 
rest of academia, I didn’t hesitate one second to ask whether I can 
write about how Wim lived as an academic rather than what he 
wrote as an academic.  
Don’t get me wrong. Wim’s work has had a great deal of 
influence on my work throughout my career. This started from 
even when I had no clue about who he was. One of my first 
academic papers that was published was on the Dutch welfare 
state (Chung and Kim, 2003). In the piece, I cite Wim’s work (for 
example, van Oorschot, 2001a, 2001b) on the Dutch miracle and 
flexicurity policies a number of times. Mind you, these weren’t 
even published papers – rather conference papers I found on the 
internet as a junior scholar in Korea. I had a binder full of Wim 
van Oorschot’s papers before I met Wim. 
Furthermore, Wim’s work on deservingness criteria (van 
Oorschot, 2006), as well as his work on crowding in crowding out 
of social capital (van Oorschot and Arts, 2005), have been some 
of the key theoretical underpinnings in many of my work (for 
example, Chung, 2018, 2019; Chung et al., 2018, 2019). These are 
also included as some of the key articles I make all of my 
undergraduate and post graduate students read during my welfare 
state lectures. We of course have written many papers together, 
especially focusing on employment insecurity in Europe especially 
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during/right after the 2008 financial crisis (van Oorschot and 
Chung, 2015; Chung and van Oorschot, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
2.2 Toxic academic life 
However, again despite the great deal of influence his work has 
had in shaping my academic endeavours, what I would like to 
celebrate and share is the influence he has had in how I define a 
successful academic life. Academia is well known to be one of the 
most competitive labour markets in our societies. A recent study 
by the Times Higher Education (THE) (Bothwell, 2018) has 
noted how academia is a great example of long-hours work 
culture, where work devotion (Blair-Loy, 2009) is not only 
prevalent but expected. Two third of all surveyed stated that they 
work at least 9 hours a day, that they work on the weekends, and 
one out of three said they only had one holiday away from home 
in the past year. In addition to that, 9 per cent did not take any 
holidays in the past year. Of those who did take holidays, most of 
them still looked at and answered emails during their ‘time off’.  
This has huge consequences on academics’ ability to balance 
work with leisure and family life, which again has a damaging 
impact on their mental and physical well-being. The same THE 
survey has noted that almost 2/3rds of all academics surveyed 
said that their work-life balance was worse than that of their 
friends. The relationships of academics – not only with their 
partner but also their children – suffer due to their workload. 
Many also noted the fact that they were not able to have children 
because of their fear that children will have a devastating impact 
on their careers – and for many, any prospect of a job in 
academia. Obviously this results in serious consequences for 
academic’s mental well-being. One recent survey found that 43 
per cent of academic staff exhibited some symptoms of mental 
disorder, which is about twice the prevalence compared to that of 
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the general population (Gorczynski et al., 2017). When looking at 
post-graduates, the prevalence of anxiety or depression is almost 6 
times as high in the general population (Evans et al., 2018). 
Actually, amongst academics many claim it is almost inevitable to 
go through a period of depression during your PhD years. This is 
compounded by the fact that many academics and supervisors 
expect their students to follow this culture of long-hours work – 
that everyone puts in a 70 hour week and that no serious 
academic would work 9 to 5.1 This type of culture is also followed 
by the harsh criticism of academia – rather than providing 
constructive criticism especially to our early career researchers, we 
tend to put people down. And if they can’t handle it, they are not 
apt to take part in academia. This is so prevalent that there are 
Facebook groups and Twitter handles that are themed based on 
the ‘Reviewer 2’ culture. 
2.3 Wim van Oorschot’s way of life 
Wim van Oorschot, and the way in which he leads his life is quite 
of an anti-thesis to all of this madness that is the so-called ‘ideal 
academic’ culture – similar to the ideal worker culture of Acker 
(1990) and Williams (1999). The culture defines an ideal academic 
as someone who does not have any other responsibilities outside 
of research (teaching and admin), and prioritises work above 
everything else in their lives. Wim went against this trend by 
working shorter but productive hours, taking exercise 
seriously/almost religiously, prioritising family time/life, and 
having a serious hobby. This in fact is the exact secret 
combination to increase one’s productivity as mentioned by 
others (Pang, 2016). I am writing this secret solution of Wim’s in 
the hope that it can encourage the current early career researchers 
(that is, those who are just starting off their lives in academia) and 
others to lead a successful academic life.2 
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2.4 Work shorter hours and take breaks 
Wim works between 8am and 4pm every day. I am not sure when 
he started working according to this schedule. Some say it is 
because he was raised in a farm where everyone rises early, others 
say this is because he spent some time in Denmark (Aalborg) 
where everyone worked this schedule and somehow it stuck. 
Whatever the reason, he worked these hours with a 30 minute 
break for lunch every day. Unlike the other professoriate at 
Tilburg University (and elsewhere really) who ate their lunch in 
front of their computers, Wim always took time off for lunch to 
have his boterham (bread with cheese) and a piece of fruit. This 
lunch time was mostly shared with PhD students in the 
department, his and others, where we shared stories of our lives, 
rather than talk shop. During my time working with him at 
Tilburg, I don’t think I have ever seen him work after 4pm. What 
is more, when working with him, unlike some other professors 
who expect students/post-docs to work throughout the weekend 
to finish up projects/papers, there was an unwritten agreement 
that weekends are not there to ‘quickly finish some paper up’. 
Weekends were for family and rest. Many Monday lunches were 
times where Wim shared his story about having his children over 
the weekend (the story of his son bringing a load of laundry over 
from university every weekend still makes me smile), and how he 
went for another 100km cycling tour. Despite all of this, as you 
may know Wim is and has been one of the most influential and 
prolific academics in the field of social policy. 
2.5 Taking exercise seriously and have a serious hobby 
Another important part of Wim’s daily schedule is that he wakes 
up very early to squeeze in an hour of swimming (when in the 
Netherlands), or cycling (when in Leuven) every morning. This he 
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takes quite seriously, almost religiously and with great pride. He 
and Peter Taylor-Gooby (another well-known avid cyclist and 
social policy scholar) used to compete not on their research, but 
on how much they cycled in the past years, how fast they can go, 
and whether or not they finished some sort of long cycling tour 
that was famous for being difficult and how fast they made it. His 
passion for cycling was not watered down despite the cycling 
injury he had circa 2010 where he broke, what I remember as, his 
hip or thigh bones. What was remarkable, or possibly in 
retrospect completely expected, was how fast he recovered. I 
remember visiting him at home quite soon after his accident (of 
ramming into a safety pole – oh the irony – whilst cycling at an 
incredibly high speed during his cycling tours). He was ‘running 
around’ on his crutches, mentioning how his physiotherapist was 
impressed with the speed of his recovery – being the ‘top of class’.  
Obviously there are some drawbacks to his one hour sports a 
day and waking up early regime. Wim sleeps very early – I mean 
like 9pm early. One of the things I have never done with Wim, 
despite knowing him for about 15 years now, is to go out drinking 
with him. With the exception of the glass of wine during 
conference receptions, I don’t think I have had the pleasure of 
going to a pub/bar with Wim after a conference dinner.3 What is 
more, he never stays late at conference dinners or workshop/ 
project/board meeting dinners. Maybe this is known to others as 
well, but he does what is called a ‘French Exit’ – where you leave 
a party without anyone noticing.4 I’ve never been able to say 
goodbye to him during a dinner, since he leaves so quietly and 
early.  
In addition to sports, I know Wim had taken up singing quite 
seriously and sang (and still does so I am told!) in a choir for a 
long time – with performances. Later on after turning 60, his love 
has moved on to sailing which he would talk about with great joy. 
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2.6 Importance of family 
Another important thing to note about Wim is how much he 
treasures his family and the time he spends with them. I 
remember him very often talking about his sons and daughter, 
what they were doing with great pride. Guido made his webpage, 
his daughter Irene was doing a really important anthropological 
study about judges’ decision-making et cetera. I know he made 
sure to spend dedicated time with his kids and his wife, and made 
sure to be there for them. What is more, unlike many other 
academics – especially supervisors, who would not want to hear 
about family given that they may become a distraction5 – Wim 
always made a point about asking about my family, how my 
daughter was doing, and he really enjoyed getting updates on how 
she grew up. Even now, as a grandfather the first thing he will do 
when you meet him is to share the photos of his beloved 
grandson, with whom he spends a day a week caring for. As a 
gender scholar of work-life balance, I know how important the 
attitudes of senior managers are in shaping organisational culture 
(van Breeschoten, 2019), as well as the importance of embedding 
work-life balance issues in our work conversations (Kelly et al., 
2014). In this sense, Wim has been a great role model for having 
family in the centre of our work conversations and showing how 
important it is to value the time with them. 
2.7 Give time and hope to young scholars 
On top of this, as is the case with those who do practice such 
academic life, Wim takes the development and encouragement of 
early career scholars very seriously. This means that he not only 
gives you the time of day, which unfortunately many ‘big name 
stars’ would not, but generally takes notice and makes a point of 
encouraging and giving feedback to early career researchers. 
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Furthermore, he gives you truly insightful comments/feedback. 
Most importantly, he gives you the encouragement to move 
forward in your career. He was the principal of the first ESPAnet 
doctoral summer school, in which he took the role of mentoring 
young scholars seriously. He never threw his weight around or 
misused his position of power or authority, treated us (young 
scholars) as equals worthy of a debate, and was open for 
discussion, a true discussion. Through this experience, many of 
those who had the opportunity to work with and learn from him 
have flourished into key scholars all over Europe.  
For me personally, Wim not only offered me PhD funding 
circa 2006, which I unfortunately could not take, he gave me a 
post-doc position straight after my PhD. What is more, without 
Wim, I would have left academia for good soon after my PhD. In 
2010, a year after my PhD, and having had so many rejections 
(papers, grants, and jobs) while my peers were doing great, I was 
about to give up on writing papers or looking for a job in 
academia. However, Wim was optimistic about my future. He told 
me not to take rejections seriously, it happens to everyone – even 
him! – and one should just move on. Furthermore, he told me 
that he sees great potential in me as an academic/researcher. I 
told him he probably is a better expert in these things than I am, 
and followed his advice. I think I can thankfully say that he was 
right, I was wrong. This is just one story, but I am sure there will 
be many more like this, where Wim gave someone the right 
amount of encouragement/feedback/joint collaborative project 
that shaped their future careers. 
One final thing to note is about Wim’s encouragement of 
women into the field. Wim has promoted many young female 
scholars into the field of European social policy. As many of you 
may be aware, most of his PhDs were women, as were/are many 
of his post-docs. What is more, many of the things I’ve noted in 
this essay – shorter working hours, enabling better work-life 
balance, encouraging the discussion around family within work 
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conversations – are all key factors in ensuring more gender 
diversity into the workplace (Goldin, 2014; Cha and Weeden, 
2014). I know he took notice of gender early on when this was 
not an issue many raised – again the number of high-flying female 
academics that trained under him in some function or another is a 
good example of this. 
In sum, Wim has had a significant impact in academia not only 
as an internationally renowned scholar who has shaped the field 
that is comparative social policy, but also as a great scholar who 
has shown many (including myself) how to be a great academic. 
He has, during his whole academic life, encouraged the 
development of a good/constructive work environment which is 
inclusive and sustainable. I am sure he won’t disappear anytime 
soon from the field, and through many of us, his work and his 
way of life/work will live on for even longer. I for one have been 
greatly shaped by the way he has carried out his academic life and 
am trying to continue on his tradition of living a good academic 
life whilst encouraging others to follow. Thank you Wim, for 
showing us that you can both be a nice balanced person whilst 
achieving greatness in the field. 
NOTES 
1. Lucy Foulkes, ‘How to be an academic without working 60 hours a week’, 
The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2018/ 
feb/13/how-to-be-an-academic-without-working-60-hours-a-week (accessed 
4 July 2020). 
2. I further hope that this may change the minds of those established scholars 
to reflect on what kind of culture we truly want to establish. 
3. This is contrary to my experience with the other Wim (Van Lancker), who I 
don’t think I’ve ever NOT had a late nigh drink at a pub till mid night every 
conference/workshop we’ve attended together. 
4. Unlike ‘Brexit’ where you bang on about leaving forever and 4 years on you 
still haven't left.  
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5. One famous feminist scholar used to tell her female PhDs and post-docs that 
‘you either write books or you make babies’. I won’t tell you who this is. 
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3. On the Social Policy Research and 
the Principles of Wim van Oorschot  
Minna van Gerven 
Those are my principles. If you don’t like them I have others 
(Croucho Marx, 1890–1977). 
With this phenomenal quote Wim van Oorschot and Jochen 
Clasen (2002) started their article titled ‘Changing principles in 
European social security’ in the European Journal of Social Security. 
This article soon became the life-line and source of inspiration for 
my PhD project that aimed at extending their research to cover a 
longitudinal socio-legal analysis of the changing principles of the 
three European welfare regimes (van Gerven, 2008). This, and 
many other articles written by Wim, have extended the scholarly 
understanding of welfare state change and brought academic work 
further by encouraging to study change rather than inertia as the 
past generations of welfare state development had done. Wim has 
made several contributions to the field of social policy research. In 
this short essay, I will highlight three of these achievements. 
First, Wim has made a major contribution to the development 
of social policy research as an academic discipline. There is 
abundant discussion whether social policy qualifies as an academic 
discipline or not. Although this discussion is likely not to be 
settled soon, the crux of the social policy scholarly work is that it 
provides highly relevant knowledge of how and to what extent 
societies respond to social needs and contribute to welfare and 
wellbeing. In this area, sociological theories have an undisputed 
value to social policy scholarship as they zoom in on the ‘social’ in 
the public institutions, systems, and outcomes. Wim is a 
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sociologist with a sheer fascination to study and understand social 
change. During his impressive career, he has studied in a wide 
range of publications how welfare states evolve and how social 
relations underpinning welfare states develop (Clasen, Kvist and 
van Oorschot, 2001; Drøpping, Hvinden and van Oorschot, 2000; 
van der Waal, de Koster and van Oorschot, 2013; van Oorschot, 
2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2009; van Oorschot and Abrahamson, 2003; 
van Oorschot and Boos, 1999; van Oorschot and Hvinden, 2000; 
just to name a few). This sociological imagination of Wim has 
been a great merit to social policy scholarship and particularly 
understanding the societal rooting of welfare state institutions. 
Wim’s numerous studies show how welfare states and social 
policies do not evolve due to their (neo)institutional properties, 
but also due to change of values, norms and attitudes of the 
society.  
In the article that I started this essay with, Wim followed 
Deutch (1975) and distinguished three different principles 
underlying the European social security: need, equality and equity 
(Clasen and van Oorschot, 2002: 91). These inherent principles 
are directly forming the social policy arrangements of the state. 
Following the need principle, state intervention is seemed to be 
legitimate if other actors (individual/household, society or market) 
fail to satisfy the needs of citizens. Therefore societies, 
characterized by the need principle, make intensive use of needs- 
and means-tested systems in determining the eligibility of 
beneficiaries. The state-solidarity in such a model is limited to a 
selected group of citizens. The principle of equality follows a 
different logic than the need principle, as it strives to provide 
universal coverage and distributes according to an egalitarian 
criterion. The principle of equity is based on the reciprocal 
relation between state and receiver of social security. The schemes 
cover those with specified status (worker, contributor et cetera). 
This social contract is the essence of the post-war social insurance 
schemes, particularly in the Bismarckian insurance system 
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tradition. The students of social policy are sure to recognize some 
similarities of this holy trinity of redistributive justice principles to 
other popular typologies used to analyse the welfare regimes as 
Esping-Andersen did in 1990 or other typologies of welfare 
systems. Wim’s contribution to this debate, and what he 
developed further in several other publications later, is to convey 
the message that welfare state provision is organized around 
inherent normative principles, which define the input and outputs 
for social policy systems and the political landscape where these 
reforms are negotiated, legislated and implemented. It reminds us 
about the fact that social policies are highly normative and 
culturally constructed. From this perspective it may not be such a 
surprise that the development of welfare states does not always 
follow the classic economic or rational choice models, as 
economists often assume. Rather it encourages more sociological 
imagination to extend the social policy discipline to understand 
change and its direction.  
Wim has conducted a remarkable amount of work, together 
with his many PhD students and junior scholars, to show how 
social policies are designed around such norms, values and 
strongly related to public attitudes. Wim’s work on deservingness 
perceptions (for example, Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk, 2013; 
van Oorschot, 2000, 2006; van Oorschot, 2008; van Oorschot, 
Roosma, Meuleman and Reeskens, 2017), and how some groups 
enjoy a higher level of perceived deservingness than others, 
reminds us about the complexity of social policy institutions, and 
the various interests that are central in welfare state developments. 
Relatedly, together with Dorota Lepianka, Wim has done eminent 
work on understanding popular poverty attributions (Lepianka, 
Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010; Lepianka, van Oorschot and 
Gelissen, 2009). This work illustrates clearly how social policy is 
tightly bound by popular beliefs and attitudes and the difference 
of poverty attributions among the European countries and 
between world regions. For me personally, Wim’s work on the 
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shift from collective solidarity to selectivity and targeting (Clasen 
et al., 2001; van Oorschot, 2009; van Oorschot and Abrahamson, 
2003) has been central for understanding the welfare state change 
in the Netherlands and has inspired me and many researchers to 
further analyse various phenomena of social security, such as 
activation and non-take-up. Wim’s work does not only allow a 
better understanding of social policy developments in the past, his 
academic sophistication gives important insights what to expect 
about social policy reforms in the future, as the main themes of 
the ESPAnet 2021 conference organized by Wim in Leuven will 
demonstrate. Wim’s work on welfare deservingness and solidarity 
are invaluable in the studies that view modern developments of 
automatization and digitalization of welfare that will challenge the 
decision-making of deservingness and may lead to conflicts in 
solidarity, high non-take-up and blind spots in benefit receipt. 
This and all, makes Wim’s work pioneering and full of guiding 
principles for the discipline of social policy. 
Second, Wim has made an enormous contribution as academic 
supervisor and promotor of junior scholars. I was among the first 
PhD students Wim supervised at Tilburg University. I think I am 
not wrong to claim that we both learned a lot during this long 
path to my PhD. The life of a PhD student is full of highs and 
lows, and good supervision is crucial to survive this period. I have 
learned from Wim a lot about the meticulous principles of 
supervision and he has had a great impact on me in what kind of 
PhD supervisor I am today. I will always be grateful for Wim for 
connecting me with the social policy researchers around the 
world. It is evident that Wim has been central to the careers of all 
his (PhD) students. Many of Wim’s former PhD students are now 
occupying important positions in social policy research and 
policymaking in the Netherlands and beyond. Moreover, he is 
‘force majeure’ as teacher and lecturer for many cohorts of 
sociology students. I have heard many stories of students 
changing their majors to sociology after hearing Wim lecturing. 
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Wim’s contribution to social policy in the Netherlands is eminent 
and ever growing. It is a sign of a great academic, when he directly 
or indirectly has inspired practically all social policy students in 
this small country as Wim has done. And since a few years, this 
also applies to Belgium, but of course, to all Europe. It is the 
principles of a great supervisor that matter. 
Third, through the establishment of ESPAnet, the Network of 
European Social Policy Analysis, Wim together with Jochen 
Clasen and others, has institutionalized social policy in the 
European research community and fueled it to the active 
flourishing society that it is today. ESPAnet was founded in 2002 
to offer a platform and venue for social policy scholarship to 
exchange knowledge and discuss and develop the discipline of 
social policy. Before ESPAnet was borne, social policy scholars 
were lacking events to come together and exchange their views on 
social policy research. It was the wisdom of the first ESPAnet 
chairs and Wim’s personal dedication to discipline that has led to 
an active research community of social policy scholars that now 
exists already two decades. Wim held the pre-ESPAnet conference 
in Tilburg in 2002, which is now known as the moment when this 
success story called ‘ESPAnet’ started. Working in the first 
secretariat of the network, I had an excellent view on the initiation 
of ESPAnet and how Wim and Jochen firmly steered the network 
towards a great future. Over the last decades, ESPAnet society has 
witnessed an enormous growth in members, events and outcomes 
the network is fostering. The intense collaboration with the 
Journal of European Social Policy is a good example of the 
achievements of ESPAnet, as are the active national ESPAnet 
societies in various European countries as well as European 
regions. The annual conferences of ESPAnet have become the 
yearly highlight of the social policy research community and they 
remain to highlight the initial principles of ESPAnet that echoes 
Wim’s words: to provide a platform and venue of high-quality 
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social policy research and to support the junior researchers in 
their progress. 
This dedication to the discipline and to new generations of 
researchers, are very much credited to Wim van Oorschot, a man with 
multiple principles in science, supervision and social policy society. 
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4. Wim van Oorschot and the Early 
Years of ESPAnet 
Jochen Clasen and Jon Kvist 
4.1 Introduction 
Wim van Oorschot is honorary president of ESPAnet, the 
European Network for Social Policy Analysis, and acted as its co-
chair between 2003 and 2008. We assume that most social policy 
researchers (above a certain age) will be aware of this. What is 
perhaps less well known is Wim’s role in debates and initiatives 
that led to the eventual creation of ESPAnet. In this contribution 
we would like to rectify this. We briefly revisit social policy arenas 
as they existed before ESPAnet. We then reflect on the origin of 
the network, its aims and mission, as well as various activities 
which, from the start, went well beyond the annual conference. As 
will be demonstrated, Wim’s input into the early shaping of 
ESPAnet has been pivotal.1  
4.2 The context of social policy debates in Europe of the 
1990s 
At the risk of overly generalising, social policy scholarship and 
debates in the 1990s were shaped by Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s 
notion of welfare state regimes (1990), and Paul Pierson’s theories 
of welfare reform (1994). While there was no single organisational 
and multi-disciplinary context for regular scholarly exchange in 
Europe, several international social policy arenas existed. For 
example the research stream 19 (RC19) of the International 
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Sociological Association (ISA) on Poverty, Social Welfare and 
Social Policy had for more than two decades been the place where 
comparative welfare state researchers met independently of their 
background in sociology, economics or political science. At the 
occasion of its annual conferences, vivid exchanges took place 
and discussions were based on the assumption that all conference 
participants had read all conference papers in advance. This was 
one inspiration for the later adoption of the ESPAnet ‘golden 
rules’ (see below).  
Two other arenas for social policy exchange in Europe deserve 
to be mentioned. Organised by Maurizio Ferrera and Martin 
Rhodes, the Welfare State Forum at the European University 
Institute in Florence brought numerous social policy scholars 
together for conferences, workshops and weekly meetings over a 
period of 12 months (1998/1999). Another, yet a very different 
context for exchange, was provided by the European 
Commission, which funded two thematically relevant social policy 
networks with participating researchers meeting once or twice 
annually to discuss on-going work: the so-called Cost-Action 13 
(Changing Labour Markets, 1999–2003) and the Cost-Action 15 
(Reforming Social Protection Systems in Europe, 2000–2004). 
Wim van Oorschot was an active participant of both. Indeed, 
most scholars who later became members of the first ESPAnet 
board also played a role in one or both of these EU sponsored 
programmes. 
Last but not least, and now superseded by the research network 
on the ‘Sociology of Social Policy and Social Welfare’, the 
‘permanent’ research network on social policy was part of the 
annual conference of the European Sociological Association 
(ESA). Probably most important for the eventual creation of 
ESPAnet was the 5th ESA conference in Helsinki in August 2001. 
As part of the conference, members of the network engaged in a 
lively discussion which culminated in the suggestion of organising 
a regular conference entirely dedicated to social policy – and 
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attended not only by sociologists. There were several sceptical 
voices expressing doubt about the viability of this idea. This was 
mainly because there were already opportunities for social policy 
researchers to regularly meet at international level, for example 
those mentioned above, and also more specialised associations 
which had started in the 1990s (such as FISS, the Foundation for 
International Studies on Social Security). However, others 
believed that there would be strong demand for an annual 
conference at European level. Wim did not only belong to the 
latter group but offered to devote resources to and organise such 
an event at Tilburg University in the following year. Later entitled 
‘Social Values, Social Policies’, it was in the wake of this 
conference that a group of invited researchers decided to set up a 
European social policy network which, given its multi-disciplinary 
nature, should be separate from ESA.  
4.3 The ‘zero’ conference in Tilburg 2002 as launch pad for 
ESPAnet 
In January 2002, Jon Kvist organised an international research 
seminar on flexicurity at the SFI in Copenhagen. This event was 
used by the two authors of this text as an opportunity to talk with 
Wim about the upcoming conference in Tilburg. It was hoped 
that the occasion would possibly serve as a platform for a yet-to-
be-defined regular network of European social policy researchers. 
The three of us decided to invite a group of about twenty 
international researchers from across Europe to a meeting 
preceding the start of the Tilburg conference in August 2002. Our 
assumption was that those selected would not only be interested 
in setting up a regular forum of scholarly exchange on social 
policy, but also be prepared to actively contribute to this aim. In 
addition to Wim hosting the Tilburg conference, Jon volunteered 
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to organise what would become the network’s first conference, 
and Jochen a doctoral workshop.  
The Tilburg conference in August 2002 subsequently became 
known as the ‘zero’ conference, as this was where the network 
was founded and its broad contours and early activities were 
decided upon. Rather than an association with fee-paying 
institutional or individual membership, there was broad agreement 
within the group of invited scholars to set up an international 
social policy network with open (non-fee paying) membership. 
The network was to be interdisciplinary in nature and revolve 
around an annual conference, but also organise other activities 
(see below). There was no immediate consensus on its name, until 
Wim’s proposal of ESPAnet (European Social Policy Analysis 
network) was adopted. Jon’s offer to organise the inaugural 
conference in Copenhagen in 2003 was gratefully accepted, and 
Wim and Jochen volunteered to act as the network’s co-chairs.  
At the Tilburg meeting, the first ESPAnet board membership 
was decided upon.2 From the start, its composition was to be 
guided by core principles, such as aiming for gender balance, 
geographical representation and disciplinary diversity. Crucially, all 
board members committed themselves to finding the resources 
for and staging one ESPAnet activity during their (maximum) six 
years on the board (see below). The board discussed and decided 
on the ‘mission’ (or terms of reference) of the network, which 
were drafted by Mary Daly, Jane Lewis and Jochen Clasen in 
September 2002. Most generally, these included the aims of 
facilitating exchange and cooperation among social policy scholars 
in Europe and to provide a forum for and network of 
communication for the development of European social policy 
analysis. More specifically, ESPAnet was to adopt a broad multi-
disciplinary orientation, a commitment to promoting young (early 
career) scholars and advancing comparative social policy research. 
Finally, although not set up as an association but as an open 
network, it was decided that ESPAnet needed a ‘home’, as it 
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should have an internet presence, its own email distribution list 
and a central location for relevant information and exchange. 
Once again, it was Wim who took the initiative in this respect, 
instituting an ESPAnet secretariat at the University of Tilburg, run 
by Minna van Gerven, who was one of his PhD researchers at the 
time. 
4.4 2003: the first ESPAnet conference in Copenhagen  
Jon Kvist organised and hosted the inaugural conference of 
ESPAnet in November 2003 (entitled ‘Changing European 
Societies – the role of Social Policy’) at the SFI in Copenhagen. 
There was overwhelming interest in the event, providing clear 
evidence that there was indeed a considerable appetite amongst 
social policy scholars for a regular forum for exchange and debate. 
In total, 230 paper proposals competed for 100 paper slots. 
Within 18 thematic streams, 32 sessions were organised, each with 
typically three presented papers and a varying number of 
contributed (or reserve) papers. A total of more than 230 scholars 
from European countries and beyond participated. These 
numbers suggested that ESPAnet had the potential to become a 
primary vehicle for international social policy exchange.  
Learning from Copenhagen, the board decided that subsequent 
annual conferences should be guided by certain principles (or 
golden ESPAnet conference rules). First, in order to strengthen 
the quality of cross-national and supra-national research, each 
conference should offer at least one stream on comparative 
methodology and another on EU social policy. Initially, there was 
also the aim to run a regular stream addressing historical aspects 
of social policy. While the first two themes have remained 
prominent features in following annual conferences, the third 
seems to have been somewhat neglected. 
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The second principle was openness. Conference themes, 
stream convenors, and also papers should be found via open calls. 
This commitment to openness was also manifested in the 
rejection of streams run by, and largely for, members of existing 
research networks or research projects. Already in the beginning, 
the annual ESPAnet conferences aimed to be an accessible forum, 
allowing any individual scholars to offer and present papers in any 
stream, rather than a vehicle for research groups and their 
members presenting work in progress exclusively to each other.  
Two more rules related to opportunities for early career 
researchers and a strict deadline for paper submission. The 
promotion of early career social policy researchers was one of the 
early aims adopted by the network. This was to be reflected in 
annual ESPAnet conferences, with stream organisers being 
encouraged to offer, if feasible, at least one paper slot to junior 
scholars. A key reason for prioritising young scholars was to 
reinvigorate the field of international social policy research and 
debate, a goal which the first ESPAnet board considered 
important in order to raise the status and also quality of existing 
and future European social policy research. 
Finally, a conference rule which has been implemented to 
varying degree by conference organisers, is the rejection of papers 
which failed to be submitted by a certain deadline. Common 
nowadays, but less so at the time, the idea was that conference 
participants should be given the opportunity to read papers well in 
advance, as this would improve the chance of better informed and 
thus higher quality discussions. The corollary is that accepted 
papers which were not shared by a given date would be replaced 
in the programme with papers that had been accepted as 
contributed papers. In principle, this also meant that all sessions 
had a full set of papers to be discussed and that as many 
participants as possible adopted an active part in the conference. 
We believe that this rule, while perhaps not always implemented 
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as intended in the early 2000s, is one of the reasons why ESPAnet 
conferences remain popular today. 
Finally, aiming for a good geographical spread, including 
hosting conferences in Central and Eastern European countries, 
has been another explicit network aim. Coming together regularly 
at the annual conference, the ESPAnet board members decided 
on the location of not only the subsequent but the next three or 
four annual conferences. Indeed, by 2019, ESPAnet conferences 
have been staged at 17 venues in 15 different countries, including 
three locations in CEECs (Budapest, 2010; Poznan, 2013 and 
Vilnius, 2018).3  
4.5 Other network activities 
From the start, Wim emphasised that ESPAnet should not only 
organise annual conferences but also other scholarly activities 
such as young (later doctoral) workshops, summer schools, as well 
as thematic (or ‘expert’) workshops. As ESPAnet operates without 
institutional funding or membership fees, the assumption was that 
board members would be prepared to ‘organise’ at least one of 
those activities. In fact, one of the key principles was that board 
members would commit to host (and find funding for) at least 
one ESPAnet event during their time on the board. 
All three activities were launched in ESPAnet’s first year of 
operation and, once again, Wim led from the front, hosting the 
first thematic seminar, on ‘welfare and the social bond’, at the 
University of Tilburg in March 2003. Bringing together PhD 
students with established scholars, Jochen organised the first 
doctoral workshop at the University of Stirling in May 2003 
(Social Policy in a Changing Europe) and Yuri Kazepov hosted 
the first ESPAnet summer school (on the ‘local dimensions of 
social exclusion in Europe’) at the University of Urbino in 
July/August 2003.4  
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Another activity was a competition for the doctoral researcher 
prize, awarded to the best paper presented by a PhD student in 
any of the above-mentioned events during a particular year. To 
this purpose, ESPAnet linked up with the Journal of European Social 
Policy (JESP). The first (2003) winner was Ingela Naumann for her 
paper on ‘Child care and feminism in West Germany and Sweden’ 
(published in JESP, 15 (1), 2005). Since then, ESPAnet and JESP 
board members have continued to join up as judges for the annual 
doctoral researcher prize competition. More generally, over the 
years, JESP has become all but ESPAnet’s ‘house journal’, 
manifested also in one dedicated ESPAnet board membership 
place on the JESP editorial board, and vice-versa. 
The quick and early success of ESPAnet was evidenced also by 
the network’s role in promoting the exchange of social policy 
research and scholarship not only across but also within individual 
European countries. After the success of early annual 
conferences, individual scholars approached the ESPAnet board 
about helping with the setting up of domestic social policy 
networks. Anxious not to compete and potentially undermine 
already existing national associations (for example in the UK or 
Finland), the ESPAnet board eventually agreed to assist countries 
where there was a clear demand for the development of a national 
ESPAnet association. Especially Trudie Knijn (Wim’s successor as 
the network’s chair) was instrumental in supporting domestic 
groups and in clarifying the relationship between ESPAnet and 
national associations. Running their own conferences and 
workshops, there are now more than ten active national ESPAnet 
associations across Europe. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Not even twenty years old, ESPAnet has established itself very 
quickly as a much-valued forum of international social policy 
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debate in Europe. And although it would perhaps be too strong to 
claim that no network at all would have emerged without Wim, 
we are certain that without his invaluable input it is highly unlikely 
it would have developed as quickly and successfully as it did – and 
it would not have been called ESPAnet! Thus, for those of us who 
appreciate the network’s role in the promotion of European social 
policy scholarship and exchange, Wim’s key contribution to the 
emergence of ESPAnet and the path it pursued cannot be 
overstated.  
NOTES 
1. As a warning, this short essay is an attempt of remembering events which 
occurred about two decades ago and our recollection might not always stand 
up against rigorous empirical testing. As somebody who knows a thing or 
two about opinions and perceptions, we hope Wim may find it in himself to 
forgive us. 
2. In addition to the two co-chairs, the first ESPAnet board included Giuliano 
Bonoli, Mary Daly, Ana Guillen, Valeria Fargion, Olli Kangas, Yuri Kazepov, 
Zinka Kolaric, Jon Kvist, Stephan Lessenich, Jane Lewis, Philip Manow, 
August Österle, Bruno Palier, Joakim Palme, Axel West Pedersen and Alan 
Walker. 
3.  CEE countries (CEECs) are EU member states which were part of the 
former Eastern bloc. The following countries are included: Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/artikelen/nieuws/2018/31/internation 
al-road-haulage-over-4-percent-up-in-2017/cee-countries--ceecs-- (accessed 
23 March 2020). 
4. Information on early, subsequent and current ESPAnet activities can be 
found here: https://blogg.hioa.no/espanet/ (accessed 23 March 2020). 
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5 The Welfare Regime Debate 
Revisited: Some Epistemological 
and Methodological Observations 
Wil Arts 
5.1 Introduction 
In the late 1990’s Tilburg University’s Faculty of Social and 
Behavioural Sciences was in dire straits. The consequences were 
several rounds of reorganization and budget cuts. The department 
of social security studies was shut down and the sociological 
department was first decimated and then reconstructed. From the 
point of view of sociological research this development proved a 
blessing in disguise. From inside the faculty several high profile 
social security researchers, such as Ruud Muffels and Wim van 
Oorschot, were transferred to the sociology department just as 
specialists in the methodology of international comparative 
research, such as Loek Halman and Ruud Luijkx. From outside 
came Matthijs Kalmijn, a prolific researcher. The new 
constellation of the sociology department generated considerable 
benefits in terms of synergy in the field of comparative cross-
national research. Several important books (for example, Ter 
Meulen, Arts and Muffels, 2001; Goul Andersen, Clasen, van 
Oorschot, Halvorsen, 2002; Arts, Hagenaars and Halman, 2003, 
Halman, Luijkx and van Zundert, 2005) and a great number of 
articles in international journals (for example, Kalmijn, 2002; 
Luijkx, Róbert and De Graaf, 2002; van Oorschot and 
Abrahamson, 2003; Muffels and Fouarge, 2004; van Oorschot, 
Arts and Halman, 2005; Halman and Draulans, 2006) were the 
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front 
 42 
result. As chairman of the sociology department I counted my 
blessings.  
One of the topics of the new comparative research programme 
pertained to the question of whether welfare state typologies and 
their underlying theories had explanatory and/or heuristic value 
for understanding people’s attitudes and actions. By asking this 
question several Tilburg sociologists (for example, Goodin, 
Heady, Muffels and Dirven, 1999; Arts and Gelissen, 2001, 2002; 
van Oorschot, 2003, 2007) got involved in the debate about 
welfare state regime types that has been going on since the 
publication of Esping-Andersen’s The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (1990). Twice John Gelissen and I tried to draw up the 
balance sheet of this debate (Arts and Gelissen, 2002, 2010). 
Already a year after our last instalment two new important critical 
surveys of Esping Andersen’s seminal work and the debate that it 
evoked, were published (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011; 
Powel and Barrientos, 2011). Many new contributions followed in 
the years to come. It is perhaps a good time, now Wim van 
Oorschot is retiring, to take once again a glance at the welfare 
regime debate. After all even in his Leuven period, freed from the 
shackles of the Tilburg programme, he kept working with welfare 
state regime typologies (for example, Roosma, Gelissen, van 
Oorschot, 2013, 2016; van der Waal, de Koster, van Oorschot, 
2013; Laenen, Rossetti, van Oorschot, 2019). I will focus my essay 
on only a few epistemological and methodological issues that 
popped up in the debate. 
5.2 A modern classic 
In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism Esping-Andersen treated 
the welfare state as a societal type sui generis, that is, a novel 
phenomenon in the history of capitalist societies. He was of the 
opinion that the existing theoretical models of this phenomenon 
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were inadequate. Therefore sociological reconceptualization and 
re-theorization was needed. He also believed that only 
comparative empirical research would adequately disclose the 
fundamental properties that unite or divide welfare states. He 
argued that there is neither such a thing as ‘the’ welfare state nor 
are there only ‘unique’ welfare states. What he assumed and found 
was a clustering of welfare states into three highly diverse regime-
types, each organized around its own discrete logic of 
organization, stratification, and societal integration. He labelled 
them respectively conservative, liberal, and social democratic. He 
also found that welfare states that more or less closely 
approximate the liberal ideal type can be found in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, the social-democratic ideal type in Scandinavian 
countries and the conservative type in continental Europe. Some 
countries, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, proved to be 
hybrid cases.  
In 2015 a special issue of the Journal of European Social Policy 
(JESP) was published with the title ‘25 years of The Three Worlds 
of Welfare Capitalism’. In their introductory article to this issue 
the editors (Emmenegger et al., 2015) remarked that Three 
Worlds in the meantime has become a classic. They argue that this 
is evidenced by a large and increasing number of references to the 
book. Looking at citations (by way of Google Scholar) they found 
a remarkable pattern of growing interest reaching a breath-taking 
1600 citations in 2013 alone. While writing this essay I repeated 
their search and looked at the cumulative number of citations at 
that moment in time (Google Scholar, accessed 4 July 2019). The 
result was a stunning 34436 citations since 1990. If we compare 
this score with modern classics in sociology this is higher than for 
example, Talcott Parsons got with The Social System (26645), 
Robert King Merton with Social Theory and Social Structure (31285) 
or George Casper Homans with Social Behavior (14066). In political 
science Paul Kennedy with The Rise and Fall of Great Powers got 
8788 references and Robert Putnam with Bowling Alone 20368. 
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Only John Rawls got more citations with A Theory of Justice 
(81486).  
Emmenegger et. al. (2015) found that the JESP was the 
academic journal with the most references to the Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism between 1991 and 2013, one-third of all JESP 
articles over this period of time and even 50 per cent in 2013. A 
content analysis of these articles indicated that this book has 
obtained a paradigmatic status and that its claims are often taken 
for granted rather than challenged.  
5.3 Paradigm or research programme? 
This conclusion was elaborated in the same issue by van 
Kersbergen and Vis (2015). They avowed that it is difficult to 
overstate the importance of The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism and its many innovations. They also argued, however, 
that the recent welfare regime literature that takes Esping-
Andersen’s paradigmatic study as starting point or key reference 
has started to show signs of doing normal science in the sense of 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Many 
welfare state researchers problematize, theorize and do research 
within Esping-Andersen’s explanatory framework. They slowly 
accumulate details in accord with the paradigm without 
questioning or challenging the underlying assumptions. This is, 
according to van Kersbergen and Vis, not helpful for asking 
interesting new explanatory questions about the worlds of welfare 
capitalism. Esping-Andersen’s three worlds’ typology and its 
underlying theory is therefore at risk of becoming an unproductive 
intellectual straightjacket. 
There are, however, several problems with using Kuhn’s 
perspective as van Kersbergen and Vis do. First, Kuhn has been 
called an epistemological subjectivist, irrationalist and relativist by 
several philosophers of science (Stegmüller, 1979: 132) and even 
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an epistemological nihilist (Quine, 1969: 87–88). Kuhn asserts that 
the question of which paradigm is accepted by a particular 
scientific community is a question of politics and propaganda and 
not of surplus value in terms of epistemological criteria. Secondly, 
Kuhn is much more positive about knowledge accumulation by 
way of practicing normal science than van Kersbergen and Vis 
are. Their position sooner resembles the views of critical 
rationalists as Popper (1970) and Watkins (1970) who criticize 
Kuhn for his irrationality. Lastly, Kuhn used his theory for 
explaining events in the history of the natural sciences. He has 
always been very reluctant to apply his theory to the social 
sciences that are in his view preparadigmatic.  
Van Kersbergen and Vis refer in another part of their article 
approvingly to the work of the methodologist Gerring (2001). In 
my opinion they would be well advised to take his judgement 
seriously also with regard to Kuhn’s work. Especially where 
Gerring (2001: 15) refers to Kuhn’s belief that in underdeveloped, 
preparadigmatic sciences there is no such thing as normal science. 
Work in these sciences stems according to Kuhn from the diverse 
impulses of myriad methods, frameworks, and subfields, each 
with its own more or less specialized vocabulary and parochial 
sensibility. It is explicitly constructed to be not only applicable to 
the natural sciences, but also to the underdeveloped social 
sciences. Gerring advises to use Lakatos’ (1970, 1971) methodoly 
of scientific research programmes instead. Lakatos is in agreement 
with Kuhn that philosophy of science without history of science is 
empty, but makes an additional point aimed against Kuhn by 
declaring that history of science without philosophy of science is 
blind. According to his methodology a scientific research 
programme consists of methodological rules: some tell us what 
paths of research to avoid (negative heuristic), and others what 
paths to pursue (positive heuristic). All scientific research 
programmes may be characterized by their hard core. The 
negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to try to refute this 
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hard core. Instead we must articulate auxiliary hypotheses that 
form a protective belt around this hard core and we must direct 
severe tests to these hypotheses. The positive heuristic gives 
indications about the best form and content of the auxiliary 
hypotheses. Anomalies lead to changes in the protective belt and 
not in the hard core. A research programme is successful if this 
process leads to progressive problem shifts and not successful if it 
leads to degenerative shifts. It is however difficult to answer the 
question of whether a particular research programme is in a 
progressive or a degenerative phase. Criticism of a programme is a 
long and often frustrating process and one must treat budding 
programmes leniently. Van Kersbergen and Vis have done some 
preliminary work that leads to the impression that the three-
worlds paradigm is in a degenerative phase, but they have to do 
much more work to actually prove this. 
5.4 Ideal types, real types and cases 
In their article van Kersbergen and Vis (2015) critically address 
still another issue: the confusion in the welfare regime literature 
between ideal types, real types and cases. Van Kersbergen made 
this point earlier in his contribution to the Routledge Handbook of the 
Welfare State (2013). He argued that Esping-Andersen himself in 
his landmark study was already confusing his typological method 
with the ideal type approach and cases with types. These are in his 
opinion different breeds of study designed for different purposes, 
each using a different methodological approach. Van Kersbergen 
and Vis elaborate on this idea as follows. Ideal types are, 
according to them, theoretical constructs whereas typologies are 
empirical classificatory devices that reduce observed complexity 
by cataloguing empirical cases as meaningful representatives of 
some relevant dimensions. In an ideal-typical analysis the question 
of ‘goodness of fit’ is the crucial one. Do specific empirical cases 
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correspondent more or less or not at all with certain ideal types? 
In a typological analysis, however, ‘goodness of fit’ plays no part. 
Empirical cases always find a place in the classificatory device. 
Cases with similar or identical scores on theoretically relevant 
empirical dimensions (variables) are classified as belonging to the 
same type. A little bit earlier Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) 
and Rice (2013) made more or less the same point. All these 
critics agree on the usefulness of the ideal-typical method but 
disagree and have their doubts about how the participants in the 
welfare regimes debate use the typological method. 
To understand this discord one has to realize that the welfare 
regime debate is part of a long sociological tradition rooted in 
deductive reasoning and the use of ideal types. Ferragina and 
Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) refer to Max Weber for the locus classicus 
of this tradition and cite his programmatic statement that for an 
adolescent science as sociology, combining the construction of 
ideal types with building formal theory is the proper way of 
analysing and mastering the complexity of social life. What did 
Weber actually say about this combination? He especially 
elaborated on it in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1921 [1972]) and 
more in detail in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (1922 
[1988]). As Hempel (1965: 155–156) has however correctly 
argued, he is clearer as to what ideal types are not, than what they 
are. Weber describes ideal types or pure types as constructions of 
the mind. In its purity they are hardly anywhere empirically 
observable in real life. They are the results of isolating and 
exaggerating certain aspects of concrete empirical phenomena. 
Ideal-typical statements are meant to perform heuristic functions. 
They function as standards with which cases can be compared. 
They can be seen as limiting cases against which reality can be 
measured. As limiting cases they only appear in reality seldom 
under very specific conditions when they take on their most 
extreme possible values. Ideal types are neither simple concepts 
nor hypotheses. They are theoretical constructs and contain 
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orienting statements that offer guidance to the construction of 
hypotheses. Weber writes that there are parallels between ideal 
types in the social sciences and certain idealizations in physics and 
economics (confer Lind, 1993). Just as in these sciences empirical 
evidence can be used to calibrate the degree of approximation of a 
case type with the ideal type.  
In his analysis of typological methods in the natural and the 
social sciences Hempel (1965: 171) came long ago to the following 
still valid conclusion about the usefulness of ideal types: 
‘(…) ideal types can serve their purpose only if they are interpreted as 
theoretical systems, i.e., by (a) specifying a list of characteristics with 
which the theory is to deal, (b) formulating a set of hypotheses in 
terms of those characteristics, (c) giving those characteristics an 
empirical interpretation, which assigns to the theory a specific domain 
of application, and (d), as a long-range objective, incorporating the 
theoretical system, as a special case, into a more comprehensive 
theory’. 
If you take this conclusion as a sound advice it is especially in the 
theoretical sphere that still a lot of work has to be done in the 
welfare regime modelling business. 
It is a little ironic, conclude Powell and Barrientos (2011) in 
their audit of the modelling business, that Esping-Andersen’s 
work aiming to lay bare the theoretical substance of welfare states 
has led to a largely a-theoretical debate. In their opinion much 
investment has gone into the wrong place by producing different 
(theoretically informed) typologies and (purely empirical) 
taxonomies instead of driving the debate in the direction intended 
by Esping-Andersen, that is, identifying ‘ideal types’ as a necessary 
prelude to further theorization. Aspalter (2011, 2019a, b) has 
arrived at the same kind of conclusion by stating that despite the 
numerous discussions and reviews of Esping-Andersen’s welfare 
regime typology, the most vital element of his theory, its ideal-
typical approach has received the least attention. What did get 
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attention was the categorization of his cases, (that is, 18 OECD 
countries) in real-typical terms ranging from prototypes to 
hybrids. Others followed in his footsteps by constructing 
comparative typologies that commonly seek to classify empirical 
cases, sometimes rather inductively. Comparing these real types 
delivered a very detailed picture that proved to be, however, much 
more sensitive to short-term, local and programme-level changes 
than the theoretically grounded ideal types. In a rejoinder to his 
critics Esping-Andersen (1999) admitted that one of the 
problematic characteristics of his typology is that it is inherently 
static. It provides only a snapshot of welfare capitalism at one 
point in time (that is, 1980) and handles the three worlds of 
welfare capitalism as if they are frozen landscapes. Therefore, his 
typology does not easily capture mutations or the birth of new 
species. It is only valid as long as history stands still, which it has 
not. Since 1980 a proliferation of ideal types, real types and cases 
has taken place (Aspalter, 2019b), but the original regimes and 
cases have been quite resilient (Arts, 2013: 14).  
In the welfare regime debate at least two radical solutions to 
the aforementioned problems are proposed. One is suggested by 
Rice (2013) who contends that the welfare regime concept should 
be stripped of its historical-geographical connotations and should 
be transformed from an empirical typology into an ideal-typical 
framework. Such a framework should take the emergence of 
different welfare cultures and welfare institutions in Europe as a 
starting point, but distilling from these religiously and 
geographically rooted traditions three ideal-typical dimensions: 1) 
welfare culture, referring to fundamental ideas about the 
individual and the state, 2) welfare institutions, referring to laws, 
regulations and actor networks occupied with the provision of 
welfare, and 3) social-structural effects of welfare policies. The 
resulting framework is a cube, or in methodological terms, a three-
dimensional property space. Such an ideal-typical three-
dimensional welfare regime framework has according to her 
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several advantages: 1) It is not limited to Western welfare states 
but can also been used to analyse social policy developments in 
other parts of the world; 2) it can be applied not only to welfare 
states as seemingly monolithic entities, but also to welfare 
regions/localities and welfare programmes; 3) welfare states, sub-
states and programmes need not by definition be regarded as 
congruent across all three ideal-typical dimensions; 4) each of the 
ideal-typical dimensions can be organized into two juxtaposed 
axes: conservatism versus liberalism or socially conservative 
versus socially transformative effects on the one hand, and 
solidarism versus residualism or economically conservative versus 
economically transformative effects on the other hand. Because 
the conservatism-liberalism and solidarism-residualism axes are 
explicitly understood as spectra or continua rather than boxes it 
offers an elegant solution to the problem that in empirical reality, 
welfare states or systems often appear as hybrid cases of Esping-
Andersen’s fixated welfare regime categories.  
Whereas Rice (2013) maintains that categories of a typology 
need not necessarily be mutually exclusive, van Kersbergen and 
Vis (2015) insist that they should. A typology that intends to 
catalogue existing cases or real types as meaningful representatives 
of some theoretically relevant dimensions, should not only be 
exhaustive but also mutually exclusive, that is, an empirical case 
must be assigned to one type only. In order to be an analytically 
useful empirical classificatory device it should be meaningful, 
reliable and efficient in reducing complexity. Van Kersbergen and 
Vis proclaim that turning to developing theoretically informed 
ideal types and starting to examine to what degree welfare states 
correspond to these ideal types, as for example Rice does, would 
clearly be a step forward, because it clarifies the typology/ideal 
type confusion and it introduces a more explicit theoretical 
starting point. However, this would not move us beyond the 
normal science of the welfare modelling business. Really 
innovative and revolutionary would be to develop explanatory 
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typologies that move beyond purely classificatory exercises. For 
such explanatory typologies to work, the existence of pre-existing 
theory is crucial. Therefore, van Kersbergen en Vis suggest that 
the field should rethink the theoretically interesting question 
about what the current and most relevant theoretical substance of 
the welfare state is. What is it that, ultimately, we are – or should 
be – interested in? They are of the opinion that we focus on the 
socially relevant outcomes that welfare regimes produce, because 
these fundamentally affect people’s interests, capabilities, life 
chances, and life cycles. We should study the welfare state’s role in 
producing or moderating inequality, poverty, stratification, 
mobility, education, employment et cetera, and not the goodness 
of fit of all kinds of typologies. 
5.5 Conclusion and discussion  
The welfare regime debate has been going on for 30 years, but it is 
still not clear what the balance is. On the credit side entries can be 
recorded such as Esping-Andersen’s success in incorporating in 
his theory feminists’ critique about his neglect of the family and 
the different positions of men and women in formal and informal 
work. Another positive entry is that an at first sight competing 
theory-cum-typology regarding production regimes, that asserts 
that the welfare state is shaped by how the production in societies 
is organized, at closer inspection appeared to be compatible. Still 
another positive point is the great number of research projects 
that have been initiated to elaborate on and test Esping-
Andersen’s ideas and the affluence of publications that are 
offshoots of these projects. On the debit side, however, are items 
as the lack of investment in theory construction and the confusion 
of the methodology of ideal types, real types and the 
categorization of cases. One can differ in opinion about the 
virtues and vices of normal science (that is, the slow accumulation 
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of knowledge), but what is definitely missing is one or more 
competing research programmes.  
Van Kersbergen and Vis (2015) ended their article by citing a, 
not so often quoted, passage in Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds 
of Welfare Capitalism (1990: 141) that says:  
‘(…) be it contemporary Scandinavia, Western Europe, or even 
North America, the welfare state is becoming deeply embedded in the 
everyday experience of virtually every citizen. Our personal life is 
structured by the welfare state, and so is the entire economy. Given 
the magnitude and the centrality of the welfare state, it is unlikely that 
we shall understand much of contemporary society unless it becomes 
part of our model’.  
They express the wish that this key observation of Esping-
Andersen will inspire welfare state research for the next 25 years. 
One could with good reason argue that this is exactly what Wim 
van Oorschot has done in the past decades. In an impressive 
number of articles in refereed international journals he has written 
about how welfare state institutions have influenced people’s 
everyday life and how people’s actions and moral sentiments have 
had an impact on these institutions in turn. These articles are most 
of the time written with colleagues and/or PhD students. Now he 
is retiring it is up to his former PhD students to hold high the 
torch of welfare state research by following in his footsteps. 
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6. Revisiting the ‘Dependent Variable 




Quantitative comparative analyses require data, and working with 
data involves conceptualisation and measurement. The pros and 
cons of different types of data for analysing the development of 
welfare states and social policy are extensively discussed in 
research. Two important shifts in this debate can be identified. 
The first was the move from analyses based on social 
expenditures to social rights in the late 1980s. The second is more 
recent (and ongoing), and marks a transition from social rights to 
benefit recipiency. Whereas prominent scholars such as Korpi 
(1989) and Esping-Andersen (1990) were important promotors of 
the social rights perspective in comparative welfare state research, 
Wim is pioneering the analysis of benefit recipiency. I write this in 
present tense as I believe (and hope) Wim will continue this line 
of research.  
I first met Wim when I was a Phd student at Stockholm 
University in the late 1990s. Wim was already an established 
scholar. I remember that he always treated us students with great 
respect, expressing a genuine interest for the work that we did (or 
planned to do). For me, this was important. I was very impressed 
with Wim’s work on deservingness, conditionality, and non-take- 
up of social benefits, which he carried out around this time. Later 
on, it inspired me to study how countries had organised their 
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means-tested social assistance programmes. Today, almost two 
decades later, Wim’s research is once again attracting my 
unreserved attention. With great interest, I have followed his 
recent work on using socio-economic surveys (such as EU-SILC) 
to analyse the number of benefit recipients and the amount of 
income that they receive. By utilising this new source of social 
policy data, it is not an understatement to say that Wim has 
revitalised the debate about the ‘dependent variable problem’ in 
comparative welfare state research.  
What can we learn from Wim’s analyses of benefit recipiency? I 
would like to bring out three key advancements of research: the 
theoretical positioning of benefit recipiency as a mediating 
variable at the micro-level linking social rights and social 
expenditures at the macro level, the discovery of new trade-offs in 
social policymaking, and the emphasis on the complementariness 
between different types of social policy data.  
Below, I will briefly present Wim’s work on each of these 
topics, and discuss how it contributes to existing research. Three 
studies by Wim and his collaborators have been essential for this 
chapter. The first study is published in the European Journal of Social 
Security as a single authored article (van Oorschot, 2013). The 
second study is a CEPS working paper written together with Anne 
Reinstadler (van Oorschot and Reinstadler, 2013). The third study 
is co-authored with Adeline Otto, and published in the Journal of 
European Social Policy (Otto and van Oorschot, 2019).  
6.2 Linking social rights and expenditure data 
Before Wim started to work with survey-based benefit recipiency 
data, state-of-the-art in quantitative welfare state research was to 
use social expenditures, or to follow a rights-based approach in 
the conceptualisation and measurement of welfare states and 
social policy. The advantages and disadvantages of social 
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expenditure and social rights data have been extensively discussed 
in the literature. As this is not the place to delve deeply into this 
debate, I refer those who are interested to Wim’s main arguments 
and his critical perspective in the studies mentioned above. In this 
section, I will merely raise a few issues that motivate us to devote 
more time analysing benefit recipiency data. Much of this 
discussion is centred on Wim’s approach of positioning benefit 
recipiency data as the missing individual-level link that binds 
together social rights and social expenditures at the country level. 
Social expenditure is still the most commonly used data source 
in comparative welfare state research, probably because data from 
the national accounts are easy to access and regularly updated by 
several international organisations for a large number of countries. 
However, it is only a crude approximation of welfare effort. 
Besides being heavily influenced by changes in business cycles and 
demographic trends, problems appear in the classification of social 
protection into different programme types. Social spending is also 
affected by the tax claw-back of transfer income (Ferrarini and 
Nelson, 2003; Adema and Ladaique, 2005) and whether 
administration costs are included or not (De Deken and Kittel, 
2007).  
Social rights data focus on legislative structures, with indicators 
being based on eligibility criteria, entitlement levels, and rules of 
financing. The social rights perspective was introduced to research 
as a means to analyse the role of distributional conflict for the 
development of social citizenship (Korpi, 2010).1 Inspiration came 
from Marshall’s (1950) ideas about the rights and duties associated 
with the expansion of welfare states in the post-World War II 
period. Nowadays, social rights data are not only used to analyse 
driving forces, like the role of workers mobilisation or 
globalisation for welfare state development. They are also 
extensively used in analyses of outcomes, such as poverty (Nelson, 
2003; Bäckman, 2009; Bäckman and Ferrarini; 2010; Alm et al., 
2020) and mortality (Ferrarini and Norström, 2010; Palme and 
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Norström, 2010; Nelson and Fritzell, 2014).2 The social rights 
perspective gets us closer to the policymaking process, but it does 
not consider how benefits are actually used. It is precisely here 
where benefit recipiency data come into play.  
Most discussions on the conceptualisation and measurement of 
welfare states and social policy centre on content validity (that is, 
the extent to which data provide a complete description of the true 
nature of the welfare state). Wim approaches the validity question 
from another (and to my mind more fruitful) angle, asking how 
different types of data on the welfare state and social policies are 
theoretically related. I have borrowed Figure 6.1 from one of 














Source: van Oorschot (2013). 
Figure 6.1 The relationship between social rights, benefit recipiency and 
social spending 
The figure shows how Wim portrays the relationships between 
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According to this theoretical (or conceptual) framework, the 
number of benefit recipients, and the amount of money they 
receive from the welfare state, is the result of eligibility criteria and 
entitlement levels (as codified in social rights data) being applied 
to a population in need. Social expenditure in the national 
accounts simply reflects the number of people in receipt of a 
benefit, multiplied by the amount of money that is distributed 
through the system. 
Wim’s positioning of benefit recipiency between social rights 
and social expenditures may seem trivial. However, in its 
simplicity, the implications of these macro-micro and micro-
macro level links are far-reaching, not only for theory-building but 
also for the possibilities of research to provide meaningful policy 
recommendations. What matters for people is probably not 
spending per se, but the extent to which economic risks during the 
life course are protected by the state, especially those associated 
with old age, sickness, disability, work accidents, and employment.  
Data on benefit recipients provide a direct estimate of how 
those rights of economic compensation are exercised in real life, 
which may differ from the ways in which social policies are 
codified in legislative frameworks. The extent to which the 
separation of social spending into rights and benefit recipients 
changes our understanding of the fundamental factors driving 
welfare state development is an important topic for future 
research that has attracted scholarly attention only in the last year 
or so. According to some new preliminary results, dominant 
economic (de-industrialisation), sociological (left partisan politics), 
and political science (constitutional veto points) explanations for 
the development of welfare states seem to have limited 
applicability as the analysis shifts from social rights (or 
expenditures) to benefit receipts, at least in the area of 
unemployment (Otto, 2020). 
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6.3 Trade-offs in social policymaking 
Trade-offs are unavoidable in social policymaking, and as 
researchers, it is important to identify and specify them correctly, 
as well as to analyse the multifaceted consequences of different 
policy choices. Several of these trade-offs are described in the 
literature, such as the inverse relationship between target 
efficiency and the effectiveness of social transfers to reduce 
poverty (Nelson, 2004), or the disincentive effects of generous 
social benefits on labour supply (Katz and Meier, 1990). Other 
important trade-offs are left to discover. The one between access 
rates and benefit amounts raised by Wim is a recent example.  
Data on the receipt of social benefits based on socio-economic 
surveys can be analysed in different ways. Compared to 
administrative data, socio-economic surveys do not only contain 
information about the receipt of a social benefit, but also how 
much income each individual (or household) actually have from 
the welfare state. Based on this information, we can construct two 
variables: the access rate and the transfer share. The access rate 
shows the portion of the target population that receives a social 
benefit. The transfer share shows the size of benefits as a fraction 
of the total income in the target population. The calculation of 
access rates and transfer shares differ somewhat depending on 
whether the receipt of benefits and transfer incomes are analysed 
at individual, household, or country level (Otto, 2018). 
I have borrowed also Figure 6.2 from one of Wim’s studies 
above. It is a scatterplot of access rates and transfer shares 
(originally denoted ‘amount of benefits’ by Wim) in the working 
age population of European countries. The access rate is the share 
of people in active ages that are in receipt of a social benefit. The 
transfer share is the ratio between transfer income and total 
income in the working age population (measured at the individual 
level but aggregated to country averages in Figure 6.2).  


























Source: van Oorschot (2013). 
Figure 6.2 Access rates and transfer shares in 27 European countries, 
2003–2008 
The number of benefit recipients are adjusted to the size of the 
non-employed population in active ages. Thus, the country 
differences revealed by the data are not due to the size of the 
needy population (that is, those not in employment). The analysis 
included the following programmes: social assistance, 
unemployment benefits, sickness and disability benefits, old age 
benefits, and survivors’ benefits. Data for 2003–2008 were 
pooled. The solid horizontal and vertical lines show the axis 
means, whereas the dotted vertical line indicates the tipping point, 
above which the proportion of people in the working age 
population that receives a benefit is larger than the proportion of 
people who are non-employed. 
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The trade-off between access rates and transfer shares is clearly 
visible in the data. In countries where many people receive 
benefits, the size of transfer income tend to be low. Conversely, 
countries with a low number of recipients are more likely to have 
higher benefits. As pointed out by Wim, this trade-off between 
access and levels of transfer income is not only empirically 
intriguing but also theoretically interesting. The scattering of 
countries along the two dimensions does not mirror the old 
distinction between universalism and selectivity in social 
policymaking (Titmuss, 1968). Nor does it fully support previous 
categorisations of countries into different model system types 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
The Nordic welfare states, with universalism as one of their 
essential trademarks, are scattered in the lower right corner with 
high access rates, but relatively meagre benefits. It should be 
noted that income replacement in some of the Nordic countries 
has eroded extensively in recent decades, in part because of an 
insufficient indexing of earnings-ceilings for benefit purposes in 
major social insurance schemes (Bäckman and Nelson, 2017).  
At the opposite corner of the diagonal, we would expect to 
find welfare states with strong traits of selectivity (that is, mean-
tested benefits targeting the poor), such as Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. Instead, we find in this corner the Southern European 
countries, with their dualistic approach to social policy. 
Comparatively generous benefits are here provided to a small 
group of labour market insiders, leaving those outside the labour 
market less protected (Ferrera, 1996). The Eastern European 
countries do not form a separate cluster, as suggested elsewhere 
(Cerami, 2006; Fenger, 2007). Instead, the Eastern European 
countries (except for Poland) resemble the countries of 
continental Europe, with average levels on both dimensions of 
access and transfer shares. 
Despite providing new input to the ongoing (and never-ending) 
discussion about welfare state regimes, Wim’s approach to analyse 
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access rates and transfer shares from socio-economic surveys is 
useful in assessments of policy change and crisis packages.3 For 
example, in a follow-up study, Wim and his colleague Adeline 
show that several European governments tried to keep budgetary 
control during the global financial crisis (beginning in 2007/2008), 
either by combining broader benefit access with lower benefits, or 
the other way around (Otto and van Oorschot (2019). 
6.4 Complementarities in data 
For many years, scholars competed to have the best data for the 
comparative analysis of welfare states and social policy, 
particularly in the area of cash benefits. Luckily, this trench 
warfare is now changing in favour of a more fertile debate 
focusing on the complementarities between different types of 
social policy data. Wim was not the first scholar to advocate such 
a shift in perspective (see Green-Pedersen, 2007; Kühner, 2007; 
De Deken and Clasen, 2011), but his contribution is nonetheless 
noteworthy.  
To illustrate the complementary character of social rights and 
benefit recipient data, Wim posed three essential questions 
(slightly revised below) for any analysis of the quality of social 
protection:  
o Which needs are covered?  
o Do people in need have access to the support that is 
offered?  
o Does the available support match established needs among 
those with access? 
Wim concluded that social rights data are indispensable in 
addressing the first question, while benefit recipient data is crucial 
for addressing the latter two questions. I agree with Wim that a 
more complete analysis of social protection needs to answer 
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front 
 
 66 
multiple questions utilising different types of data. An example 
based on my own experience of working with social rights data 
may help to clarify this point. 
In the fall of 2009, we submitted a report to the Swedish 
Government in association with its second presidency of the 
European Union (Palme, et al., 2009). The purpose of this report 
was to map systematically the social protection systems in the 
European Union. Based on social rights data, we discovered that 
social insurance net replacement rates in several Eastern 
European countries were on par with or even higher than those of 
the old EU member states.4 Had the Eastern European countries 
already catched up on social policy developments in Western 
Europe?  
To investigate this further, we turned to social expenditure 
data. Much to our surprise, despite comparatively generous 
benefit levels, the Eastern European countries spent considerably 
less money on social insurance (even when adjusted for 
differences in the size of the needy population). Our tentative 
conclusion was that eligibility criteria and labour market structures 
in Eastern European countries seriously restricted the extent to 
which people had access to social insurance. Wim’s approach to 
analyse benefit recipiency data based on survey data (such as EU-
SILC), would undoubtedly helped us substantiate this claim 
empirically, as well as provided better guidance for effective policy 
reform (Nelson and Nieuwenhuis, 2019).  
6.5 Discussion 
The conceptualisation and measurement of welfare states and 
social policy will continue to be a prominent issue in comparative 
welfare state research. Not only because it is such a fun topic to 
work with, but also because it affects the research questions that 
we are able to address, and the findings that we discover. 
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Academic research evolves slowly, but sometimes significant 
shifts appear that redefine how we approach our topics. Quite late 
in his successful career, Wim started to address the ‘dependent 
variable problem’ in welfare state research, drawing upon what we 
had learned so far and contributing new insights. 
Will Wim’s contribution to the ‘dependent variable debate’ 
change how we pursue quantitative welfare state analyses? It is far 
too early to start counting citations. Nevertheless, there are other 
means to establish impact in the social sciences. One alternative is 
to think more carefully about how you will approach your own 
research, when you have gained knowledge by Wim’s work on 
survey-based recipiency data. Personally, I believe that it will be 
difficult in the future to base my empirical analyses solely on 
social rights data (yes, I am a former student of Walter Korpi and 
trained in the Stockholm school of comparative social policy), 
without at least considering how the results will turn out using 
micro-level data on the benefit recipients themselves. I see no 
apparent reason why other scholars should think differently.  
NOTES 
1. The dominating theoretical paradigm on welfare state development up to the 
1990s used structural functionalist explanations describing social policies 
mainly as products of industrialisation and economic development (Wilensky, 
1975). 
2. Other examples of outcomes for which social rights data have been used is 
material deprivation (Nelson, 2012), subjective health (Ferrarini et al., 2014), 
unemployment (Sjöberg, 2000), job insecurity and subjective well-being 
(Sjöberg, 2010), employment commitment (Esser, 2005), gender equality 
(Korpi, 2000; Korpi et al., 2013), fertility (Ferrarini, 2006; Billingsley and 
Ferrarini, 2014), and trust (Birnbaum et al., 2017). 
3. A google scholar search of ’welfare state regimes’ yields around 1600000 hits, 
and roughly 20000 hits for 2018 alone. 
4. Net replacement rates show the extent to which benefits replace earned 
income in periods of work incapacity. These indicators are usually based on 
model family analyses techniques (Bradshaw et al., 1993), in which 
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entitlements are calculated for stylized households based on national 
legislation. 
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7. The Declining Poverty Reducing 
Capacity of Social Security: Base or 
Superstructure? 
Bea Cantillon 
‘It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, 
but their social existence that determines their consciousness’ (Karl 
Marx, 1859 [1993]. 
7.1 Introduction 
The study of deservingness perceptions, to which Wim van 
Oorschot made an important contribution (van Oorschot, 2000, 
2006), leads to the notion that the generosity of social protection 
is related to public opinions, legitimacy, and ideas about 
deservingness. In particular, it suggests that a narrowing of the 
legitimacy base of social redistribution is the cause of the declining 
poverty reducing capacity of social security schemes in many 
contemporary welfare states. Van Oorschot writes:  
‘That is, in neo-liberal and communitarian thinking about welfare, 
which is popular among policy elites at European and national levels, 
individual responsibility of citizens is strongly stressed. Citizens are 
nowadays even more expected to be active and to provide for 
themselves. This is a message which in our view may quite easily form 
a basis for the general idea that apparently those who are in need do 
not take up their responsibility well, and can therefore be blamed for 
their neediness. If people are blamed, they do not deserve support, 
and there is no need for a comprehensive welfare state’ (van 
Oorschot et al., 2008: 284). 
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But is it true that the change in general ideas about deservingness 
is transforming the welfare state? Or is it rather the change in the 
structure of needs and the systemic impact of changes on the 
modus operandi of the welfare state that affects public opinions? 
Does the base of economic and social production determine the 
superstructure of ideas and power, or vice versa?  
In this homage to van Oorschot’s seminal work, I posit that 
the reduction of the poverty alleviating capacity of welfare states is 
linked to structural changes in economic and social production. 
This make it structurally more difficult for social welfare states to 
function. Changing views on deservingness may have reinforced 
these trends. The engine of welfare state reform lies, however, in 
social and economic transformations. 
7.2 The transformation of social and economic production 
Since the second half of the 1970s, developed welfare states have 
sailed into choppy waters. At least in three areas that are 
important for their functioning, there have been trends that 
contrast with those observed in the post-war period of the 
flourishing welfare state. As a consequence of changing 
employment and family structures and the decoupling of 
productivity and (low) wage growth, the distribution of jobs 
among individuals and households has become more unequal 
while pressure on minimum incomes has increased.  
Everywhere, to a greater or lesser extent, the significant rise of 
employment benefited the low-skilled only marginally. As a 
consequence, in the new era of the welfare state, full (or nearly 
full) employment for more highly educated individuals has been 
accompanied by structural under-employment among people with 
low levels of education. There is, moreover, ample evidence for 
the deterioration of the working conditions among low skilled 
workers, especially in countries where employment levels are high. 
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Precarious, uncertain and unpredictable work increased in a large 
majority of OECD countries. Clearly, the skewed distribution of 
jobs among individuals and the flexibilisation of employment 
contrast with full employment (among men) and the relative job 
security that characterised the three decades following World War 
II. 
In many countries the unequal growth in employment resulted 
in an increasingly skewed distribution of jobs across households, 
driven by forces of modernisation and complex changes in family 
structure, such as the increase in the number of small households 
as a consequence of individualisation and the emergence of two-
earner households combined with assortative mating (Corluy and 
Vandenbroucke, 2014). Since the 1990s, in some countries, a 
significant increase in the share of work-rich households was 
accompanied by an increase in the number of work-poor 
households, while in others the increase of work-rich households 
was much stronger that the decrease of work-poor households. 
This polarisation contrasts with the widespread availability of jobs 
among households in the post-war era when the single 
breadwinner model largely prevailed. 
Over the past decades, productivity growth has decoupled 
from real wage growth. Although there are important cross-
national differences, this trend seems to be universal. It is likely 
driven by technological innovation (the replacement of labour by 
machines, computers and robots) and globalisation (the relocation 
of labour). Further, this trend was reinforced by work-centred 
welfare state reform, in particular policies of wage moderation and 
labour cost reductions, which have been considered necessary to 
cope with growing global competition. Importantly, we also 
observe a decoupling in the pace of growth of minimum wages on 
the one hand and average wages on the other hand. This is a third 
important contrast with the three decades following World War 
II, which were characterised by constant increases in the wage 
share. 
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As a result, the structure of needs has changed dramatically, the 
distribution of jobs among individuals and households has 
become more unequal while downward pressure on low wages 
and social benefits have decreased the capacity of the welfare state 
to protect the workers at the bottom end of the labour market 
and the jobless households (Cantillon et al., 2019). 
7.3 A systemic stress on the welfare state 
From my perspective, social security balances van Oorschot's 
deservingness criteria: 1) as an insurance system, social security 
entails reciprocity: contributions must be paid (through work) in 
order to be entitled to protection in the event of a social risk; 2) 
social risks refer in principle to situations of need which are linked 
to events beneficiaries could not control; and 3) social security 
systems are deployed as a means not just of damage compensation 
but also damage prevention and repair. In doing so, they have an 
impact on attitudes. 
Social security is fuelled by self-interest, solidarity and the 
human ability to empathise. It reduces poverty through 
mechanisms of horizontal and vertical solidarity on the one hand 
and by prevention and repair of social risks on the other. The 
principal toolset of social insurance is modelled after the ‘piggy 
bank’ principle of private insurance (Barr, 2001). However, the 
actuarial logic is complemented (to varying degrees) with the 
principles of horizontal and vertical solidarity. Higher incomes 
and lower-risk groups pay more than is strictly necessary from an 
insurance point of view. This is done in order to enable decent 
protection for low incomes and for people with 'bad risks', for 
which insurance coverage would be too expensive.  
Coming back to my central argument, I posit that fundamental 
changes in the employment and family structure and the 
decoupling of productivity and (low) wage growth have affected 
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the poverty reducing capacity of social security systems in a 
systemic way.  
As noted above, vital to the social security paradigm is the 
notion of horizontal redistribution from the healthy to the sick, 
from the employed to the unemployed, from the young to the old, 
et cetera. This insurance technique presupposes: a) a large spread 
of risks across the population; b) non-predictability; and c) risks 
that are not too strongly exposed to moral hazard. When risks are 
predictable, too much concentrated among certain groups in 
society and/or easily malleable, it becomes more difficult for 
social security to serve as a piggy bank. This is typically the case 
for many of the so called ‘new social risks’ such as divorce, the 
work-family balance, in-work poverty and long-term 
unemployment. Divorce is obviously liable to moral hazard, the 
uptake of parental leave or working part-time are a subject of 
choice, while in the post-industrial economy long-term 
unemployment is a highly asymmetric and predictable risk to 
which the insurance paradigm is unable to formulate an adequate 
answer.  
Moreover, it can also be argued that, on a systemic level, the 
poverty-reducing impact of horizontal redistribution has declined. 
The extent to which universal horizontal distributive mechanisms 
reduce poverty depends on the ex-post distribution of social risks 
or, put differently, on the connection between risks and needs. 
For example, because low-income groups face higher risks of 
illness or unemployment than higher-income groups, the 
horizontal solidarity implied in these social insurance systems also 
effects vertical redistribution from rich to poor. Entitlements 
aimed at balancing work and care stand on the other side of the 
continuum because the take-up of parental leave is typically higher 
in two-earner households. Therefore, the coverage of new social 
risks such as benefits aimed at balancing work and family 
responsibilities tend to diminish the poverty reducing capacity of 
overall social security spending (Cantillon, 2019). 
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The link between poverty prevention/activation and poverty 
reduction, finally, depends on: a) the approach taken (for example, 
a too strong focus on keeping benefits low in order to make work 
pay can induce poverty); and b) the success ratio of activation 
measures, particularly in terms of reducing the number of jobless 
households. Because unemployment among the low skilled 
remains relatively high in most countries (even though 
employment levels have reached very high levels), the tension 
between decommodification – adequate income protection for the 
jobless – on the one hand and recommodification – activation and the 
fight against unemployment traps – on the other hand remains 
inevitably high on the political agenda and in public discourse. 
This is the case, despite the fact that the disappointing growth of 
employment among low skilled persons strongly points to limits 
of activation and prevention strategies deployed by tax-benefit 
systems (Cantillon et al., 2019).  
7.4 The glass ceiling 
The effectiveness of vertical redistributive mechanisms in reducing 
poverty depends on: a) the take up of benefits; b) whether or not 
unemployment traps present themselves; and c) the adequacy of 
protection levels for the most needy households. It can be argued 
that, as a consequence of downward pressures on low wages and 
persistent under-employment of the low skilled, social security 
systems now face tensions in their attempt to: (1) provide 
adequate incomes to families with children, while simultaneously 
(2) make work pay and (3) keep social spending in check. These 
tensions can be conceptualised as a ‘social trilemma’, or a three-
way trade-off between adequacy of incomes, welfare state effort, 
and financial incentive to work. The ability of welfare states to 
balance each of those three objectives is constrained by the level 
of gross wages relative to median incomes. Accordingly, in order 
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to compensate for stagnation or decline of low gross wages 
welfare states should work harder while using other instruments 
than social security (for example tax credits). 
Within the ‘fabric of the welfare state’, there is a hierarchy of 
incomes. In general terms, the disposable income of low-wage 
earners should be higher than the minimum incomes of jobless 
people. Given the inadequacy of the wage floor in many countries, 
it has become increasingly difficult for welfare states to guarantee 
adequate income protection for low-wage earners and work-poor 
households while preserving (or increasing) financial work 
incentives (Cantillon et al., 2020). Thus, wages at the bottom of 
the earnings distribution act as a ‘glass ceiling’ over the adequacy 
of minimum incomes. When low wages stagnate or decline 
relative to median incomes, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
minimum incomes to lift non-working households towards or 
above the poverty threshold. This is especially a problem for lone-
parent families, because they rely on one single income while 
double incomes have become the societal norm, pushing up 
median household incomes. 
So, at a systemic level, social security currently faces structural 
constraints on the improvement of income protection and on its 
poverty reducing capacity. First, so called new social risks are 
typically more predictable, more concentrated among certain 
groups in society and/or are more malleable than the old 
industrial risks. Therefore, it has become more difficult for social 
security to serve as a piggy bank. Second, the coverage of new 
social risks such as benefits aimed at balancing work and family 
gives way for new Matthew effects and tends to diminish the 
poverty reducing ability of social security spending. Hence, the 
tension between horizontal and vertical redistribution has 
increased. Third, social protection is in the stranglehold of the 
fight against unemployment traps. The inherent tension between 
solidarity and subsidiarity has thus become structurally greater 
(Cantillon, 2019). Subsidiarity presupposes more people at work, 
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solidarity higher social benefits. However, these two are difficult 
to reconcile: work must remain attractive, wages at the bottom fall 
short, while higher minimum wages threaten the employment 
opportunities of people with low productivity. The only outcome 
is that governments intervene and subsidise low-productivity jobs. 
7.5 Conclusion: running harder  
How did welfare states respond to these constraints? Overall, the 
empirical evidence suggests that retrenchment has not been the 
general rule. On the contrary, many welfare states started to work 
harder in order to compensate for new social risks and the 
sluggish growth of low wages (Cantillon et al., 2019). In 
contradiction to popular beliefs, there is no evidence of a 
universal decrease of the generosity of social protection, at least 
not in the past two decades. Instead, there is evidence that many 
nations increased their relative spending efforts, while the 
literature also points to many examples of policy changes having 
in themselves poverty-reducing effects. In other words, many 
welfare states responded to major social, economic and 
demographic changes by doing more in different ways. This 
included shifting the focus from ‘protection’ towards ‘activation’, 
by supporting low wages, by subsidising low productivity work 
and by increasing the progressivity of social spending. However, 
in an overwhelming number of cases, this was far from sufficient 
to keep poverty among the working age population in check, 
especially not among jobless households.  
So conceived, it is the changing base of economic and social 
production that explains the declining poverty reducing capacity 
of contemporary welfare states and not (or at least not primarily) a 
narrowing of the legitimacy base of social redistribution. More 
pronounced perceptions of deservingness are more likely 
themselves the result of the social and economic transformations 
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that have created new needs, and jeopardize the social protection 
of those unable to participate in the post-industrial, individualised 
two-earner society. 
REFERENCES 
Barr, N. (2001), The welfare state as a piggy bank, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Cantillon, B. (2019), ‘Social security and poverty reduction: cracks in the post-
war policy paradigm, avenues for the future’, in P. Saunders (ed.), Revisiting 
Henderson, University of Melbourne Press, pp. 19–46. 
Cantillon, B., T. Goedemé and J. Hills (eds) (2019), Decent incomes for all: improving 
policies in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cantillon, B., Z. Parolin and D. Collado (2020), ‘A glass ceiling on poverty 
reduction? An empirical investigation into the structural constraints on 
minimum income protections’, Journal of European Social Policy, 30 (2), 129–
143. 
Corluy, V. and F. Vandenbroucke (2014), Individual employment, household 
employment, and risk of poverty in the European Union: a decomposition 
analysis, in B. Cantillon and F. Vandenbroucke (eds), Reconciling work and 
poverty reduction: how successful are European welfare states?, Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 94–130. 
Marx, K. (1859), A Contribution to the critique of political economy, Moscow: Progress 
Publishers [1993], https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/down 
load/Marx_Contribution_to_the_Critique_of_Political_Economy.pdf 
(accessed 26 March 2020). 
van Oorschot, W. (2000), ‘Who should get what, and why? On deservingness 
criteria and the conditionality of solidarity among the public’, Policy & Politics, 
28 (1), 33–48. 
van Oorschot, W. (2006), ‘Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness 
perceptions among citizens of European welfare states’, Journal of European 
Social Policy, 2006, 16 (1), 23–42. 
van Oorschot, W., M. Opielka and B. Pfau-Effinger (eds) (2008), Culture and 
welfare state: values and social policy in contemporary perspective, Cheltenham, UK and 






8. Social Work and Social Policy: Two 
Sides of the Same Coin? 
Koen Hermans 
8.1 Introduction 
It’s not an easy task to write a chapter for a book to celebrate the 
emeritus of one of the giants of social policy research in Europe. 
Wim van Oorschot is such a giant without a doubt. He always 
seemed to be ahead of new developments in the field, and laid out 
the lines of the social policy research agenda. There are plenty of 
examples, such as the legitimacy of the welfare state, 
deservingness, welfare chauvinism, and the relation between social 
capital and the welfare state. Of course, I can make use of specific 
scientific parameters to identify his main so-called objective 
academic contributions, but for me, it is his dynamic model to 
understand and analyse the non-take-up of social benefits. The 
main reason is that this model is simple and encompassing at the 
same time. The dynamic model is based on a fundamental critique 
of the idea that non-take-up arises from (wrong) choices made by 
the benefit claimant. On the contrary, van Oorschot (1995; 1996) 
shows that non-take-up is the result of a multilevel process in 
which also characteristics of the scheme itself (such as the degree 
of the selectivity and the conditions of the benefit), and the 
administrative level (such as the quality and quantity of 
information provision, the complexity of the application 
procedure and the behaviour of bureaucrats) play an important 
role. Developed more than 30 years ago, it is still the starting 
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point for many empirical studies and, it nicely links the academic 
fields of social work and social policy. 
8.2 Non-take-up caused by the implementation of social 
policies 
I started working at KU Leuven on the same day as Jos 
Berghman, to study the activation of social assistance users. We 
were both members of the social policy team and Jos Berghman 
gave me Wim van Oorschot’s PhD dissertation ‘Realising rights’ 
(1995). This book had a huge impact on my thinking about social 
policy, since it showed convincingly that policy makers and 
administrators are responsible for the problem of non-take-up 
and not only clients. But the book demonstrates also another core 
quality of Wim van Oorschot, namely the formulation of strong, 
telling titles. If you read his publication list, it is striking how 
attractive these titles are.  
In that period of my research career, I studied implementation 
practices from a policy perspective, as Wim van Oorschot still 
does. I was strongly influenced by the work of Lipsky (1980), 
which Wim teaches until today in his course on social policy. 
Lipsky was only one of those implementation researchers at the 
end of the 1970s in which I immersed myself (see also Prottas 
(1979), Kagan (1978), Mashaw (1978)). And also, the Dutch 
implementation studies grounded in Lipsky’s theory were very 
inspiring (such as Knegt (1987), Engbersen (1990) and van der 
Veen (1990)). Remarkably, these studies already paid a lot of 
attention to how street-level bureaucrats made use of 
deservingness criteria to deal with the tension between quality and 
quantity, or between ‘doing a lot for the few’ and ‘doing less for 
many clients’.  
In public administration handbooks, these studies were 
categorised as a ‘bottom-up perspective of policy implementation’ 
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(Sabatier, 1986). In contrast, the top-down perspective starts from 
a policy decision by governmental (often central government) 
officials and then asks to what extent the actions of implementing 
officials and target groups are consistent with (the objectives and 
procedures outlined in) that policy decision, and to what extent 
the objectives are attained over time, that is, to what extent were 
the impacts consistent with the objectives, and what are the 
principal factors affecting policy outputs and impacts, both those 
relevant to the official policy as well as other politically significant 
ones? The top-down implementation approach distinguishes 
between five factors that explain the success or failure of 
implementation: (1) clear and consistent goals, (2) a logical causal 
theory that links the goals with the necessary actions to be taken, 
(3) a clear hierarchy of authority, (4) clear rules established at the 
top, and (5) resources/capacity to carry out the commands from 
the top. The bottom-up implementation approach is convinced 
that street-level bureaucrats are the key to successful 
implementation. Implementation occurs only when those who are 
primarily affected are actively involved in the planning and 
execution of these programs (O’Toole, 2000: 470). Instead of 
focusing on the implementation of a specific legal decision, 
bottom-up researchers start from the street-level bureaucrats and 
try to understand what is going on in practice, what they are doing 
and why. They are convinced that street-level workers need 
discretion in the implementation process.  
In my PhD, I combined the street-level bureaucracy approach 
with neo-institutionalism to identify those factors that contribute 
to a paradigm shift from delivering benefits to activating clients 
(Hermans, 2005). The federal government of Belgium had decided 
in 1999 that social assistance clients needed to be activated, but 
this policy direction left a lot of discretion to the local level. In my 
qualitative analysis, I pointed to the importance of what I named 
‘champions of change’. These were mainly social workers who 
were convinced of an emancipatory approach to activation and 
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who contributed strongly to organisational change. Only years 
later, I realised that I did not fully understand the role of social 
workers in policy change. At the same time, I also paid a lot of 
attention to these factors on different levels that contribute to the 
granting of benefits (such as deservingness), or in other words, to 
the take up of social benefits. 
8.3 From social policy to social work 
In 2005, the KU Leuven started a Master’s programme in social 
work. Given the topic of my PhD, I was asked to teach in this 
programme. Quickly, under the influence of Jos Berghman, we 
changed the name to Master in social work and social policy. We 
were convinced that the surplus value of our Master’s programme 
was the focus on the linkages between social policy and social 
work. During the following years, I immersed myself in the social 
work literature. I discovered that the street level bureaucracy 
literature was also used in social work research. However, it 
became more and more clear that social work researchers used it 
differently. In addition, I realised that the bottom-up perspective 
on the implementation of social policy that I used in my PhD had 
important limitations. The bottom-up approach still runs the risk 
to narrow its focus on the implementation of specific policies 
without paying attention to the complex mixture of policies and 
measures that they have to implement and to the complex 
environment in which social workers operate. In 2016, Urban 
Nothdurfter visited our research centre (financed by the Jos 
Berghman Welfare Stipend, which was organised by Wim van 
Oorschot). We decided to execute a literature review on the 
question how three different disciplines (social policy, public 
administration and social work) make use of the theory of street- 
level bureaucracies.  
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Our review confirmed that Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy 
approach became a central point of reference in the fields of 
public management, social policy and social work (Nothdurfter 
and Hermans, 2018). In all three fields, numerous studies inform 
an ongoing and increasingly nuanced debate on implementation 
and delivery processes, on the role of frontline workers and 
managers and on their use of discretion in street-level 
organisations. At the same time, the dialogue and the mutual 
exchange between the different fields and perspectives still seem 
rather limited. With a few exceptions of ‘border-crossing’ authors, 
both receptions of, and contributions between, the three fields 
remain below their potential.  
The theoretical and empirical developments within public 
management and social policy literature have yielded two 
outstanding insights. The first is the explicit consideration of the 
negative effects of discretion, not only in terms of implementation 
hurdles, but also in terms of negative outcomes for service users, 
such as non-take-up. Brodkin and Maimundar (2010) write about 
‘procedural discretion’, referring to the informal practices of 
street-level workers to increase the cost of benefit claiming for 
vulnerable groups. They also link these micro-practices to broader 
organisational and, by extension, macro-level priorities, such as 
reducing the number of welfare claimants. These negative effects 
of the use of discretion can be linked to factors on the meso- or 
macro-level, such as the tightening of budgets and the different 
ways that street-level workers define and operationalise their role 
and their view on the deservingness of clients (Djuve and Kavli, 
2015). In general, the social policy perspective is interested in the 
role of the street-level implementation in relation to policy 
outcomes. This is probably shown best in regard to the street-
level delivery of activation policies that can be more or less 
supportive and enabling, or disciplining and punitive (Altreiter 
and Leibetseder, 2015; van Berkel and van der Aa, 2012).  
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front 
 
 86 
Within the social work literature, some authors, such as Evans 
(2015), Scourfield (2015) and Carson et al. (2015), have 
contributed to the conceptual refinement of the street-level 
perspective by including the notion of professionalism, pointing 
out that professional commitment is not just serving self-interest 
but is also an important factor for the use of discretion and that it 
can, therefore, make a difference in dealing with the dilemmas of 
street-level practice. At the same time, the available studies remain 
rather vague about how professionalism comes into play. In 
addition, social work studies point to the need and even the 
necessity of discretion to make a person-centred approach 
possible. The possible negative effects of the misuse of discretion 
get less attention. This conceptualisation of discretion is less 
linked with rules and the gaps between rules and concrete 
situations of clients, but is shaped by the literature on professions. 
For instance, Freidson (2001) conceptualises discretion as the gap 
between the knowledge base of the professional and the specific 
person with which the professional works. Thus, the social work 
studies suggest that street-level bureaucrats such as social workers 
use their professional expertise to shape policies in practice. But 
how does this expertise change the aims of policies, and what if 
policy measures are contradictory to the professional values? In 
conclusion, discretion is evaluated in both disciplines variously 
and even conflictingly. 
8.4 Social work as an object of study or as a specific 
discipline? 
We defined social work studies as those studies that were 
published in social work journals (Nothdurfter and Hermans, 
2018). But even then, the question remains whether and why this 
is social work research. The International Federation of Social 
Workers is responsible for the global definition of social work. 
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Remarkably, in the last version of 2014, social work is not only 
regarded as a profession but also as an academic discipline. This is 
a quite ambiguous standpoint; but it reflects the growing amount 
of countries in which social work is an academic program at the 
university. At the same time, this academisation of social work is 
not fulfilled yet, since in many countries (such as the Netherlands 
and Norway) there are no academic degrees in social work. 
If social work considers itself as a specific academic discipline, 
then there needs to be a common view on the object of study, the 
knowledge base and the research methods (Shaw, 2007). 
Concerning the object of study, the evident answer is social work 
practice. Instead of using policy goals as a starting point, social 
work research starts from the analysis of social work practice to 
understand what is happening on the street-level, not a specific 
policy measure or policy program. Social work scholars study how 
social workers act as professionals, how they develop a working 
alliance with social work users (Steens et al, 2018), how they 
mobilise their expertise to realise their professional goals, how 
their practice is shaped by human rights (Vandekinderen et al, 
2019), how they account for their practice to various stakeholders 
(van der Trier et al., 2020), how they implement policy measures, 
how they develop new practices and how they try to influence 
policy makers. This implies a radicalisation of the bottom-up 
approach to implementation.  
For instance, in Belgium there is growing interest during the 
last 15 years in non-take-up at the policy level as well in social 
work practice. Flemish community workers have developed their 
own approach to the fight against ‘under-protection’ (Eeman et 
al., 2013). They prefer this term instead of non-take-up, because it 
stresses more the public responsibility than non-take-up does. 
Under-protection is also broader than non-take-up, since it is also 
more critical towards current social rights. Under-protection also 
refers to the question to which extent the existing social rights and 
benefits are sufficient to realise human dignity.  
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Community workers have implemented six strategies that must 
contribute to the fight against non-take-up: more information, 
automatic rights application, outreaching, qualitative social 
services, integrated social services and informal practices at the 
neighbourhood level. Some of these strategies were already 
identified in the dynamic model of benefit receipt by Wim van 
Oorschot (1995; 1996), some of them are relatively new. 
Especially, community workers developed a neighbourhood-
oriented approach (called ‘De Stek’) that tries to bring vulnerable 
groups together by organising low-threshold social activities in 
local centres. These activities also serve to restore their trust in 
social services. Community workers use these neighbourhood 
centres to bring social rights to them. At the same time, these 
social workers organise participatory practices so that people in 
poverty can raise their voice about their experiences and can have 
a direct dialogue with policy makers. This neighbourhood 
approach is recently financed by the Flemish Minister of Social 
Welfare. This example shows how social work develops 
innovative strategies to combat non-take-up that can influence 
social policies. In other words, social work practice and social 
work research can and should feed back into social policy research 
and legislators’ perspectives. This is a truly bottom-up perspective. 
But of course, the question remains to what extent these practices 
effectively diminish non-take-up of social rights and to what 
extent these practices can be upscaled. Thus, social work research 
should also make use of social policy research to disentangle the 
effectiveness of such strategies.  
8.5 Social work and social policy, two sides of a coin?  
Studying these intersections between social work and social policy 
is one of our central research lines at the Centre for Sociological 
Research at KU Leuven. The dynamic model of benefit receipt 
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continues to inspire us to consider non-take-up of social benefits 
as litmus test of the effectiveness of social policies. The model 
also brings into light the role of implementation processes and of 
implementers to explain non-take-up. However, it fits more into a 
top-down perspective of implementation that starts from specific 
policy measures or policy programs. A social work perspective 
motivates us to look deeper into social work practice from a truly 
bottom-up perspective. It directs our attention to the question 
how social workers are acting on a daily basis, how they mobilise 
their professional expertise, how they develop innovative 
practices, how they give feedback to legislators and how they try 
to influence the policy agenda by translating private troubles into 
public issues. But at the same time, social work research has to 
keep in mind essential lessons from social policy studies, namely 
the latent and possibly perverse effects of their implementation 
strategies on the realisation of social rights and the need of an 
international-comparative approach to disentangle the complex 
interaction between social work and social policy. Thus, social 
work and social policy seem to study the same practices, but from 
a different perspective, or, in other words, both disciplines are 
two sides of the same coin.  
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9. Why do the Elderly Fail to Realize 
their Social Rights in Belgium? And 
What can we do About it? 
Joy Schols and Hans Peeters 
9.1 Introduction 
As is well known by social policy scholars, claimants can ‘slip 
through the net’, in the sense that they do not receive the benefits 
they are entitled to. This phenomenon is referred to as non-take-
up or non-use. Research on the factors causing non-take-up was 
already initiated in the 1960s, but it was only with Wim’s work 
during the mid-1990s that a multilevel framework to analyse non-
take-up was put forward. In his influential book Realizing Rights 
(1995) Wim synthesized the prevailing theories, indicated their 
shortcomings and introduced a new framework, which he 
continued to develop in later publications (for example van 
Oorschot, 1996). Contrary to the then popular theories, in the 
multilevel framework it was emphasized that not only claimants 
but also policy makers and administrators could be responsible for 
non-take-up (van Oorschot, 1995). 
In a nutshell, Wim argued that the reasons for non-take-up are 
located at three levels: the level of the benefit scheme, the level of 
the administration and the client level (van Oorschot; 1991, 1996). 
These three levels however cannot be viewed separately from one 
another. As Wim’s studies have shown, non-take-up is usually not 
caused by one specific factor on one particular level but is instead 
the result of interacting factors at different levels (van Oorschot; 
1995, 1996). To give but one example, non-take-up can be the 
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result of a lack of knowledge (level of the client), which can be 
influenced by a poor provision of information by administrators 
(level of the administration). 
Ever since the introduction of the multilevel framework, it is a 
widely accepted theory in non-take-up research (for example 
Behrendt, 2000; Matsaganis et al., 2010). Hence, we have also 
based our own research on this multilevel framework. More 
precisely, our qualitative research on non-take-up of the Income 
Guarantee for the Elderly, which was conducted in 2016, uses the 
multilevel framework to present and interpret our results in a 
comprehensible way. The Income Guarantee is a Belgian means-
tested social assistance benefit that serves as the most important 
safety net for elderly who have been unable to build up sufficient 
pension rights. People over 65 years old who fall under a set 
income threshold are granted the benefit (usually as a surplus on 
the public pension) by the Federal Pensions Service. 
To investigate non-take-up of the Income Guarantee, we 
conducted interviews with multiple administrators, given their 
unique insights in both the legislative pitfalls and the difficulties 
experienced by claimants during the application process. During 
these semistructured interviews, we first asked civil servants about 
their experiences with the causes of non-take-up. Next, we invited 
them to formulate recommendations on how to reduce future 
non-take-up. These causes and recommendations are summarised 
in the following two sections.1 On the basis of a new interview 
with one of our original respondents, the third section shows that 
our research findings are still relevant today. 
9.2 What are the causes of non-take-up of the Income 
Guarantee? 
Fully in line with the multilevel framework, our investigation 
identified multiple interrelated causes for non-take-up. These 
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causes are located at the level of the benefit scheme, the 
administration and the client. Our investigation first identified 
three features of the benefit scheme that play an important role in 
non-take-up of the Income Guarantee. 
 
a. The target group of the automatic investigation – The means-test is 
automatically organised on the initiative of the Federal Pensions 
Service at the moment the legal retirement age is reached. This 
automatically initiated means-test is henceforth referred to as the 
automatic investigation. In practice, this automatic investigation 
consists of sending declaration forms to those elderly who might 
be entitled to receive the Income Guarantee. The problem 
identified by the respondents is that not all individuals who might 
be entitled will automatically receive the declaration forms. The 
reason is that the automatic investigation is only initiated for three 
target groups: individuals with a calculated public pension benefit 
that falls under a set income threshold, individuals who receive an 
allowance for the disabled and individuals claiming a subsistence 
benefit. As a result, some individuals ‘slip through the net’ of the 
automatic investigation. Housewives, for instance, who have 
never worked are very likely to be entitled to receive the Income 
Guarantee but they have to submit an application on their own 
initiative. Many respondents doubt that individuals who have not 
built up any pension rights find their way to the pension 
administration or the municipality to apply for the Income 
Guarantee.  
Who slips through the net? The ones we do not know here (…) [at the Federal 
Pensions Service]. 
b. The timing of the automatic investigation – A second problem of the 
automatic investigation arises when individuals are not entitled to 
receive the benefit when the means-test is conducted but become 
entitled at a later stage in their lives. According to the civil 
servants that were interviewed, this situation is quite common. 
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For one, an individuals’ income might not fall under the set 
income threshold at the legal retirement age due to a recent 
property sale or the availability of plenty of savings. The financial 
situation of elderly people however can change rapidly and they 
might become entitled to the benefit only a few years later. In the 
case of entitlement for the Income Guarantee at a later stage than 
the initial means-test, claimants must submit an application at the 
municipality or directly at the Federal Pensions Service on their 
own initiative. The interviewed civil servants repeatedly state that 
elderly are more than often unable to file this application. Lack of 
knowledge of the benefit scheme and the age of the target group 
are determining factors here. Hence, this cause for non-take-up is 
strongly intertwined with various factors on the client level.  
If you are 65 years old and you have recently sold your house (…) then you have 
to remember at 75 years old ‘Oh, I have to go to the municipality to apply for it’.  
c. Residency requirements – Having a legal address is a frequently used 
requirement to receive Belgian state support. In the absence of a 
legal address, a reference address is considered a legal substitute. 
A reference address is usually provided by a private person, 
mostly a friend or family member. In case of homelessness, the 
Public Centres of Social Welfare are also qualified to provide a 
reference address. This address is used for administrative 
correspondence with the claimant and allows individuals without 
an official residency to claim certain social benefits. The Income 
Guarantee is only granted to those individuals with a legal Belgian 
address or a reference address with the Public Centres of Social 
Welfare. In contrast to other benefits, a reference address 
provided by a private person is thus not sufficient to receive the 
Income Guarantee. As a result of this legislative condition, the 
respondents argue that not all homeless people receive the 
Income Guarantee because the Public Centres of Social Welfare 
are not always able or willing to provide a reference address. 
These situations of non-take-up are striking because the homeless 
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are strongly dependent on the benefit to escape their precarious 
situation.  
If you don't have it [a reference address with the Public Centres of Social Welfare] 
then you don't exist (…) for nobody. 
Apart from the three causes at the level of the benefit scheme, the 
respondents identify two main causes at the level of the administration.  
 
a. Complex declaration forms – The respondents paid special attention 
to the complex declaration forms used to organise the means-test. 
At the legal retirement age, the Federal Pensions Service organizes 
the means-test by automatically sending declaration forms to 
those elderly who might be entitled to receive the benefit, i.e. 
those individuals with low public pension benefits, disability 
benefits or subsistence benefits. The elderly, in turn, are required 
to declare all their income sources using these declaration forms. 
The interviewed administrators argue that the forms used to 
examine the financial situation of claimants are too complicated. 
Proper knowledge of the social legislation is required to be able to 
understand the used jargon. Many elderly lack this knowledge 
(confer client level factor) and as a result, plenty of claimants fail 
to properly complete these forms. Even more striking is that 
some elderly do not attempt to fill in these forms out of doubt or 
incapacity. 
It is literally impossible (…). It is just not clear. The children are often the ones 
that fill in the declaration forms but the elderly that are alone easily slip through 
the net. 
b. Poor provision of information – Poor communication and giving 
insufficient information to the elderly is often mentioned to be an 
important factor causing non-take-up. Most respondents argue 
that the elderly have too little knowledge of the benefit scheme 
and that the administration fails to reach them. Social security 
agencies like the Federal Pensions Service have taken resource to 
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digital technologies to provide information to claimants and many 
elderly are thus far not familiar with these technologies. 
I am 42 years old, I grew up without a computer (…). Let alone the 65–75 year 
olds. I don't think those people are going to visit the website [of the Federal 
Pensions Service]. So how are they reached? 
Personal face-to-face communication with administrators, on the 
contrary, has proven to be of great value for the take-up of 
Income Guarantee. Appointments at the regional offices of the 
Federal Pensions Service and information days held at 
municipalities outside the main regional offices are of great 
importance for the elderly. Availability of these personal 
appointments is however scarce since the Federal Pensions 
Service is understaffed and overwhelmed by claimants seeking 
assistance.  
Finally, in addition to the causes at the level of the benefit 
scheme and the administration, the respondents recognized three 
client level factors causing non-take-up of the Income Guarantee. 
 
a. Stigma – Stigmatization for one, is a factor named to be 
responsible for non-take-up. This is not surprising. A means-test 
is in fact organised with the aim to prove one is poor enough to 
receive state support. Some respondents had witnessed certain 
instances where individuals refused to apply for the Income 
Guarantee because they do not want to be considered poor. 
They have to ask for it [for financial help]. [They feel] ashamed]. 
b. Lack of knowledge – A lack of sufficient knowledge of the scheme 
is another well-known cause for non-take-up that also applies to 
the Income Guarantee. Our research provided evidence that some 
elderly deliberately not apply for the Income Guarantee due to 
incorrect perceptions of eligibility. 
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It is very likely that those who need to know about the scheme, don’t. Those who 
don’t know their rights are not going to apply for the Income Guarantee. It is a 
pity but it is what it is. 
Strong interactions with causes on different levels are present. The 
respondents explain that the knowledge gap of elderly is at least 
partially caused by a poor provision of information by 
administrators. Information is nowadays distributed online which 
is making matters worse for the elderly (cf. administration level 
factor). 
 
c. Physical barrier – The existence of a physical barrier was 
highlighted by the respondents as a cause for non-take-up that 
specifically applies to the target group of the Income Guarantee. 
People over 65 years old can experience physical barriers when 
they need assistance with filling in the declaration forms or with 
submitting the application. Civil servants explain that when elderly 
people are physically unable to pay a visit to the administration of 
the Federal Pensions Service, the Public Centres of Social Welfare 
or the municipality, such assistance cannot always be guaranteed. 
I tried my best. I asked the administrators of the municipality if they could visit 
the person at home to submit the application for the Income Guarantee but such 
home visits are not organised here. 
9.3 What are the recommendations of civil servants to 
reduce non-take-up of the Income Guarantee? 
Besides identifying several causes for non-take-up, the interviewed 
civil servants made many recommendations. The three most 
important are mentioned here.  
 
a. Automatic investigation every 5 of 10 years – If non-take-up is 
discovered by civil servants, it mainly concerns individuals who 
become entitled to the benefit after the initial means-test has 
taken place. Respondents thus note that the one-off means-test, 
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which is automatically conducted by the Federal Pensions Service 
at the legal retirement age, is merely a snapshot. The respondents 
advise to repeat the means-test periodically (for example every 
five or ten years) in order to prevent non-take-up. 
 
b. Adjusting the declaration forms – The second recommendation is to 
simplify the used declaration forms. The idea is that the jargon, 
the words and phrases, should be adjusted so that they better fit 
the target group. However, simplifying the jargon is only a first 
step. The respondents also propose to fully adjust the declaration 
forms by using all electronic data available in such a way that only 
those incomes sources from which no data is available should be 
declared. This latter recommendation is feasible. After all, the 
administrators of the Federal Pensions Service already check the 
information of completed questionnaires with the available 
register data. 
 
c. Clear communication and cooperation with the Public Centres of Social 
Welfare – Third, respondents argue for a better provision of 
information for the elderly. According to civil servants, the elderly 
can be reached in two ways. First, the accessibility of the Federal 
Pensions Service can be improved by increasing staff capacity, in 
particular for face-to-face appointments and information days 
held at municipalities outside the regional offices. Second, the 
respondents refer to the important role of social workers of the 
Public Centres of Social Welfare in combating non-take-up. Social 
workers are viewed as important partners since they often assist 
claimants in the application process. More so, the respondents 
indicate that social workers, unlike the staff of the Federal 
Pensions Service, are better suited to track down non-users 
because social workers provide more accessible services within the 
municipality and have personal knowledge of those living in 
precarious situations. Creating a better cooperation between these 
two bodies is therefore much recommended. 
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9.4 Current developments 
We reached out to one of our respondents of the Federal 
Pensions Service to find out whether the three recommendations 
made in 2016 are still relevant today. In sum, we can conclude that 
over the last few years the Federal Pensions Service has actively 
worked on its service to reduce non-take-up. To that end, the 
administration has simplified the used declaration forms. These 
new declaration forms will be put in practice any time now. To 
increase the provision of information and the cooperation with 
the Public Centres of Social Welfare, an analysis is currently being 
made with the aim to improve the provision of information. 
However, not all recommendations have been dealt with. The 
Federal Pensions Service is currently unable to periodically repeat 
the automatic investigation due to a lack of capacity and means. 
9.5 Conclusion 
Our research into the causes of non-take-up of the Belgian 
Income Guarantee for the Elderly once again indicated the 
importance of Wim’s multilevel framework. In line with the 
framework, our research identified different interrelated causes for 
non-take-up at the level of the benefit scheme, the administration 
and the clients. To recapitulate one of our findings: some elderly 
fail to receive the benefits they are entitled to because they lack 
the necessary knowledge to complete the complex application 
forms that are used by administrators when organising the means-
test.  
As a result of identifying the reasons for non-take-up, the 
administrators were able to formulate valuable recommendations 
to reduce future non-take-up. The Federal Pensions Service has 
already taken action to put some of these recommendations into 
practice. More reform is, however, needed to prevent non-take-
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up. To guide this reform ‘small-scale’ research like ours is 
insufficient. Fortunately, in 2016, the TAKE-project was launched 
by the University of Antwerp and partners with the aim of 
conducting a ‘large-scale’ research on non-take-up of Belgian 
means-tested social benefits. While we await the final results of 
this research project, we are pleased to see that Wim’s multilevel 
framework has also taken centre stage in this project (see Van 
Mechelen and Janssens, 2017). This once again proves that Wim’s 
work on non-take-up is of great importance: it aims to improve 
our social policies by enabling all citizens to realize their rights. 
NOTE 
1. This contribution is a shortened version of an article published in a Belgian 
journal (see Schols et al. (2018a) for the Dutch version and Schols et al. 
(2018b) for the French version), and is based on a masters’ thesis research 
(see Schols, 2016). Please note that only a limited number of research results 
are reported in this article. For a more extensive discussion of the literature 
used, the original quotes, the research results and the research design, one can 
consult the abovementioned references. 
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10.  Harmonising Social Security 
Financing 
Paul Schoukens and Danny Pieters 
10.1  Introduction 
Our cooperation with Wim van Oorschot goes back to 1985 at 
Tilburg University. In what was a new sub-faculty of ‘social 
security sciences’ back then, two young researchers met: one has a 
social policy background, Wim van Oorschot. The other one, 
Danny Pieters, is a lawyer. Under the leadership of the much 
missed Jos Berghman, they approach the phenomenon of social 
security in a multi- and interdisciplinary way. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, Danny Pieters returns to the KU Leuven where he 
starts cooperating intensively with Paul Schoukens. Both are 
lawyers studying social security primarily in a comparative fashion. 
However, at the same time, they are aware that in order to fully 
grasp the fundamental fabrics of social security, there must be 
close interaction with other disciplines. This interaction and 
cooperation materialised initially with Jos Berghman and later 
again with Wim van Oorschot, when they joined the Faculty of 
Social Sciences at the KU Leuven. 
Selecting a topic to pay tribute to Wim van Oorschot is quite a 
challenge as he has been prominently present in many research 
fields that touch upon social security research and education. We 
chose to single out a research topic that reflects our cooperation 
in Tilburg and later in Leuven: the need for further harmonisation 
in social security in Europe. Harmonisation was intensively 
debated back in the late 1980s with the establishment of the fully 
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integrated European Community-market – better known as 
‘Europe 92’. Today, with the adoption of the European Pillar of 
Social Rights (EPSR) in 2017, the harmonisation of social security 
once again is the centre of attention. The process of monitoring 
the performance of member states used to be mainly financial and 
economic in nature, addressing social security largely as an 
expense and less as a contributor to stability and social cohesion. 
The EU’s ambition with the EPSR was to give the monitoring 
process a more social character. As a consequence, the discussion 
concerning the extent to which more harmonisation is needed in 
social security (law) reappeared. 
In this contribution, we plead for more (legal) harmonisation 
concentrating primarily on the financing of social security. We 
suggest to create a European ‘bandwidth’ within which the 
national financing of social security has to take place (a social 
security fork) while at the same time the national systems are still 
monitored at a European level through soft-law and/or by using 
open policy monitoring instruments. With the introduction of 
such a European financing fork, a clear link will, however, have to 
be forged between the need for social security harmonisation and 
the need to safeguard fair competition in the EU. Or, in other 
words, the European internal market will need some clear rules on 
the national financing of social security, at least if we want to 
avoid social security becoming too strong an element in the fight 
to cut production costs (social dumping). 
10.2  The feasibility of harmonising social security 
Ever since the establishment of the European Union (EU) 
economists, social policy experts and lawyers have studied the 
feasibility and opportunity of harmonising social security systems 
of the member states. 
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The question first emerged at the very beginning of the 
European Communities. At that time, the main emphasis in the 
discussion was on the enormous diversity of the systems then in 
place (Pieters, 1989). Due to the fact that this diversity found its 
origin in the different national cultural and economic factors that 
determined the development of (national) social security systems, 
it was considered better not to intervene at the supranational 
European level (by setting minimum standards or establishing 
EU-level social rights). It was feared that such supranational 
intervention could upset the political, cultural and social 
equilibrium underlying the social security systems, which in turn 
might lead to the undermining of these systems (Pieters, 1991).  
Aside from the large differences in the determining economic 
and cultural factors, the debate also turned against the 
harmonisation of social security for yet another reason: the 
harmonisation of the national social security systems was not 
considered necessary for giving companies equal competition 
opportunities in a single market. Indeed, it was suggested that 
setting European social security standards would risk disturbing 
competition in the market. Social security is only one element in 
the (wage) cost of work. Singling out only this particular element 
and regulating it at European level was feared to reduce the level 
playing field for companies and, more generally, states to offset 
social costs. This is because the cost of labour is also determined 
by other factors such as fiscal policies, social stability, the level of 
the infrastructure etc. In other words, fair competition within a 
single market did not require the harmonisation of national social 
security systems (Pieters, 1991). Additionally, it was argued that if 
the social security burdens (among others) threaten the national 
economy of a member state, then this state was still free to 
strengthen the competitiveness of its businesses by adjusting its 
exchange rate. 
On the realisation of a ‘fully integrated market’ (1 January 
1993), the discussion on increased harmonisation reappeared in 
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full strength. The discussion focused on the question of whether 
such a fully integrated market could be achieved while there was a 
wide diversity of social security systems in place. However, 
compared to the first discussion at the beginning of the European 
Communities back in the 1960s, there was now the fear as well as 
the hope that most of the elements that influence the cost of 
labour would start to converge as a result of the integrated market. 
For instance, considerable efforts were to be made to raise the 
level of infrastructure and education in the least developed regions 
of the Community to a fixed Community standard. Moreover, the 
Monetary Union that followed in the aftermath of the internal 
market further reduced the margins of levelling out (too high) 
labour costs (for example through a devaluation of the national 
currency) as member states lost considerable freedom in running 
their (national) monetary policy. Given all this, we considered it 
necessary to intervene in the field of social security and called for 
the establishment of some harmonisation at EU level (Pieters, 
1991). 
Apart from launching the credo that the EU is characterised by 
its social model (European Commission, 1994), no concrete (legal) 
action was, however, taken to give this model any real European 
substance. In the meantime, infrastructure improved considerably, 
fiscal and budgetary policies were brought under close European 
scrutiny, health and safety at the workplace became subject to EU 
standards, Erasmus and other EU programmes created a ‘Europe 
of study’ etc. Nevertheless, no measures harmonising social 
security emerged. Not even the Monetary Union established 
between the Euro countries called for the harmonisation of social 
security systems. By the turn of the millennium, harmonisation 
was again forgotten. Furthermore, the treaty articles were even 
adapted in order to ban in reality any kind of legal harmonisation 
in the field of social security (Korda and Schoukens, 2006). 
Since the 2008 (global) financial crisis, interest in the 
harmonisation of social security once again gathered nevertheless 
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momentum. Hopes were high that this could be a turning point 
leading to a stronger (and more legal) social Europe (Schoukens 
and Beke Smets, 2014). Apart from rather isolated initiatives to 
harmonise specific social risks or otherwise intervening in these 
(such as the idea of a European unemployment benefit scheme, 
see Pieters, 2019), European attention gradually started, however, 
to focus on social security in the national budgets. To guarantee 
financial equilibrium, the EU increasingly showed interest in 
having more financial control over social security expenses.  
10.3  International law harmonising the financing of social 
security 
A harmonisation of social security is needed to ensure that 
competition, essential to the EU’s internal market, is organised in 
a fair way. However, when we look at the legal achievements in 
the strict field of social security harmonisation, we see that not 
much (legal) attention has been paid to the cost element or more 
broadly to the financing of social security. A similar restricted 
interest in the financing side is to be discerned when we look at 
the ILO and the Council of Europe, the main institutions – up to 
now – to have developed social security harmonisation instruments. 
Their harmonisation instruments focus on the level and 
conditions of the benefits to be granted. It is in fact significant to 
observe that the harmonisation instruments of the ILO and the 
Council of Europe do not focus on (the harmonisation of) social 
charges. Possibly the only impact of these instruments relates to 
the distribution of employer and employee contributions in the 
field of social security. 
In article 71 of ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention N° 102, we read that:  
o establishing the way of financing social security should avoid 
hardship to persons of small means and should take into 
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account the economic situation of the state and of the 
classes of persons protected; 
o the employee contributions should not exceed 50 per cent of 
the total of financial resources allocated to the concerned 
group of persons; 
o the state guarantees that enough means will be available to 
cover the costs of the benefits guaranteed. Moreover, the 
necessary actuarial studies and calculations concerning the 
financial equilibrium should be made, periodically and 
whenever before the way of financing the benefits is to be 
changed.  
Apart from being restricted in number, these provisions seem to 
be somewhat outdated in their goals. Establishing that the 
employee contributions cannot exceed the employer contributions 
(plus state subventions) is a rather peculiar norm as it starts from 
the false presupposition that there is a natural distinction between 
employee and employer contributions. As employers are normally 
liable for withholding the contributions of their employees, the 
socio-economic reality nowadays starts more from the reality of a 
total work contribution (employee plus employer contribution, 
plus part of the fiscal budget that goes to the financing of social 
security). Consequently, employees think in terms of the net wage 
(nominal wage minus the employee contribution and taxes): that is 
what they receive in the end. Employers think in terms of the total 
costs it takes to employ a person (nominal wage plus the 
employer’s contribution). Moreover, the norm does not consider 
at all the (income or wage) taxes on the income paid by the 
socially insured persons. In the end, this part of taxation will, 
however, constitute a considerable part of the total financing of 
social security. 
Further, establishing that one has to take into account the 
economic situation of the state as well as the small means that 
contributing persons may possess provides little legal basis to 
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have the ILO provisions monitored, controlled or even 
sanctioned. The same goes for concerns regarding the actuarial 
studies and calculations that are to be made. From a legal point of 
view, the provision that the state is responsible for providing the 
benefits that are promised, might be more important as it makes 
clear that a state can never disengage from its responsibility to pay 
the legally established entitlements (benefit). So, even if a social 
security benefit is to be paid by private actors (for example private 
social insurance or funds), the moment the benefit is considered 
to belong to statutory social security, the state has to guarantee 
these benefits. 
10.4  The hidden ‘social’ model of the EU  
So far, EU harmonising norms have to a large extent remained 
invisible as far as social security is concerned. However, in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial-economic crisis, the EU slowly 
started to pay more attention to (the cost of) social security in its 
monitoring of the fiscal and budgetary policies of the member 
states. Over the years and across the various member states, we 
see a pattern occurring in the way the EU addresses social 
security. Specifically in the area of social security, the EU has 
made the following recommendations (Schoukens, 2016: 56):  
o to have or to keep a unified social security system; 
o to reform the family benefits (from income replacement to 
more services); 
o to introduce additional targeting in social security schemes; 
o to link life expectancy to the retirement age; 
o to restrict the unemployment benefits (in duration and in 
amount); 
o to apply more stringent conditions in the invalidity/disability 
benefits;  
o to harmonise the pensionable age between men and woman; 
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o to reform the national health care system (giving more 
attention to adequacy and quality); 
o to reduce the burden on social security contributions on 
labour; 
o to loosen the indexation of social security benefits from 
wage indexation; 
o to keep benefits adequate (among others through private 
savings and occupational pensions); 
o to reduce the share of undeclared work and;  
o to combat poverty and social exclusion. 
One recommendation directly addresses the reduction of the 
burden of social security costs on labour, but in the end most of 
the recommendations ultimately aim to reduce the costs of social 
security. The EU is increasingly addressing social security as a cost 
factor in the overall budget that should be well managed and 
maintained in order not to jeopardise the financial sustainability of 
the system and of the country. This overall attention to the 
budgetary and fiscal impact of social security systems is reflected 
in the formulation of the recommendations listed above. 
Recommendations having a social objective such as combating 
social exclusion and keeping an adequate level of social protection 
are vague in their formulation and are thus hard to monitor in 
terms of their impact. By contrast, social recommendations with 
financial or fiscal impact are more detailed and can eventually be 
used to sanction member states (Schoukens and Beke Smets, 
2014). Hence, we concluded in earlier research that  
‘national social security systems are primordially monitored on their 
economic and financial soundness. The social objectives and social 
security parameters are simply not concrete enough to speak of a true 
social model, leave aside the legal tools to make the social model 
sufficiently effective. We are far from the original ideas of the EU 
social model as launched by the EU-Commission at the beginning of 
the 1990s’ (Schoukens, 2016: 44). 
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10.5  Conclusion: a call for a closer cooperation between 
lawyers, economists and social policy experts 
Although the need for harmonisation measures has been felt from 
the very beginning of the European Union, legal scholars have 
mainly focused on the social benefit side, be it with little impact. 
The financial side of social security has been the focus of the 
monitoring of the systems at European level in practice. Perhaps 
the time has come for the financial side to become the object of 
legal harmonising measures in order to deal with the concerns 
regarding the wide diversity of national social security schemes 
already raised in the first days of what has become the European 
Union. In other words, rather than trying to overcome the 
differences in the benefit side of social security, why don’t we try 
to develop harmonising standards with regard to the financing of 
the national social security schemes? This would optimally respect 
the national competence to define a state’s social security system 
and take into account the concern about the socio-economic and 
financial impact of social security upon national budgets. At the 
same time, this idea directly addresses the main arguments that 
from the very beginning the European Community called for the 
harmonisation of social security: avoiding unfair competition 
through social security and combatting social dumping. 
Developing harmonising standards with regard to the financing 
of social security could, in our opinion, best be done by defining a 
‘fork’ or a ‘bandwidth’ within which social security contributions 
and government subsidies to the social security systems would 
need to be situated. We are convinced that such an approach is 
not only feasible but also expedient. However, it would require 
substantive research in which social scientists, economists and 
lawyers must combine their findings to provide concrete figures.  
The basic idea is to set a minimum and maximum percentage 
for social security contributions levied upon the real wages/ 
professional incomes and a minimum and maximum percentage 
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for the costs of social security to be financed out of the public 
budget. These minimums and maximums constitute the ‘fork’ or 
‘bandwidth’ within which national social security systems can 
determine how social security benefits are designed. It is obvious 
that, in doing so, the possibilities to use social security 
arrangements to falsify competition between (enterprises of) 
member states would be considerably reduced. At the same time, 
the fork would guarantee that each member state allocates an 
adequate amount of the workers’ incomes and of the state budget 
to social security, thus countering a rush to the bottom.  
Before this idea can be tested, quite a lot of ‘development’ 
research has yet to be done. What social security schemes are to 
be taken into account? In an initial approach, we mainly suggest to 
concentrate on the contributory social insurance schemes. These 
are the schemes that today fall under the EU social security 
coordination regulations. Non-contributory social benefit schemes 
would not be considered in this initial step. This means that for 
social assistance and specific non-contributory benefits member 
states would enjoy exclusive competences in the decision about 
how they wish to finance them. For other social security benefits, 
we suggest they should be financed by the fork-levy. By contrast, 
the cost compensating schemes, health care and family 
allowances, should be excluded as these have little to do with the 
social charges on labour. This aspect would need further 
examination. 
As far as the fork for social contributions is concerned, we 
propose not to make any distinction between employer and 
employee contributions as this is a totally artificial distinction. 
What matters in the end is the overall social security cost for the 
employer and what net income the worker receives for his/her 
work. We would set the fork for the total amount of the 
contributions without considering specific social risk schemes 
separately. All kinds of special tariffs for specific groups or 
statuses would have to be incorporated in the final totals of the 
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eventually set (maximum) level of the fork. This could end up 
being a rather complex but, in our opinion, possible exercise. A 
fork for the social security contributions levied on the income 
from work (wages, professional income of the self-employed) 
would also require a clear definition of what ‘income from work’ 
is and, at the end of the day, of what ‘work’ is. A new danger for 
distorting internal market competition could otherwise indeed 
result from the emerging of new patterns of work: gig work, 
platform work, et cetera (Schoukens and Barrio, 2017).  
Regardless of these technical details, the question of course 
remains as to whether it will be feasible to define minima and 
maxima of social security contributions for all EU member states. 
Here too, research on the current financing of the national social 
security schemes would be needed: what is the share of social 
contributions? What is the share of state subsidising? Simple 
questions as they may seem, they are very complex to answer.  
Obviously, for this contribution we restricted ourselves to 
launching some ideas, and we are aware that by doing so we may 
be raising many more questions than answers. What should be 
kept in mind though is that these questions cannot be answered 
by lawyers alone; nor by social policy experts alone; nor by 
economists alone. To find comprehensive and integrated answers, 
they will have to be addressed jointly, in a multidisciplinary 
approach, and in a spirit of cooperation between colleagues –
aspects that strongly reflect the research approach which Wim van 
Oorschot practices and upholds in daily life. We can only hope 
that it will inspire many others to apply this approach in their 
research, and more concretely to chalk out the research pathways 
along which the harmonisation of social security in Europe will 
eventually take place. 
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11.  Flex Well: Balancing Labour Market 
Flexibility, Security and Wellbeing 
Sonja Bekker and Ioana Pop 
11.1  Introduction 
Finding a balance between labour market flexibility and security 
has been a major topic for some decades, both in academic 
research and in policy-making (van Oorschot, 2004; Wilthagen 
and Tros, 2004; European Commission, 2007; Chung, 2012; 
Bekker and Mailand, 2018). This balance between flexibility and 
security is far from static. The pendulum keeps swinging from 
encouraging flexibility to guaranteeing a certain level of security. 
Decades ago, in a context of structurally high unemployment rates 
and companies struggling to compete on international markets, 
European debates mainly addressed ways to make the labour 
market more flexible (European Commission, 1993). Getting rid 
of rigidity would support companies in their response to rapidly 
changing economic demands, while workers could benefit from 
more flexibility as well. However, the concern for workers’ 
security did not disappear. Boos et al. (2001) addressed this issue 
in a report to the European Commission. Later on, in 2007, the 
European Commission developed the common principles of 
flexicurity, stimulating an actively designed balance between 
flexibility and security. Flexibility and security were key issues 
studied by the researchers of the interdisciplinary labour market 
institute ReflecT of Tilburg Law School, addressing labour market 
dynamics, flexicurity and social cohesion. The departments of 
HR-studies, Economics and Sociology contributed to ReflecT as 
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well, and Wim van Oorschot brought in his expertise from a 
sociological perspective. As of 2015, after a severe economic and 
social crisis, the EU has started to tackle the negative effects of 
flexibility for vulnerable groups more actively. For example, the 
European Commission recommends countries to fight labour 
market segmentation and to help people make a transition into 
more stable jobs (Bekker, 2018). In particular, the European Pillar 
of Social Rights (2017) aims at fair working conditions for all, 
including flexible workers, self-employed and platform workers in 
the digital economy. 
Also in Dutch labour market discussions, the pendulum 
regularly swings from flexibility to security. The report for the 
European Commission, to which van Oorschot contributed, does 
not only give a detailed overview of Dutch labour market 
regulations (Boos et al., 2001). It also stresses the role of the social 
security system to protect workers, both in or out of employment. 
The report ends with a list of rather critical comments. The 
authors speak of a ‘participation neurosis’ in the Netherlands 
whereby policymakers focus on getting people in a job while 
neglecting job quality, ignoring the limits of ‘employability’ and 
‘trainability’ of people, and overlooking the strong interference 
with private lives (Boos et al., 2001: 43). They also see tensions 
between the government encouraging flexible employment on the 
one hand and expecting beneficiaries to flow into full-time jobs 
on the other hand. 
In a follow-up, van Oorschot (2004) reviews the growing 
flexibility in the Netherlands, combined with the trend of a more 
‘activating welfare state’. At that time, the Dutch welfare state was 
referred to as the Dutch miracle because it was considered to be 
successful in activating the unemployed and in giving protection 
to flexible and part-time workers. Van Oorschot (2004) critically 
assesses this ‘miracle’ and concludes that Dutch activation 
measures are not a large success. Several groups of unemployed 
do not benefit from activation. Additionally, some of these 
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measures even lead to perceived social isolation and a feeling of 
uselessness among unemployed and disabled people. At the same 
time, and in spite of some favourable changes in labour law, the 
social security for flex-workers remains insufficient.  
Since van Oorschot’s study, flexibility and security have 
remained part of Dutch labour market debates and the country 
continues its search for a balance between flexibility and security, 
implementing laws such as the Act Work and Security (Wet werk 
en zekerheid 2015) and the Act Act Labour Market in Balance 
(Wet arbeidsmarkt in balans, 2020). The latter aims to bridge the 
gap between ‘flex’ and ‘permanent’ by stipulating that people who 
have had three consecutive fixed-term contracts over the period 
of three years have to be offered a permanent contract. The final 
conclusions of the Dutch Committee Regulation of Work 
(Commissie Regulering van Werk / Commissie Bortslap, January 
2020) underline that current rules still do not match the challenges 
of working anno 2020. Groups of workers struggle with having 
insecure and low-quality work for a longer period of time. This 
not only poses a threat to the Dutch social cohesion but also to 
the economy, as it affects the availability of skilled people in a 
negative way. The Committee therefore suggests an integral 
redesign of the rules on labour, social security, taxation and the 
ability to engage in learning and upskilling throughout the life 
course. 
The remainder of this chapter deals with the current state and 
trends in Dutch labour market flexibility, adding two relevant 
perspectives: that of labour market dynamics and that of workers’ 
well-being. The chapter first follows different generations that 
have flown into the Dutch labour market after having finished 
their school or studies. It shows which transitions starters make in 
their first six years in the Dutch labour market, and whether there 
are differences between generations. Second, it looks at the self-
reported wellbeing of early career workers who have been in 
flexible jobs for long periods of time. 
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11.2  Generations on an ever more flexible labour market: 
which transitions do they make? 
As outlined above, flexibilisation is typical for the Dutch labour 
market. However, in other European countries the ‘typical’ 
employment relationship has decreased as well (Eurofound, 2017). 
Young people enter a very dynamic labour market, and less and 
less people have permanent employment contracts. In our 
research (Bekker and Pop, 2020; van Deurzen and Bekker, 2018), 
we used data from ‘het Arbeidsaanbodpanel’ we used data from 
'het Arbeidsaanbodpanel' (Labour Force Panel; SCP, 2016). More 
specifically, we analysed the waves 1985 to 2014 to follow 
‘starters’ in the labour market during the first six years of their 
careers. The guiding research questions were: can young people 
still expect stable jobs? What are the differences between the 
generations entering the labour market in the 1990s and early 
2000s (which van Oorschot studied) and current generations? 
What are actually the typical labour market trajectories of starters? 
Do systems of labour law and social security help people to make 
transitions into more-stable employment?  
In order to see which trajectories different generations of early 
career workers take in the labour market, we followed them 
during the first six years after their education finished. Figure 11.1 
distinguishes four different statuses: typical (permanent or open-
ended employment contract), atypical (temporary work or self-
employment), jobseeker (unemployment or looking for a job), and 
inactivity. The latter means not having and not looking for a job. 
During the investigated period between 1985 and 2014, the use of 
temporary contracts has increased. However, not only do we find 
that the labour market has become more flexible. It has also 
become more turbulent (Bekker and Pop, 2020), that is, young 
people change more often to a different kind of labour contract. 
They have a chain of different employment statuses. For example, 
in the past they switched only once from temporary to permanent 



















































employment, but young people nowadays more often switch 
between labour market statuses: from temporary employment to 
unemployed, back to temporary employment, to permanent and 
back to temporary work.  
From the generation who entered the labour market between 
1985 and 1999, 39 per cent found a permanent starting job. An 
equal number entered the labour market with an atypical type of 
contract. After six years, a whopping 79 per cent of all starters had 





















Source: Arbeidsaanbodpanel SCP, own edit, see: Bekker and van Deurzen, 2019.  
Figure 11.1  Distribution of labour market status of starters on the labour 
market, by educational level (in percentage)  
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In the period 2000 to 2007, we saw 37 per cent starting with a 
flexible contract, but only 24 per cent started in a permanent 
employment. In this period, there was also high unemployment 
among starters. After six years, 66 per cent of the starters still had 
a flexible labour market status. Hence, in this period already, the 
permanent contract was not the final stage for the majority of 
starters. The youngest generation we followed shows an even 
greater flexibility. This generation started participating in the 
labour market between 2008 and 2014, mostly in atypical 
contracts (56 per cent). After six years, from this generation, 86 
per cent were still in flexible jobs. The majority of young people’s 
labour market trajectories no longer ended with permanent 
contracts. On the contrary, a large part keeps hopping between 
temporary contracts, while an increasing group starts working as 
self-employed. Whereas the permanent employment contract was 
still the norm before 2000, nowadays it seems to be more of an 
exception than a regularity.  
These results make van Oorschot’s (2004) original call to give 
sufficient social security to flex workers ever more important. 
Social security for flex workers would not only mean access to 
income support when making a transition to a next temporary job. 
It could also support people in finding new suitable employment, 
for instance actively bringing them into contact with new 
employers, thus building bridges between jobs (Borghouts and 
Freese, 2017). 
Additionally, Figure 11.2 shows that less stable labour market 
status is not equally distributed among groups. In particular, 
groups with lower levels of education have been flowing into an 
ever more flexible labour market. Flexibilisation might facilitate 
their access to a job. However, at the same time, it means only 
having access to fixed-term employment and no options to get 
permanent employment contracts. Hence, low-skilled have a hard 
time in obtaining a stable career and a stable income. 
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Figure 11.2  Distribution plot of the labour market statuses observed during 
the 6 years after entering the labour market 
11.3  The impact of long-term flexible work on health 
If the Dutch labour market offers atypical employment to early 
career workers for a longer period, what does this mean in terms 
of their wellbeing? Using the same dataset as previously, since 
2000, we can measure how workers in atypical employment rate 
their health. We have done this for young people who entered the 
labour market in the period between 2002 and 2008. We look at 
the effect of the cumulation of atypical employment spells on 
health. Because nowadays it is quite normal to enter the labour 
market with an atypical employment contract, this is not 
immediately a negative thing. We reason that it is the unfulfilled 
expectation of transitioning into secure employment that could 
become a stressor with negative effects on health. Table 11.1 
shows that especially for men, accumulation of atypical labour 
contracts relates to experiencing worse health (van Deurzen and 
Bekker, 2019). We do not find this relationship for women. The 
% 
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dataset does not allow to derive an explanation for this. It could 
be that the Dutch society still endorses the single earner 
breadwinner model, and attaining a secure work arrangement 
could matter more to men than to women. Alternatively, these 
results could reflect the specific life stage traversed by the early 
career workers, that is, of starting a family. If so, and given that 
they are still primary caretakers for small children, women are 
more likely to consider the flexibility of atypical employment as a 
positive feature that allows them to combine work and care. This 
does not have to mean that long periods in flexible working 
contracts have no negative effects for young women. We have 
only tested the effect on self-rated health but have no information 
on other effects, for instance on mental illness. 
Table 11.1  Results of the fixed effects models for the dependent variable of 
self-rated health 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3w Model 3m 




-0.03 (0.03) -0.09 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) -0.09 (0.04) 
* with women (men ref.) 0.11 (0.06)   
N respondents  593 593 321 272 
N observations  1181 1181 637 544 
Notes: Effects (with associate standard errors).  
 Bold effects are statistically significant for p < 0.05.  
 w stands for the women subsample; m stands for the male subsample. 
 * interaction with cumulative atypical employment variable. 
11.4  Conclusion 
Van Oorschot (2004) rightfully addressed the need to provide 
decent social security to people with flexible jobs. Looking at the 
ever-growing labour market flexibility, which for some groups 
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even turns into turbulent and chaotic labour markets, his call to 
provide social security remains highly relevant. In addition to this, 
van Oorschot’s critique (2004) of policies that activate (young) 
people into unstable jobs without a long-term perspective for a 
stable income or career remains important in current labour 
markets. Especially the low-skilled seem to have to cope with the 
prospect of predominant flexibility, without much perspective of 
getting an open-ended employment contract.  
It is good to discuss the effects of flexible employment for 
employees, including the effects for young people. In this 
discussion, it also needs to be weighted to what extent we can 
offer Dutch young people a perspective on permanent 
employment, or help them in their steps from temporary to 
temporary jobs. It means answering questions such as if and how 
a flexible or even turbulent labour market may be combined with 
a perspective on a career and a stable income. If a permanent 
contract no longer is a realistic perspective, we need to find 
inclusivity in different areas, such as social security. In this respect, 
it is very welcome that the Committee Regulation of Work (2020) 
calls for an integral redesign of the Dutch rules regarding work, 
including labour law, social security, taxation and access to 
learning throughout the life course. This seems a necessity to 
make sure that ‘chaos’ and ‘turbulence’ on the labour market no 
longer lead to exclusion, long-term insecurity and bad health. This 
is even more important for people with primary education as 
highest acquired level. Social security systems should thus make 
sure that people in-between different employment statuses get 
enough income support. Partly, this is also needed for people who 
do have a job but still cannot make ends meet. Yet, other types of 
support have to be developed as well, including support in making 
the transition from job to job, thus building bridges to future and 
eventually more-secure employment. 
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12.  Entering the Labour Market 
Dualism Dilemma: a ‘Macro-
Micro-Macro’ Perspective to 
Investigate Social Divides in 
European Labour Markets 
Valeria Pulignano and Nadja Doerflinger  
I like friends who have independent minds because they tend to make 
you see problems from all angles (Nelson Mandela, 1975). 
12.1  The labour market dualism dilemma  
Labour market dualisation between a secure and an insecure 
labour force has become a striking feature of a number of 
European labour markets. Scholars disagree on whether the 
weakening of labour market and collective bargaining institutions 
increase uncertainty for all workers or whether dualisation results 
from these institutions which aim to protect the security of labour 
market insiders at the expense of outsiders (Rueda, 2007). 
Furthermore, the link between dualism and unemployment in 
macro-level research on labour markets has been highlighted. In 
particular, within a well-protected (or rigid) labour market, 
employers would be reluctant to employ workers on secure 
standard employment contracts to keep a certain level of flexibility 
(see the ‘insider-outsider’ debate for example Lindbeck and 
Snower, 1988). As Colin Crouch points out ‘if standard 
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employment is itself precarious, no one will need to occupy a 
particular precarious niche’ (Crouch, 2019: 85).  
In this vein, the rather ‘static’ argument on dualism and 
employment protection has been challenged. Several studies 
illustrate that firms embedded in labour market institutional 
settings increasingly employ workers outside the frame of the 
standard employment contract (for example, Rubery et al., 2018; 
Pulignano et al., 2016). Specifically, employers can minimise the 
impact of employment protection legislation by hiring workers 
with lower protection levels who usually are on temporary 
employment contacts (Vosko, 2010; Stone and Arthurs, 2013), 
‘on-call’ (such as in the gig economy) (Wood et al., 2019) or ‘zero-
hours’ contracts (Gasparri et al., 2019). Employing workers on 
non-standard contracts often contributes to removing them from 
union jurisdiction (Doellgast et al., 2018). In addition, those 
workers may not enjoy the same (macro-level) protections as 
those employed on standard employment contracts.  
This brief discussion has two essential implications. First, 
studying dualism only at the macro level can be too narrow since 
factors at both the firm and industry/sector levels equally account 
for changes towards more unequal labour market outcomes 
(Becher et al., 2012; Pulignano and Keune, 2015). Second, 
standard and non-standard forms of employment are 
heterogeneous. There is within-group variation in work outcomes, 
for example, linked to different forms of work within both broad 
groups (that is, temporary, part-time, zero-hours contracts as 
different forms of non-standard employment).  
This is why current studies in welfare, employment and labour 
market research have increasingly addressed the need to move 
beyond ‘methodological nationalism’ (Häusermann and 
Schwander, 2010; Eichhorst and Marx, 2015; Pulignano, 2018), 
and to develop an integrative analytical framework when 
examining inequality, dualism and precariousness in European 
labour markets. The challenge to develop such a framework in a 
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sound theoretical and empirical way constituted the basis of the 
collaboration with our KU Leuven colleague Wim van Oorschot, 
which started in 2014.  
The core of this intellectual challenge was to move away from a 
pure macro-level institutional analysis of labour market dualism, 
and thus, to find a way to combine macro- and micro-level 
structures, behaviours and social interests when examining labour 
market dualism. The combination of different analytical levels was 
essential because of a simple principle of industrial relations, that 
is, institutions regulate employment at different levels (that is, 
European, national, (inter-)sector, company, workplace). 
Therefore, macro-level (national) institutional effects may be 
reproduced at lower levels. For example, working conditions in 
the private and public sector of a country usually differ with 
regard to individual dismissal regulation, remuneration systems, 
and employee representation rights. Moreover, the increase of 
employers’ discretionary power (Baccaro and Howell, 2017) 
potentially enhances organisations’ control upon working 
conditions (for example, wages and working time) everywhere. 
However, distinctive national and sector-based industrial relations 
and welfare institutions (for example, trade unions, collective 
bargaining, social benefits) still retain capacity to monitor and 
mediate diverse degrees of compliance and/or exit to labour 
market regulation (Meardi, 2018). Thus, the major question 
informing our collaboration was: how can we link macro (institutional) 
and micro (individual) levels of analysis when studying labour market 
dualism?  
12.2  Studying labour market dualism from a macro-micro-
macro approach: the social divides perspective 
Labour markets, industrial (employment) relations and welfare 
arrangements are a coherent entity. However, these fields still 
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largely remain empirically separated within current scholarly work. 
The pioneering work we developed with Wim van Oorschot 
deserves to be mentioned as one of the few expectations. Wim’s 
insightful input regarding the use of a macro-micro-macro 
perspective to investigate social divides in European labour 
markets entailed to offer a novel theoretical and empirical 
perspective to study labour market dualism.  
We define social divides as differences or inequalities in 
working conditions, job quality and social rights of different 
groups of workers (distinguished by gender, age, education level, 
nationality and type of employment contract). Two interrelated 
analytical considerations have underpinned our research rationale. 
First, the impact of macro-level social structures depends to an 
important extent on micro-level social actions (Marx, 2012). Thus, 
we aimed to demonstrate that macro-level social structures as well 
as micro-level strategies and social processes concur together to 
enhance or inhibit social divides. Second, macro-level institutions 
provide direction to the way social actors act at the micro-level, 
but they do not determine their actions (Pulignano and Keune, 
2015). These considerations highlight the necessity to bridge 
different (that is, macro-micro) levels of social analysis; and we 
were convinced of the usefulness for studying labour market 
dualism.  
In the 1970s–1980s, the debate on the emergence of labour 
market dualism focused on the micro-level, examining the impact 
of individuals’ behaviour and social actors’ preferences on 
segmentation within firms. Accordingly, the differential treatment 
between a protected ‘core’ (primary or internal labour market) and 
a less protected ‘peripheral’ (secondary or external labour market) 
workforce was considered as a function of the firm’s economic, 
political and social resources (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Berger 
and Piore 1980). Over time, this micro-analytical perspective was 
gradually abandoned and in recent years the dualisation debate has 
largely focused on the macro-level. Accordingly, social divides are 
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conceived as the result of structural policy shifts. This is because 
micro-level actors are expected to act according to macro-level 
institutional logics (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Palier and Thelen, 
2010). Dualisation thus denotes a ‘political process by which 
policies increasingly differentiate rights, benefits and services 
provided to different categories of recipients’ (Emmenegger et al., 
2012: 207–208).  
In accordance, scholars have investigated various macro-level 
institutions and mechanisms leading to the creation of outsiders, 
that is, (1) governments’ social policy reforms in the 2000s with 
limited redistributive capacities (Gilbert, 2002); (2) dismissal 
protection legislation, unions’ institutional involvement and labour 
market policies which have exacerbated or limited insider-outsider 
differences (Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013); (3) social and 
migration policy reforms and eroding collective industrial relations 
institutions which are believed to increase insider-outsider divides 
(Emmenegger and Careja, 2012; Arrowsmith and Pulignano, 
2013). Hence, neither the micro-level mechanisms easing or 
preventing social divides nor their interaction with macro-level 
structures have been sufficiently addressed. This left the question 
of how social divides are produced in European labour markets 
largely unexplored. 
Our research ideas aimed to integrate a micro-level perspective 
with a macro-level focus to enhance the theoretical explanatory 
potential of the macro-level contextual variables in shaping social 
divides. Following sociological theory on methodological 
individualism, we argued that linking the macro and micro levels 
was crucial since micro-variables alone cannot explain macro-level 
outcomes and vice versa. As Coleman (1990) argues, macro-micro 
links are the ‘micro foundations’ of macro-level outcomes.  
We were convinced that our research idea on developing a 
macro-micro-macro analytical framework for studying labour 
market dualism is relevant for sociological theory, as the latter 
advocates a dynamic approach to the study of labour markets. 
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This is because internal and external competitive pressures 
deriving from firms’ strategies mutually interact to shape 
individuals’ behaviours, and this concurs to shape workers’ labour 
market positions (Grimshaw and Rubery, 1998). Such 
considerations informed our central research question, that is, 
‘How are social divides produced in contemporary European labour 
markets?’. However, an essential question remained, that is, How 
can social divides be empirically investigated from a macro-micro-macro 
perspective?; or How can the macro-micro-macro perspective be put in action?  
12.3  Exploring empirically the macro-micro-macro link  
To bridge different (that is, macro-micro) levels of social analysis 
and to explore the macro-micro-macro-link, we considered a 
sequential mixed-methods research design as the best way to 
address the different aspects of our research problem. We have 
envisaged three steps: first, uncovering social divides between 
different groups of workers at the micro-level; second, explaining 
those divides by measuring the impact of macro-level institutions; 
third, explaining the uncovered divides by studying processes and 
mechanisms taking place at the level of organisations embedded in 
sectors. Again, Wim’s inputs (complemented by ideas from our 
KU Leuven colleague Bart Meuleman) were crucial, particularly 
regarding the first step.  
We decided to measure social divides based on latent class 
analysis (LCA) as an innovative method for uncovering different 
labour market segments. This was, however, only possible for 
divides regarding job quality (based on European Working 
Conditions Survey data) and working conditions (based on 
European Labour Force Survey data). Due to the lack of 
comparative European datasets providing information on 
differences in entitlements to social benefits for certain social risks 
(that is, unemployment, sickness, disability, old age, care need) 
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and on the amounts of such entitlements, we could not include 
the social rights dimension in this step. We have considered using 
the European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC). However, as it contains only data on the actual benefit 
receipt and not the entitlement to those benefits, using EU-SILC 
was not an option. After in-depth discussions, we decided to 
integrate the social rights dimension at the micro-level through 
qualitative interviews on workers’ social rights and entitlements 
provided through ‘occupational welfare’ (Natali and Pavolini, 
2014). The inclusion of the occupational welfare dimension is 
important as employers have become important providers of 
‘market-driven’ social benefits at company- and sector-levels 
(Goodin and Rein, 2001). Related provisions may include non-
wage benefits (that is, fringe benefits) and are provided to 
employees through collective agreements.  
Integrating the occupational welfare dimension in the study of 
social divides is relevant as occupational welfare programmes may 
potentially reinforce social divides (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012) for 
three reasons. First, private social protection can constitute a 
functional equivalent of public social protection for some but not 
for all occupational groups, which potentially results in a 
bifurcation of welfare. Second, occupational welfare programmes 
are based on a strong connection between the characteristics of 
the employment contract and access to benefit entitlements. In 
post-industrial societies, labour conditions between (contractual) 
groups of workers are increasingly differentiated, which could lead 
to fostering social divides. Third, institutional changes of public 
welfare may lead to social divides resulting from the abandonment 
of the universalistic ambition of modern social policy programmes 
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12.4  Conclusion 
The research ideas developed around the concept of social divides 
received funding from KU Leuven (C14/16/015) and the Flemish 
Research Council FWO (G071716N). Both projects attracted 
attention from the scientific community and contributed to 
advancing knowledge in the field of employment studies and 
labour sociology. Several articles have already been published, 
while others are under review or in preparation.  
The conceptual framework presenting the macro-micro-macro 
framework and its implications for the study of social divides in 
labour markets was the first paper to be published (Pulignano and 
Doerflinger, 2018). Two interrelated papers focusing on the first 
step of the approach – that is, uncovering social divides – have 
been published recently (Lukac et al., 2019, with a methodological-
empirical focus; Doerflinger et al., 2020, with a theoretical-
empirical focus). Both papers identify five distinct segments in 
European labour markets, demonstrating that there is more 
variation than assumed by binary dualisation approaches. They 
also highlight the intersection between workers’ socio-
demographic backgrounds and belonging to certain labour market 
segments. Another recently accepted article (Frans et al., 2019) 
revealed that occupational welfare provision can indeed lead to 
labour market segmentation between different groups of workers 
based on a comparative study of the chemical and food industries 
in Belgium and Germany. It particularly highlights the importance 
of power relations, social actors’ strategies and characteristics of 
collective bargaining systems as important variables in explaining 
segmentation outcomes.  
These first publications demonstrate the usefulness and the 
power of the macro-micro-macro framework for the study of 
labour market dualism. Due to the attention our work has 
received so far, we are convinced that it will become an important 
building block of future research and scholarly inquiry. It is also 
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our contention that it will offer scope for future research across 
the themes of labour, employment and welfare and social policy, 
thereby further developing Wim’s original ideas and insightful 
contribution to studying social divides in European labour 
markets. THANKS Wim! 
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13.  Targeting in Social Security and 
Healthcare: the Promises and 
Pitfalls of Digital Technologies 
Wim Van Lancker and Ine Van Hoyweghen 
13.1  Introduction 
Wim van Oorschot is a great scholar and a generous colleague. He 
is a leading expert in several fields of welfare state research which 
many chapters in this book testify. But he is also on top of new 
developments and always willing to share his thoughts and ideas 
with others. In this chapter, we want to discuss one new 
development that Wim focused upon early in his work, and which 
he encouraged us to further develop in our own work: 
digitalisation and the organisation of solidarity in the welfare state. 
Digitalisation refers to the widespread use of digital 
technologies to automate or support human decision-making 
processes. It includes ‘Big Data’ analytics, machine learning 
algorithms and artificial intelligence. Well-known examples exist in 
the fields of insurance, profiling, human resources, journalism, 
credit scoring systems, the criminal justice system, and in a range 
of online and social media applications. Such automated decision-
making (ADM) processes are increasingly deployed in the public 
realm of the welfare state. It brings together different types of 
information such as large-scale public administration databases or 
behavioural information drawn from social media. These are 
churned by algorithms to detect patterns and aid the allocation of 
benefits or the provision of services in modern welfare states. In 
this contribution, we discuss the potential consequences of 
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digitalisation for the organisation of solidarity in two domains: 
social security and healthcare. 
Digital technologies and the combination of large datasets are 
increasingly used to allow for a more precise or targeted delivery 
of public services and goods. Targeting refers to the allocation of 
goods and services on the basis of a set of pre-defined criteria: 
who should get what and why? (van Oorschot, 2000). Targeting 
healthcare interventions on the basis of individual lifestyle 
characteristics and needs is expected to make healthcare provision 
more effective on the one hand and to spare people and societies 
the side-effects and costs of interventions from which they would 
not benefit on the other hand. Similarly, targeting income 
protection benefits to people on the basis of ADM processes is 
supposed to be a more efficient spending of public resources as 
benefits are limited to those who actually need them. As such, 
digital technologies allegedly enable an unprecedented level of 
precision in the delivery of goods and services. This holds great 
promise of avoiding one of the biggest dysfunctions of targeting: 
administrative complexity and the problem of non-take-up.  
In his seminal 2002 book chapter on targeting income benefits, 
Wim took a sceptical stance towards the promise of targeting 
welfare: ‘[It] generally implies lower benefits, stronger and more 
intrusive controls over personal circumstances and activities, more 
complex obstacles to the realization of rights, fewer opportunities 
to become better-off and a greater chance of needy citizens being 
seen (and treated) as second-rate people’ (2002: 187). As we will 
discuss in this contribution, these words turned out to be quite 
prophetic. Instead of making targeting more effective, the use of 
digital technologies in social security and in healthcare runs a great 
risk of aggravating these dysfunctions. 
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13.2  Targeting social security benefits 
It is quite obvious that social security systems should be effective 
in actually reaching those citizens who are entitled to benefits and 
services. Being entitled to a benefit without actually receiving it, or 
without even being able to apply for it, is not an effective system 
of solidarity; it is a mere paper reality at the expense of the most 
vulnerable. Unfortunately, the welfare state is rife with problems 
of non-take-up (NTU) of social rights and benefits. Despite the 
fact that already in the 1980s NTU has been designated ‘one of 
the most serious problems facing social security systems’ (Fry and 
Stark, 1987), it is still pervasive across welfare states. In particular 
for means-tested benefits, it is estimated that NTU frequently 
affects more than half of the eligible population (Eurofound, 
2015).  
More than two decades ago, Wim put forward a powerful 
critique of the majority of studies at the time that tried to explain 
non-take-up (NTU) by focusing solely on the individual claimant 
level (van Oorschot, 1996). One of Wim’s key insights was that 
the role of social professionals in public administration is 
important to understand the occurrence of NTU. In a variety of 
settings, professionals, social workers or civil servants have to 
decide upon or carry out an increasingly complex set of rules, 
guidelines, and instructions. This is called discretion and refers to 
some leeway in their decision-making. Because legislation can 
never be tailored to every specific circumstance or situation, 
discretion means that professionals can and will exert their power 
to treat clients or customers differently and choose a particular 
course of action in accordance to their own, subjective judgement. 
Be it a teacher who decides upon grade retention, a human 
resource professional who has to decide upon whether to invite a 
job candidate or not, or a social worker who has to judge whether 
a client was searching hard enough for a job. Previous research 
has shown that the use of discretion by social professionals 
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responsible for checking eligibility to social assistance benefits 
leads to inequality in treatment, to delays in the process, and to 
mistakes in the final decisions. Importantly, a substantial share of 
the variation in decision-making can be explained by 
characteristics of social professionals, including their welfare state 
attitudes and their perception of clients’ deservingness. The study 
of deservingness perceptions is another area where Wim’s work 
has been hugely influential (we refer to many of the chapters in 
this book). In any case, sometimes people do not get what they 
are entitled to because the professionals judging them are 
prejudiced (De Wilde and Marchal, 2019). 
Enter automated decision-making (ADM). Public 
administrations increasingly rely on big datasets which include 
interlinked social security and labour market information of 
citizens. Algorithms, then, are the tools used to churn these 
datasets to identify potential beneficiaries, prioritise benefits 
claimants or service users, predict fraudulent behaviour, or asses 
compliance with eligibility conditions. ADM is promising in 
avoiding the errors humans unavoidably make: algorithms are not 
prejudiced with regard to deservingness criteria and treat everyone 
on the same footing, automated processes running on big datasets 
are usually cheaper than humans ploughing through case files, and 
it shows great potential to proactively identify potential 
beneficiaries and grant social rights automatically, which should 
lead to much higher take-up rates. These are promising features of 
digitalisation indeed. 
Scepticism is nevertheless warranted because digitalisation can 
also be fraught with pitfalls. The use of algorithms churning big 
data can compound the effect of simple errors. Automated 
decisions can be biased and perpetuate prejudice because the 
models are based on skewed or low-quality data. Additionally, 
grave concern has been voiced about a lack of transparency and 
accountability in automated decisions. 
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In 2018, it was announced that Amazon would abandon its 
automated programme to automatically screen résumés and rate 
applicants for its available jobs. It turned out that the algorithm 
was biased against women, reflecting gender inequalities in the 
field of IT, tech and engineering. Trained by biased data, the 
programme learned that men were better suited for tech jobs and, 
as a consequence, were more likely to end up on top of short lists. 
Despite its aura of neutrality and objectivity, ADM tools are only 
as good as the data they are fed with. While the Amazon example 
might seem innocent, applied to social security the consequences 
of bias could be devastating. For instance, algorithms that are 
deployed on big databases to predict child abuse will 
disproportionally target minorities and low-income families 
because that was the prejudice that crept into human decision-
making before. If the content of underlying databases are a 
reflection of deservingness perceptions of civil servants, 
algorithms will tend to reproduce these biases. Particularly 
problematic here is the scale of things. While case managers can 
have prejudices that lead to unequal treatment of particular clients, 
ADM risks compounding errors affecting thousands of 
beneficiaries at once. In her book on automation practices in the 
US, Virginia Eubanks (2018) documents how the systematic 
replacement of case workers by automated processes in the 
welfare administration in Indiana has led to a dramatic reduction 
of beneficiaries due to the combination of deliberate policies to 
save money, technological failures, inability to hold private 
contractors accountable, and the lack of human oversight to 
intervene in the process or rectify computer errors. 
The problem not only lies with data quality. It also lies in the 
very nature of social security which often relies on human 
judgement that cannot easily be quantified or programmed. 
Michael Lipsky once famously wrote that ‘the nature of service 
provision calls for human judgement that cannot be programmed 
and for which machines cannot substitute’ (2010: 161). Although 
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human discretion inevitably can lead to misjudgement, it can also 
lead to empathy, care, and the possibility to bend the rules to the 
benefit of vulnerable people. Moreover, replacing human 
decision-making by automated processes might also increase NTU 
because many vulnerable people lack the digital savviness to deal 
with online application systems. Life experiences are complex and 
automated systems, even if they are top notch, may not always be 
able to cope with these complexities. In a recent study, Millar and 
Whiteford (2019) document how fully-automated systems in the 
UK (Universal Credit) and Australia (CentreLink), designed to 
match data on incomes, family composition and employment in 
real time in order to predict benefit payments, are extremely error-
prone. As a result, the number of alleged overpayments rose 
strongly. Many families had to repay large amounts of debts, 
which disproportionately affected families with irregular incomes 
and pushed them deep into the abyss.  
Finally, the lack of transparency and accountability is a problem 
deeply engrained in automated decision-making. Usually, social 
professionals dealing with clients and benefit recipients are not 
those who have designed the algorithm nor have access to the 
black box of automated-decision-making. It is hard to challenge 
decisions and benefit refusals if it is not clear what criteria 
influenced the decision. This is particularly the case where 
administrators and social professionals themselves are no longer 
aware of the logic of the decision-making process. 
An important part of the theoretical framework developed by 
Wim to explain NTU is that it is the result of a multilevel process 
in which different actors are simultaneously involved: claimant 
behaviour is influenced by the behaviour of administrators and by 
the design of the benefit scheme (van Oorschot, 1996). It is 
striking how useful this framework remains until today and how 
neatly new developments such as the digitalisation of the welfare 
state can be fitted in it. 
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13.3  Targeting healthcare 
In healthcare, digital technologies have made it possible to capture 
ever wider aspects of people’s bodies and behaviours to stratify 
them into more-granular and more-dynamic groups according to 
their ‘personalised’ health profile. The notion of ‘Precision 
Medicine’ marks the shift towards a type of medicine that 
empowers patients by being more participatory and personalised 
than biomedicine has been in the past. The imperative of 
Personalised and Precision Medicine is that no two patients 
should be treated exactly the same, and each should be given 
diagnosis, treatment and monitoring that is tailored to their 
specific, individual characteristics. These practices of targeting, in 
the form of stratification or predictive profiling, do not place 
people in stable diagnostic or therapeutic groups where they then 
remain for a long time. Instead, they create new group categories 
on the basis of molecular and other characteristics that may be 
short lived. For example, breast cancer screening is no longer 
reserved for the broad category of women above a certain age. 
Instead, women who carry a particular molecular characteristic – 
for example one of the BRCA gene mutations that increase the 
risk of breast and ovarian cancer considerably – are invited for 
screening from a much younger age, in smaller intervals, and they 
have access to special screening services in certain healthcare 
systems. Furthermore, when a woman is diagnosed with breast 
cancer, the choice of treatment that she will receive is often 
influenced by the size of the tumour, the stage of the cancer, and 
the woman’s personal status and preferences (for example, 
menopausal status, age, would she prefer breast-conserving 
surgery, if possible?), but also by the tumour’s molecular subtype 
including hormone receptor status and other genomic markers. 
This means that the old categories of gender and age are now 
operating in combination with molecular and other categories 
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front 
 
 146 
pertaining to treatment response, familial, lifestyle-related, or 
genetic risk factors to shape the care pathway. 
Against the backdrop of these developments, there are 
concerns that the focus on personalised targeting and individual 
differences will have a corrosive effect on solidarity in healthcare. 
The process of dynamically stratifying people into (ever smaller) 
groups and using these ‘personalised’ classifications not only for 
treatment and other clinical purposes but to determine different 
levels or kinds of contributions that people need to make to the 
financing of the system is seen as breaking up the idea of risk and 
income solidarity that have characterised many welfare state 
institutions. For example, what happens when resources and 
services are scarce, and access to them will be limited to those 
who have the highest predicted benefit? In other words, what if 
those that are excluded are not merely women who will not 
benefit from an intervention, but those that are predicted to 
benefit less than others? This is the realm of silent rationing 
(Prainsack and Van Hoyweghen, 2020): The categories and 
practices of stratification are becoming harder to trace, and are 
sometimes made invisible. The affected people have no control 
over (at least some of) the categories that are used for 
stratification. Often, they do not even know.do often not even 
know that a certain type of information is used. This, of course, 
applies also to clinical decision-making in traditional contexts in 
which patients do often not know what information is used to put 
them into different diagnostic, prognostic or therapeutic groups. 
When decisions on stratification are made by humans, however, 
these humans can be asked to explain and be held accountable. 
Such explicability and accountability is much more difficult when 
decision-makers are machines (Marelli et al, 2020). Moreover, 
when categories of stratification are dynamic and the association 
between people and categories are fluid, it becomes practically 
impossible for people to address biases that have implications on 
fairness and equity; let alone to recognise themselves as being part 
Targeting in Social Security and Healthcare 
 147 
of a social ‘group’, imagining themselves as being discriminated 
against (Moor and Lury 2018).  
Further, as soon as behavioural information such as activity 
levels or sleeping patterns is used, it is only a small step to 
moralising these behaviours (Meyers and Van Hoyweghen, 2018). 
For example, let us assume that two patients compete for a place 
in the same clinical trial. Both have the same predicted benefit 
based on factors such as their cancer type and stage, their overall 
health status, their genetic predisposition. One of them is then 
found to lead a more sedentary lifestyle and sleeps irregularly. In 
this situation, it could appear perfectly ‘rational’ to exclude the 
person with the unhealthy lifestyle and give the precious place to 
the other person. In this manner, the use of behavioural 
information to stratify patients into groups for diagnosis and 
treatment can introduce individual responsibility into healthcare 
stratification through the back door. Such logic is particularly 
pervasive when political discourses strongly emphasise the strains 
on healthcare budgets. The real threat to solidarity is a public 
discourse that emphasises differences in costs and risks between 
people and suggests that these differences fall within the realm of 
personal responsibility, such as unhealthy lifestyle ‘choices’, or 
others who are considered as ‘free riders’ in another way 
(Hendrickx and Van Hoyweghen, 2018). These people, so it is 
argued, have removed themselves from the realm of those who 
‘deserve’ our solidarity. Again, Wim’s work on deservingness 
criteria for solidarity is seminal here to address. This morally 
charged debate about perceived ‘deservingness’ constitutes the 
ground of political efforts to assign responsibilities between the 
state, tax payers, insurers and individuals in welfare states. Digital 
technologies such as predictive profiling in healthcare tend to 
mobilise new ‘categories of worth’ of potential beneficiaries of 
healthcare that are presented as the result of individuals’ personal 
choice (Meyers and Van Hoyweghen, 2018).  
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Taking the argument a step further, behaviour would no longer 
need to be openly labelled as ‘irresponsible’ in order to be seen 
problematic. Instead, seemingly innocuous behavioural 
characteristics such as preferences for certain types of foods or 
exercise habits, if found to be associated with worse disease 
outcomes than other characteristics, would acquire the role of 
‘objective’ evidence upon which people are excluded from certain 
services. Given that those living in economic and social 
deprivation have, on average, worse health conditions, it is 
possible that characteristics that are prevalent in this group could 
become markers of worse health outcomes. The institutional 
danger here is that we are ‘editing out’ social justice considerations 
from our welfare state institutional arrangements (Prainsack and 
Van Hoyweghen, 2020). This situation is, however, not only 
rendered invisible by the air of objectivity that digital data-driven 
analyses often entail, but also by the fluid nature of data-driven 
risk stratification. If a correlation is found between two factors, 
then acting upon this correlation is seen as following the data and 
as not taking a political decision (Van Hoyweghen, 2014). 
Especially where behavioural aspects underpin such stratification, 
risk becomes a matter of personal responsibility. Through these 
mechanisms, practices of silent rationing would introduce social 
justice issues on top of the health disparities that we are already 
observing in many societies. Silent rationing threatens solidarity 
not by attacking it head-on, but by quietly taking it apart into 
small pieces (Prainsack and Van Hoyweghen, 2020). 
13.4  Conclusion 
Impact in academia is usually gauged on the basis of metrics such 
as h-indices or number of citations. And although Wim scores 
particularly well on these metrics, his true impact perhaps is that 
his theoretical as well as his empirical work remains highly 
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relevant to understand new societal developments and guide new 
research questions.  
How digitalisation affects the organisation of solidarity in 
welfare states is one of these fields where his academic legacy is 
long-lived. In this chapter, we touched upon some of the promises 
and pitfalls that are associated with the digitalisation of the welfare 
state, drawing on the examples of social security and healthcare. 
This deserves, of course, further scrutiny and more empirical 
research. We hope this chapter inspires more researchers to take 
on these questions in the same way as Wim van Oorschot always 
did throughout his career: critically, but always with great rigour. 
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14.  Dutch Local Trust Experiments: 
Workfare or Social Investment – 
What Works Better and Why? 
Ruud JA Muffels 
14.1  Preface on Wim’s career 
For almost 15 years, between 1985 and 1999, Tilburg University 
was accommodating the multidisciplinary Department of Social 
Security. This department was headed by professor Jos Berghman 
and Wim van Oorschot was one of the first assistant professors. 
Already at that time, Wim was publishing on the same issues as he 
still is: non-take-up (1991), deservingness (2000), poverty (2000, 
with Halman), social capital and solidarity (2005, with Arts) and 
welfare state issues in general such as means-tested minimum 
income and basic income schemes (Roosma and van Oorschot, 
2020). Long before he published his most cited article on 
deservingness in 2000, he published in 1991 his first article on 
non-take-up of social security in the prominent Journal of European 
Social Policy, of which he later became one of the editors.  
For a period of 14 years, Wim and I worked together on 
welfare state issues but from different disciplinary angles. He is a 
sociologist, whereas I am an economist. Wim worked hard and his 
career developed swiftly with a steep gradient. After he moved to 
Leuven to become the successor of the former head of the 
Department in Tilburg, Jos Berghman, he proceeded to build up 
an even more impressive second career. Over these last 30 years, 
Wim not only stuck to the same research topics but also 
continued to be an excellent researcher and teacher – one that is 
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very clear in what he says (and for that and many other reasons is 
loved by his students), very well documented, with a broad and in-
depth overview of the literature, very well organized and very 
productive. In his entire work, he shows to be engaged with and 
concerned about the position of the weakest in society. This is 
clearly reflected in the topics he covered and covers but also in 
what drives and motivates him as an intellectual and as a person.  
The way the weakest in the labor market are treated in welfare 
provisions is also the subject of this contribution. In what follows, 
I discuss the findings of a unique random control trial (RCT) 
experiment in five Dutch municipalities, which aimed at 
comparing the effectiveness of current ‘workfare’ policies with a 
more lenient way of supporting people on social assistance. The 
latter is based on rendering trust and autonomy to people on the 
one hand and more intensive mediation and tailored support to 
the welfare recipient on the other. The main research question of 
the study was what social policy intervention works better with 
regard to both people’s employability and wellbeing. Pre-selected 
outcome measures focused both on outflow to paid work but also 
on improving the wellbeing, health, capabilities (opportunities), 
social integration and self-management capacities of the people 
participating in the RCT.  
In the next section, I will briefly outline the design and aims of 
these five trust experiments in the Dutch social welfare system 
and the relationship with ‘social investment’ policies (Hemerijck, 
2017). First, the theoretical ideas underpinning the various 
treatments are set out and the conceptual model for the research 
is explained. Then, I briefly report the main results of these two-
year lasting trust experiments and discuss them with reference to 
some of Wim’s publications. Finally, I briefly reflect upon the 
lessons for social policy that can be learned from these findings. 
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14.2  Brief sketch of the Dutch trust experiments 
In autumn 2017, ten municipalities started a unique two-year RCT 
experiment on the basis of the Participation Act.1 Six of them 
made use of the experimentation article 83 in this act allowing 
municipalities to implement a two-year lasting experiment. The 
other four municipalities made use of other existing law to launch 
similar experiments. The only difference between the two 
approaches is that the experiments based on article 83 of the 
Participation Act are allowed to provide for extra earnings releases 
during the experimenting period while the others are not. The 
reason for the experimenting was, among other things, the need 
to improve the effectiveness of social assistance due to budget 
constraints that applied after the Participation Act came into force 
on 1 January 2015. 
The total number of participants in these ten experiments was 
5000. With this, the ten Dutch RCT-experiments were one of the 
biggest experiments in social security ever conducted worldwide, 
even slightly larger than the basic income experiments in the US 
or Canada in the 1970s. 40 per cent or 2068 of the 5000 
participants took part in the five experiments that Tilburg 
University was studying and that are discussed in more detail in 
this contribution. 
The aims of the experiments  
The experiments aimed to investigate what works better: the ‘stick 
and carrot’ approach in the current system (‘the hard hand’) which 
involves many benefit conditions and strict controls, or an 
approach which is based on putting trust in peoples’ intentions, 
paying tribute to their intrinsic motivation, giving more autonomy 
and freedom of choice, intensive mediation and support and 
rewarding people’s initiative in finding work by more-generous 
earnings release conditions (‘the soft hand’; see also Kremer et al., 
2017).  
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The content of the treatments 
Apart from the standard treatment in which people are subject to 
the existing more or less strict application and re-integration 
obligations (the ‘stick and carrot’ of workfare approach), there 
were three different treatments which were rather differently 
implemented in the five participating cities: 
1. The self-management or exemption group. The idea for this group 
is that beneficiaries need to learn how to self-manage their 
re-entry into work. The participants are exempted from the 
existing application and re-integration obligations. In 
Tilburg, they got an additional work bonus when they found 
full-time work. 
2. The earnings release group (only possible for experiments based 
on article 83 of the Participation Act). In case they found 
paid work, the additional earnings of participants in this 
group were taxed at a rate of 50 per cent instead of 75 or 
100 per cent in the standard case (but up to a maximum of 
about € 200 per month only, the income ceiling of which 
was not changed). They were to some extent exempted from 
the application and re-integration obligations except for the 
city of Wageningen where they got the standard treatment.  
3. The tailor-made supervision group. Participants in this group got 
extra support through tailor-made supervision and intensive 
mediation. They had more-frequent contact with their 
caseworker (five to six times a year) and the treatment of the 
client was demand-driven instead of supply-driven, meaning 
that participants could decide on the content of the 
treatment to a large extent. 
In Tilburg, the self-management and the intensive mediation 
conditions were not single treatments but combined with the extra 
earnings release option plus an extra work bonus that was granted 
by the municipality to people who found full-time work. 
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Welfare conditionality  
Access to welfare benefits was not unconditional in these 
experiments. Instead, reciprocity was assumed: in return for the 
wavering of the liabilities, participants had to be committed to and 
put effort into the treatment to make it a success. In some cities, 
they also signed an agreement in which rights and duties were 
stipulated. With this, the welfare experiments aligned with the 
‘deservingness criteria’ which according to Wim’s findings provide 
an important explanation for popular support for welfare benefits 
targeted to people most deserving or in need such as the poor, the 
disabled and the elderly (van Oorschot, 2006). The job search 
obligations were, however, less strict than in the regular treatment, 
that is strongly based on workfare principles (the use of benefit 
sanctions if the strict job search requirements are not met [the 
‘stick’] combined with benefits at some distance of the minimum 
wage to provide financial incentives [the ‘carrot’] when people 
move quickly into paid work). It was assumed that this will 
allegedly put less stress on people and allow them to search for 
better job matches and sustainable employment. The idea of 
rewarding instead of sanctioning was reflected in the reduced 
deduction or withdrawal rate of extra earnings. The municipalities 
expected that the more relaxed and rewarding way of treatment 
(reduced conditionality) would improve the motivation, health 
and wellbeing of the participants in the RCT. 
14.3  Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of the experiments was formed by a 
combination of behavioral economic and social-psychological 
insights. In particular, the following four insights have stood at 
the basis of the experiment.  
The first insight concerns the influence of poverty on the 
‘mindset’ or mental state of people. Research shows that (financial) 
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scarcity and stress due to poverty reduce people’s cognitive 
resources (Mani et al., 2013). If financial scarcity and fulfilling 
social assistance obligations take up a large part of people’s 
cognitive resources, there is little room for important and 
cognitively challenging tasks, such as retraining for another job, 
maintaining the social network or actively looking for paid work 
(Groot et al., 2019).  
The second insight comes from behavioral economics. It deals 
with the principles and values which are embedded in the labor 
market and social security institutions and the way in which they 
influence the behavior of beneficiaries in the form of, for 
example, search behavior. Underlying values include reciprocity 
(‘tit for tat’) and trust. Reciprocity means that individuals reward 
good treatment or the receipt of trust (an investment in social 
relationships) by, for example, making an extra effort (positive 
reciprocity) while doing the opposite if they are treated badly or 
treated on the basis of mistrust (negative reciprocity) (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 2003). Findings from experimental economy also show 
that, in exchange for the trust they receive, people are extra 
motivated and do their best for their task, thus rewarding those 
who trust them (Groot et al., 2019). So, trust is believed to lead to 
feelings of positive reciprocity and therefore to sustained 
commitment and increased productivity (Bohnet et al., 2001). 
The third insight comes from psychological motivation theory, 
suggesting that extrinsic stimuli can crowd out intrinsic 
motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2001). Intrinsic motivation can be 
enhanced by offering an activity as a choice rather than a means 
of control (Groot et al., 2019). Self-determination theory (Deci 
and Ryan, 1985) states that intrinsically motivated people 
demonstrate greater effectiveness and persistence in their 
behavior and improved wellbeing. This means that giving 
confidence to people creates a sense of self-management, which in 
turn has an effect on job-seeking behavior and sustainable 
employment. 
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The fourth and last insight is about capacitating people and 
providing ‘freedom of choice’. It stems from Sen’s ‘capability 
theory’. Within this theory, capabilities are the options people 
have or are offered to be or do the things they have reasons to 
value most for their own lives. This way, people have or are given 
opportunities or options that enhance their wellbeing (Sen, 1999, 
2004). Both the exemption/self-management as well as the 
tailored support treatment learn people to be or become self-
reliant and might therefore render people freedom of action and 
choice while increasing their capability set (set of opportunities). 
Social investment policy 
The fourth insight which builds on Sen’s capacitating approach 
aligns very well with the idea of ‘social investment’. In an earlier 
paper, me and some colleagues argued that the experiments might 
promote an upcoming shift from ‘workfare’-oriented policies, 
which is still rather dominant in the Netherlands, to ‘social 
investment’ policy approaches (Groot et al., 2019). The idea was 
that the experiments put particular social values more upfront, 
such as personal autonomy (capacitating people by providing ‘free 
choice’ options) and trust (activating people by putting trust in 
their self-management capacities). For that reason, the five local 
experiments discussed here were labelled ‘trust experiments’. We 
expected that notably the tailored support treatment will also have 
positive effects on ‘procedural justice’ (tailored support will help 
to avoid administrative mistakes) and reduce ‘non-take-up’ 
(tailored support will inform participants on their rights and 
opportunities), issues on which Wim showed particular interest 
and published in the past (van Oorschot, 1991). 
According to Sen, conversion factors convert the available 
personal resources such as knowledge, skills and social networks 
into individual choices or capabilities. In Wim’s contributions to 
the literature, many references can be found, though implicitly, to 
personal (welfare state values, opinions and principles) as well as  



























































































































































































































































































































































































Dutch Local Trust Experiments 
 159 
contextual conversion factors (on procedural justice, non-take-up, 
universality, targeting) (Oorschot, 1991, 2004). In Figure 14.1, the 
personal and contextual conversion factors are partly shaped by 
the design and content of the experimental treatments.  
14.4  Research outcomes  
The research consisted of a product and a process evaluation. The 
product evaluation was aimed at determining whether or not each 
of the various treatments perform better than the comparison 
group. The ‘primary’ outcome measure is outflow into full-time 
employment (that is, working more than 27 hours a week). The 
‘secondary’ or non-work outcome measures are: subjective 
wellbeing (SWB), subjective health (SH), mental health (MH), 
perceived capabilities (CAP), social trust (SRUST), self-efficacy in 
finding work (SEFF), social networking (SNETW) and income 
and deprivation poverty reduction (IPR; DPR). See Appendix 
14A.1 for an overview of the exact operationalizations. The work 
outcome measure is assessed using the local administrative data 
on outflow whereas the results on the non-work outcome 
measures are based on three client surveys. The process evaluation is 
aimed at examining how the experiment was implemented in the 
municipality and how the treatments were realized. To this end, 
focus group interviews were held every eight months with the 
caseworkers and the project leader(s). Additionally, three online 
surveys were filled in by the caseworkers (Sanders et al., 2020).  
Product evaluation findings: outflow to work and non-work outcomes 
The experiments were implemented between 1 October 2017 and 
the end of 2019. The data used for examining the employment 
effects are the local administrative data covering the period up to 
1 October 2019.2 Tilburg started a few months later in December 
2017. The observation time span ranged therefore between 22 to 
24 months, which is rather short to observe behavioral changes.  
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Table 14.1  (continued) 
Notes: Acronyms: EMP = Employment; SWB = subjective wellbeing; SH = subjective 
health; MH = mental health; CAP = capabilities; SRUST = social trust; SEFF 
= self-efficacy; SNETW = social networks; IPR = income poverty reduction; 
DPR = deprivation poverty reduction; NI = new inflow; SB = stock of 
beneficiaries. 
 Effects: +/- positive/negative significant effect (p < 0.10); 0 = no effect. 
 Models: LR = logistic regression with calculated % difference with comparison 
group; PSM (ATE) = propensity score matching with calculated average 
treatment effect for the treated and non-treated in % difference of the 
treatments with the comparison group; OLS = Ordinary Least Squares.  
 Controls: Models are estimated with controls at start of experiment for age, age 
squared, gender, born in foreign country, highest education level, number of 
times in welfare, log of welfare spell duration; housing situation (renter, owner; 
in living; other); family situation (single elderly, single person, multiple person 
households). 
 
Table 14.1 summarizes the results on the various outcome 
measures. We started with estimating logistic regression models 
(LR) for calculating the employment probabilities across the 
various treatments, controlling for a number of covariates in the 
models (see note in Table 14.1). Surprisingly, the results largely 
contradict our expectations. Based on the literature, we contended 
positive employment effects of the experimental treatments. 
Instead, we found either insignificant effects or, in the case of 
Tilburg, even negative effects. We only found a positive and 
significant employment effect for the self-management group in 
the city of Apeldoorn for people very shortly in welfare benefit 
receipt (NI = new inflow) and for the extra support treatment for 
people who were already longer in welfare (SB = the stock of 
beneficiaries). 
However, further analyses of the data in which we compared 
the employment outcomes of the RTC participants with a second 
comparison group of non-participants on welfare benefits 
(reference group) showed that the control group performed better 
than this comparison group of non-participants. In Tilburg, this 
was even the case at the start and after controlling for 
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composition differences (through logistic regression and matching 
methods). It also showed that the treatment groups performed 
better than the reference group with on average 5 to 13 per cent 
positive and significant differences in the various cities (ATE 
effects). Because the treatment groups and the reference group are 
likely to be selective, it is necessary to control for self-selection of 
participants into these groups (notably by benefit duration, 
educational level, foreign background). The information in the 
three caseworker surveys provided further evidence on the change 
of the control treatment during the experiment. Already at the 
start of the experiment the control group apparently behaved very 
differently in Tilburg (but apparently also in other cities) 
compared to the treatment and reference group due to experiment 
effects (see Muffels et al., 2020; de Boer et al, 2020). It requires 
further scrutiny to find out to what extent behavioral effects by 
participants and caseworkers might indeed explain the absence of 
the contended effects on outflow to paid work.  
Concerning the non-work outcomes, the results of the 
treatment groups compared to the control group are slightly more 
in line with our expectations. Although most of the effects are 
non-significant, in various cities some outcome measures are 
positive and significant. Most positive effects are found in Tilburg 
with the extra support group on self-efficacy; on subjective 
wellbeing, freedom of choice or capabilities and on subjective 
health. Finally, in three cities (Tilburg, Wageningen and 
Apeldoorn), we found positive effects of the self-management 
and the extra support treatments on reducing income (IPR) or 
deprivation poverty (DPR). Over time, we found some positive 
changes of these treatments such as on social trust. However, we 
need to stress that these non-work outcome measures tend not to 
change easily. For wellbeing, we even speak of a lifetime set-point, 
suggesting that only very serious events like the death of a child or 
a partner might change it (Headey et al., 2010). The same holds 
for social trust or mental health because these are rather stable 
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attributes of people. Moreover, the effects might easily cancel 
each other out within a particular treatment group because there is 
no one-size-fits-all approach and each person needs a specially 
tailored treatment. Eventually, because of the small numbers in 
each city, there might be a power problem for finding significant 
effects as might have been the case in Wageningen and Oss 
notably (see Muffels et al., 2020).  
Process evaluation 
Eventually, the process evaluation showed that the effects on the 
quality of service provision might be substantial. Caseworkers 
were very enthusiastic about the intensive support treatment 
which was by most of them considered to be a very successful 
treatment because there was now more time and space for having 
an open communication with people on welfare benefits and for 
giving attention and tailored support. The caseworkers saw their 
relationship with the people improved and judge the outcomes for 
them to be very positive. They all assigned a very high, positive 
score to the experiment (on a scale from 0 to 10 they gave an 8 or 
9) after two years of experimenting. In their view, it takes a long 
time to build up a trust relationship with the people but, once it is 
achieved, they tend to become more cooperative and willing to 
act. This becomes apparent in the significant steps made by the 
participants in their view on the ‘participation ladder’.  
14.5  Lessons for policymaking and conclusions 
The lessons for social policy that can be learned from the 
experiments are especially that a treatment with more personal 
attention and tailored support to the most disadvantaged people 
improves the quality of service delivery while it improves at the 
same time the job satisfaction of the caseworkers. The ideas 
embedded in ‘social investment’ approaches might pay off also 
with a view to improve the employment chances of the most 
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disadvantaged people on welfare benefits. This mainly concerns 
those with already long periods of benefit receipt and refers to 
enhancing their social participation, social trust, subjective 
wellbeing and health. It needs, however, time before the fruits of 
these efforts can be reaped.  
A lot of issues about which Wim has published during his 
academic career such as procedural (in)justice, non-take-up, 
problematic debt, (un)deservingness, (in)formal solidarity and 
poverty might at least be partly re-considered if the 
implementation of welfare practices would become more tuned 
with the new theoretical insights from the welfare state literature 
that are sketched above. Survey research as well as these field 
experiments give us also invaluable insights into the ‘black box’ of 
service delivery and implementation. A ‘human centred’ social 
investment approach that is based on values such as trust, respect 
and autonomy and that is more aligned with current theoretical 
insights on influencing behavior (nudging) and (intrinsically) 
motivating people might be better equipped to achieve an 
effective, fair and efficient welfare system. A welfare system to 
which Wim made such novel and rich scientific contributions with 
his research.  
NOTES 
1. The Participation Act replaced on 1 January 2015 the Social Assistance Act. 
The aim was to get more people more swiftly into paid work and to 
decentralize the implementation to the municipalities. 
2. The administrative records of the municipality contain information on the 
reason of exit out of welfare. We included people who exited as employee in 
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Appendix 14A.1 
Operationalization of non-work outcome measures 
 
Table 14A1.1     Operationalization of non-work outcome measures 
Survey questions All measures are normalized on 0–10 scale. 
Subjective wellbeing (SWB) Average score on life satisfaction (0–10), 
meaning of life (0–10) and happiness (0–5). 
Subjective health (SH) Subjective health question  
(1 = very bad to 5 = excellent). 
Mental health (MH) Mental health scale based on 5 items and 5-
points Likert scale: never = 1 to 5 = always.  




Based on two questions and 7 items: item is 
considered important; available in own situation 
(Likert scale 1 = never to 5 = always).   
Items: to do things qualified for; learn new 
things; co-decide; set own targets; have good 
contacts; a decent income; contribute to the life 
of others.  
Capability index: weighted sum of items, 
weighted with level of importance ranging from 
1 to 5 and normalised on 0–10 scale.  
Social trust (STRUST) ESS survey question on how much trust people 
put in others on 0–10 scale. 
Self-efficacy (SEFF)  Based on 4 statements and 5-points Likert scale 
1 = completely disagree to 5 = completely agree.  
Items: find work when I put effort; confident to 
find work in future; can make good impression 
when apply; job fits well to my education/skills. 
Social networking (SNETW) Frequency of monthly contacts with family, 
friends, neighbours, ranging from 0 to 4 times a 
month. 
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Table 14A1.1     (continued) 
Survey questions All measures are normalized on 0–10 scale. 
Income poverty reduction  
(IPR) 
Based on question on financial situation ranging 
from: have to make debts, dissave, just make 
ends meet, saving a bit of money, can save 
money.  
Reduced probability of living in income poverty 
(% of people with debts or dissavings). 
Deprivation poverty reduction 
(DPR) 
Based on two questions on necessity of item and 
whether one can afford it on 5 out of 14 selected 
items derived from EU-SILC deprivation list. 
 
5 items: once a day fruit/vegetables; once a day a 
meal with meat, poultry or fish; replace worn-






15.  The Dark Side of the Welfare State: 
the Universal Basic Income between 
Citizenship and Social Justice 
Dick Houtman 
Obtaining a sufficient income without having to work, without 
showing the willingness to work or demonstrating that one is not (or 
no longer) able to work, is fundamentally opposing the foundations 
of the common welfare systems that are in place nowadays (Roosma 
and van Oorschot, 2020: 191). 
15.1  Introduction 
Wim has built a successful academic career on research into the 
legitimacy of the welfare state, more specifically into the criteria 
deemed just for granting rights to social security. In a recent 
article with Femke Roosma (2020), he has extended this research 
into an exploration of public support for a universal basic income, 
understood by the two authors as a ‘radical alternative’ for 
currently existing welfare systems. In what follows, I argue that to 
explain such support precisely its ‘radicalness’ necessitates a 
theoretical framework that goes beyond issues of social justice. 
My argument is that even though the notions of social justice and 
citizenship have often been lumped together, the two do not 
coexist harmoniously, let alone coincide. More than that: they are 
ultimately incompatible, because social justice has a dark side that 
makes it an enemy of citizenship. 
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15.2  Citizenship and social justice 
Much of the literature about social policy and the welfare state 
overlooks the crucial difference between citizenship-based social 
rights and entitlements based on considerations of social justice. 
Citizenship rights apply to all citizens equally and are as such 
unconditional, whether they are civil, political or social rights 
(Marshall, 1950). Civil liberties and political rights, both firmly 
rooted in the Enlightenment heritage, are intimately intertwined 
with modern ideals of liberty and democracy. They are freedoms 
acknowledged by the modern liberal state to protect citizens 
against the state. Examples are freedom of conscience, freedom of 
religion, freedom of expression, freedom of speech, the right to 
privacy, freedom of assembly, freedom of press, the right to vote 
and the right to run for office. These rights have been historically 
decisive in the development of modern Western democracies, as 
can be seen from their centrality in documents like the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (France, 1789), the United 
States Bill of Rights (1791), and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (United Nations, 1948). What characterises these rights is 
that they are granted to all citizens equally and unconditionally, so 
without the need to qualify for them by meeting other 
requirements than being a citizen. 
The same applies to citizenship-based social rights, which in 
effect evade the awkward distributive question ‘Who should get 
what, and why?’ (van Oorschot, 2000). For these rights are not 
derived from a framework of social justice (or distributive justice, 
if one prefers), ‘the most valuable general definition of [which] is 
that which brings out its distributive character most plainly: justice 
is suum cuique, to each his due’ (Miller, 1976: 10, emphasis in 
original). So unlike citizenship, social justice is not unconditional, 
does not treat citizens equally, and is not about protecting citizen’s 
freedom vis-à-vis the state. The two in effect deal strikingly 
different with the principle of equality. Whereas citizenship 
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defines all citizens as equal, social justice proposes substantive 
criteria to define who will be treated equally or unequally. In other 
words, unlike citizenship, social justice is about the legitimisation 
of unequal distributions: it does not set itself the task of treating 
citizens equally. 
This is why criteria deemed necessary for a just distribution 
have traditionally been central to social justice research, which has 
become the hard core of Wim’s research from the second half of 
the 1990s onwards, after a start with research into non-take-up of 
social security benefits (van Oorschot, 1994). Wim’s recent 
research foregrounds the so-called ‘CARIN’ criteria that qualify 
people for welfare deservingness in the eyes of the public at large: 
1) not being personally responsible for one’s needy situation 
(Control); 2) displaying gratefulness for support received 
(Attitude); 3) having contributed financially to the welfare system 
and/or trying hard to find a job (Reciprocity); 4) being seen as an 
in-group member by the public at large (Identity); and 5) being in 
need (Need) (van Oorschot, 2000; van Oorschot et al., 2017). 
Like most other students of the welfare state, Wim in effect 
construes the latter’s legitimacy in the distributive terms of social 
justice. This creates a blind spot for a different set of issues that 
plagues the legitimacy of the welfare state, that is, its implications 
for liberty and freedom. These are not issues of social justice but 
of citizenship, that is, of citizens’ liberty vis-à-vis the state. Indeed, 
social justice and citizenship need to be distinguished carefully, 
because loss of freedom is the price that needs to be paid for 
social justice. 
15.3  Why the quest for social justice undermines liberty 
A widespread yet one-sided conception of the welfare state as a 
benevolent rights-granting redistributive machine masks its 
disciplinary role in forcing people into social conformity and 
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sacrifice of their personal liberty (for example Macarov, 1980; 
Piven and Cloward, 1971). While this ugly face of the welfare state 
is typically taken for granted as far as the poor laws of the past are 
concerned, it is often neglected in case of the contemporary 
welfare state. Yet, four of the five CARIN-criteria foregrounded 
by Wim (for example in van Oorschot et al., 2017) make social 
rights conditional upon conformity to state-imposed behavioral 
standards. The criteria of control, attitude, reciprocity and identity 
all demand that people identify with the bourgeois mainstream 
and stay away from lifestyles and identities deviating from it. 
The fifth CARIN criterion (need) in principle justifies social 
assistance irrespective of meeting demands of conformity. It 
differs sharply from the four other criteria, because the needy are 
not necessarily those who merit support on the basis of identity or 
past or current lifestyle. Yet, the principle of need curbs people’s 
freedom, too, albeit in a different manner. Whereas the other 
distributive criteria force people into social conformity, it rather 
forces them to open up their private lives for inspection by the 
state to check and monitor their deservingness. Those concerned 
need to prove that they do actually belong to the needy category 
singled out for support and they also need to comply with 
administrative controls aimed at verifying the accuracy of the 
provided information. This is a logical and inevitable corollary of 
the quest for social justice, because any discrepancy between 
administrative records that justify social rights and actually lived 
reality entails fraud or abuse that disturbs the just distribution 
aimed for. These administrative controls inevitably raise privacy 
issues, as in the case of so-called ‘toothbrush counters’ who check 
one’s relationship status through home visits. 
The quest for social justice, to sum up, not only limits the 
lifestyle choices people can legitimately make but also puts their 
privacy at stake. Because precisely issues like these are central to 
citizenship-based freedoms, social justice does not exist 
harmoniously with citizenship. It rather stands in its way. While 
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this dark side of social justice has all too often been neglected in 
literature about the welfare state, Dutch sociologist Abram de 
Swaan correctly points out in his book In Care of the State (1988) 
that a perfectly just distribution necessitates a police state. While 
this may sound like an exaggeration, the massive recent derailment 
of the Dutch system of supplementary income provision for 
childcare comes disturbingly close to it. 
The crisis was caused by the tax authority’s unresponsive and 
authoritarian handling of citizens’ obligation to provide it with 
information about their private situation and of the need to check 
the accuracy of the provided information. Due to a combination 
of misunderstandings by insufficiently informed citizens and a 
state bureaucracy keen to ruthlessly weed out fraud and abuse, the 
system got completely out of control. Many Dutch parents faced 
administrative decisions to stop their supplementary payments 
and to summon them to pay back what they had already received. 
This often amounted to tens of thousands of euros, and in some 
instances more than a hundred thousand. The course of events 
plunged many families into the miseries of sky-high debts, forced 
house sales, and divorces and broken families, with some of the 
victims accusing the state of having effectively destroyed their 
lives. The affair reached a provisional low in May 2020, when the 
Ministry of Finance filed a lawsuit against the tax authority, an 
organisation that falls under its own authority. While this is 
obviously an extreme case, it illustrates how the quest for social 
justice, through the bureaucratic need for verified information it 
entails, easily demolishes people’s freedom by subordinating them 
to an unresponsive, authoritarian, and inhumane bureaucratic 
state. This is the dark side of social justice: it produces 
bureaucratic formalisation, strengthens the tendency of the state 
to control and discipline citizens, and as such threatens and 
undermines the civic liberties that lie at the heart of citizenship. 
The implication for social justice research is that a rejection of 
a justice criterion by the public does not necessarily mean that it is 
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deemed unjust, simply because its application is not necessarily 
evaluated on the basis of a framework of social justice. It may also 
be rejected because of the fallout of its application for the 
freedom of citizens vis-à-vis the state, which entails an evaluation 
on the basis of a framework of citizenship. Indeed, research bears 
out that rejecting social justice on the basis of considerations of 
citizenship is not at all uncommon. 
15.4  Public evaluation of a universal basic income 
A study of popular ideas about the just distribution of health care 
(Bernts, 1988) does not leave much to the imagination. Its central 
question is how people evaluate proposals of making the right to 
health care conditional upon efforts to avoid unhealthy lifestyles 
(for example, smoking, excessive drinking, abstaining from 
sports). The study finds that forging such a link may be rejected 
on two different grounds. The first is informed by considerations 
of social justice, with respondents arguing that health and illness 
are not in the first place caused by self-chosen lifestyles but rather 
by factors that lie beyond personal control, such as one’s genetic 
makeup, environmental issues in one’s living environment, class-
based inequalities affecting one’s living conditions, etcetera. This 
coincides with traditional social-democratic justifications of 
providing social security for the unemployed, according to which 
unemployment is caused by economic downturns and crises, and 
hence by the whims of capitalism rather than by personal 
deficiencies like lack of thrift and motivation. 
Whereas this first argument against linking the right to health 
care to (un)healthy lifestyles derives from a framework of social 
justice, the second one rather argues that the establishment of 
such a link necessitates extensive state control of citizens’ 
lifestyles, which is deemed unacceptable in a free society. This is 
an argument derived from a framework of citizenship, which does 
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not reject the proposals at stake as necessarily unjust in 
distributive terms, but as having unacceptable implications for 
citizens’ freedom vis-à-vis the state. The implication is that public 
rejections of particular distributive criteria do not necessarily entail 
evaluations of social justice. 
My own PhD research about judgments on the rights and 
obligations of the unemployed demonstrates a similar interplay of 
frameworks of social justice and citizenship (Houtman, 1994, 
1997). The study addresses how the public at large balances the 
right to social security and the obligation to work in cases of work 
refusal by unemployed persons, with special attention to the 
explanation of variations in these evaluations. It concludes that 
these variations are indeed informed by frameworks of social 
justice as well as citizenship that coincide neither theoretically nor 
empirically. More specifically, those who emphasise the rights 
rather than the obligations of the unemployed prove to do so for 
two different reasons – not only because they favour state-led 
economic redistribution between the rich and the poor (that is, a 
framework of social justice), but also because they reject 
authoritarianism and insist on the protection of individual liberty 
(that is, a framework of citizenship). 
This brings us to the recent article by Wim and Femke Roosma 
(2020) already referred to in the introduction. It addresses public 
support for a universal basic income in 23 European countries, 
including Scandinavian (for example, Norway, Sweden, Finland), 
Southern-European (for example, Italy, Portugal, Spain), Western-
European (for example, Belgium, France, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands) and Central-European ones (for example, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland). A basic income is introduced to the 
respondents as 1) being universal (that is, paid to everyone, 
irrespective of whether one works or not), 2) guaranteeing 
everyone a minimum standard of living, 3) replacing many other 
social benefits, and 4) paid from tax revenues (Roosma and van 
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Oorschot, 2020: 192) and respondents have been asked whether 
they are (strongly) in favour or (strongly) against it. 
The quotation at the start of this chapter (Roosma and van 
Oorschot, 2020: 191) rightly underscores how radical an 
alternative to existing systems of social security the universal basic 
income actually is. In terms of my analysis above, this radicalness 
resides in the shift away from a framework of social justice with 
all the coercion and control this entails towards a framework of 
citizenship that privileges civil liberty and protection against state 
bureaucracy. While this is indeed the central argument of 
Western-European proponents of a universal basic income, the 
principal findings of Roosma and van Oorschot (2020) paint a 
remarkably different picture. 
For what they find is that a universal basic income receives 
most support in Lithuania, Russia and Hungary (70 to 80 per cent 
in favour), least in Sweden, Switzerland and Norway (less than 40 
per cent in favour), with support moreover being strongest among 
the economically deprived and those favouring economic 
redistribution. This largely coincides with the findings of Wim’s 
studies of social justice and deservingness and does indeed lead 
the authors to conclude that apparently ‘it is not the universal 
character or its unconditionality that makes a [universal basic 
income] so attractive to a large share of the European population, 
but the fact that it provides (poor) people with a guaranteed 
minimum income’ (2020: 203). Theoretically speaking, it indeed 
makes much sense that the universal basic income finds most 
support in the less affluent European countries without extensive 
welfare states. 
Yet, these findings are also somewhat artificial, because the 
framework of citizenship and liberty that underlies Western-
European pleas for a universal basic income (that is, the 
framework that accounts for its ‘radicalism’ as an alternative 
system!) hardly plays any role at all in this study. And of course, if 
an empirical study excludes a theory, it can neither confirm nor 
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reject it: a study informed by Theory A (here: a theory about 
social justice, referred to by Wim as ‘deservingness theory’) can 
only confirm or refute this Theory A and not a Theory B that has 
been excluded from the research in the first place (here: a theory 
about citizenship and liberty). 
15.5  Conclusion 
With the benefit of hindsight, T.H. Marshall’s (1950) classical 
account of the unfolding of citizenship rights, from civil to 
political and ultimately social ones as provided by the welfare 
state, entails not much more than a rosy social-democratic dream 
reflecting postwar optimism. For granting notable exceptions like 
the British National Health Service or old-age state pensions, 
welfare state reforms in the postwar period have tended to be 
informed by quests for social justice rather than ambitions to 
extend the rights of citizenship. 
The optimistic Marshallian account has done much to obscure 
the crucial differences between the frameworks of citizenship and 
social justice. The two do not coincide and are ultimately 
incompatible, because the quest for social justice stands in the way 
of citizens’ liberties. Indeed, until today, the principal arguments 
against a universal basic income are consistently derived from 
frameworks of social justice, irrespective of whether they come 
from the political left (‘The poor and needy should not be fobbed 
of with a basic income that is also given to the rich’) or the 
political right (‘An income ought to be a reward for work done’). 
The other way around, precisely the desire to end the surveillance, 
control and sanctioning that social justice calls for constitutes the 
central argument for the introduction of a universal basic income. 
This opens up wonderful opportunities for further comparative 
research into the support for a universal basic income in Western 
Europe and Central/Eastern Europe. For while such support is 
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informed by a framework of social justice in Central/Eastern 
Europe, as shown by Roosma and van Oorschot (2019), it is likely 
to be informed first of all by a framework of citizenship and 
liberty in Western Europe, pretty much the home ground of 
proposals for a universal basic income. To put the same in the 
terms of political sociology: while a universal basic income is 
supported in Central/Eastern Europe by the ‘old left’ (socialism 
and communism as carried by the economically underprivileged) 
as part of a quest for social justice, in Western Europe it is more 
likely to be supported by the ‘new left’, that is, well-educated 
cultural elites that support parties like the Greens in 
foregrounding personal freedom, tolerance of diversity, and 
cultural inclusion as issues of citizenship (Houtman, 2003). 
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16.  Culture as a Variable in the Analysis 
of Welfare State Institutions 
Birgit Pfau-Effinger 
16.1  Introduction  
An increasing number of theoretical contributions and empirical 
studies show that incorporating cultural factors into the 
explanatory framework for the development of social policies can 
improve our understanding of the causes of social policy 
development. Wim van Oorschot has made an important 
contribution to this debate. When co-editing the volume Culture 
and Welfare State (van Oorschot, Opielka and Pfau-Effinger, 2008), 
we intensively discussed theoretical issues about this relationship. 
I have experienced this collaboration as very inspiring and fruitful. 
This chapter gives an overview of the discussion about the 
relationship of culture and welfare states, and it shows how the 
scientific work of Wim van Oorschot has contributed to this 
research. It also introduces some theoretical reflections about the 
possibility to extend the theoretical framework for the analysis of 
the ways in which cultural change can influence welfare state 
change. 
16.2  The role of culture in the politics of social policy 
In anthropological thinking of the early 19th century, it was 
common to use a broad approach to ‘culture’ that included the 
whole complex of habits, language and artefacts of a society, 
meaning the society’s ‘tradition’ (for example Smelser, 1992). This 
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concept of culture was rather static and so broad that it 
overlapped with the concept of ‘society’. Therefore, it was 
substituted by new and more-narrow concepts that focus on 
cultural values, models and belief systems (or ‘worldviews’) about 
the ideals concerning the ‘good’ society and morally good 
behaviour and that can differ in the context of time and space 
(Alexander, 1990; Archer, 1995; Lepsius, 1990).  
Baldock (1999: 458) has suggested that research about the 
relationship between culture and welfare states tries to find 
answers to the question: ‘To what extent are a country’s social 
policies the product of its culture’? There is a lot of theorising and 
empirical research that emphasise the causal role of culture in the 
development of social policies (Béland, 2005, 2009; Campbell and 
Petersen, 2015; Danielson and Stryker, 2015; Fleckenstein, 2011; 
Schneider and Ingram, 2007; Kaufmann, 2015; van Oorschot et 
al., 2008; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Somers and Block 2005; 
Steensland, 2006).  
One main focus is on the ways in which cultural ideas influence 
the political process. Daniel Béland (2009) has introduced a 
theoretical approach that shows how cultural ideas, besides 
cognitive ideas, can influence the decision-making in the different 
stages of the political process, during the agenda-setting period, in 
the assumptions that affect the content of new policies, and in the 
construction of reform imperatives. On these different levels, they 
‘impact the ways policy actors perceive their interests and the 
environment in which they mobilize’ (Béland, 2009: 701). 
Another main focus is on public attitudes towards the welfare 
state. These are a main basis of policy-making, since political elites 
in democratic welfare states need support from the population in 
order to legitimise their policies. There is much research about 
‘attitudes’ or ‘public opinion’ related to welfare state policies 
(Danielson and Stryker, 2015). However, it is not always clear how 
attitudes towards social policies are related to cultural ideas.  
Culture as a Variable in the Analysis of Welfare State Institutions 
 183 
With his theorising and research on deservingness (van 
Oorschot, 2006), Wim has made an important contribution to the 
theorising and research about public attitudes towards social 
policies, their cultural basis and their relationship with welfare 
state policies, in part with co-authors. On the basis of 
deservingness theory, Wim has studied people’s attitudes about 
people’s deservingness for receiving welfare benefits. A main 
argument in his theorising and research is that people’s image 
about the moral character of benefit recipients is an important 
cultural variable that influences their attitudes and perceptions 
(van Oorschot, 2006, 2010; van Oorschot et al., 2012). In his 
research about public perceptions of overuse and underuse of 
social benefits in 25 countries, he has shown that cultural ideas 
contribute to the explanation of cross-national differences in 
critical attitudes toward the welfare state (Roosma et al., 2014). 
With his research, Wim shows that change in the cultural basis of 
the evaluation of deservingness was an important basis of welfare 
state change in the last decades.  
However, change in welfare state institutions does not 
necessarily lead to welfare state change. There is a broad debate 
about the conditions under which the political elites react with 
policy change to change in public opinion. Brooks and Manza 
(2007) found three conditional factors: whether public opinion 
appears to be strong and stable, whether the issue is of 
importance for the public, and whether the political elites consider 
public opinion as relevant in comparison to other policy options. 
Further, Newman and Jacobs (2010) show that, in case public 
opinion is unclear or ambivalent, the chance for political elites to 
push through their own interests or their own cultural ideas 
against public opinion is particularly high. There are also some 
other causal mechanisms by which public opinion and the cultural 
ideas behind them can lead to policy change (Danielson and 
Stryker, 2015): 
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o The political elites may use popular cultural ideas as a 
resource for the legitimation of their policies if they want to 
push through specific interests with a policy reform. 
o Another mechanism is the redefinition of popular cultural 
values by the political elites (Steensland, 2006). 
o According to the approach of ‘Discursive Institutionalism’ 
of Schmidt (2008), the political elites may broaden the 
support for the cultural basis of their policies by establishing 
political and public discourses to legitimise their policies.  
o Public discourses may also be exploited by political elites in 
order to alter values and models in the population in such a 
way that unpopular political measures gain acceptance 
(Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivinen, 2011). 
o Policy change may also be based on a redefinition of cultural 
ideas that are relevant in the population by the political elites 
(Danielson and Stryker, 2015). 
So far, the main focus in the debate about the ways in which 
culture contributes to the development of welfare state policies is 
on the ways in which the political elites deal with public opinion 
and cultural ideas. 
16.3  Suggestion for a broadening of the theoretical 
framework  
In this section, I will discuss two theoretical issues that are 
important for the further development of the theoretical 
framework for the relationship between culture and welfare state 
change. These include theoretical reflections about an adequate 
theoretical concept of ‘culture’ and ‘institutions’ and of their 
relationship, and theoretical reflections about the ways in which 
new cultural ideas in the population can enter the political arena.  
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16.3.1 Theorising ‘culture’ and ‘institutions’, and their relationship 
I argue that it is important to use an adequate theoretical concept 
of ‘culture’ and (welfare state) ‘institutions’ and their relationship 
in order to be able to analyse the ways in which culture can 
influence welfare state change.  
The relationship between culture and institutions is a contested 
issue in welfare state research. Political scientists often neglect the 
role of culture in social policy change with the argument that it is 
not possible to distinguish analytically between culture and 
institutions, because culture does not exist independent from 
institutions (for an overview see Pfau-Effinger, 2005). However, 
such approaches often lack a clear and coherent definition of 
‘culture’ and ‘institutions’. There is another strand of theorising 
that is based on Weber’s work (1989) and includes the work of 
Sociologists like Alexander (1990), Lepsius (1990) and Archer 
(1995). In this theoretical discourse, the approach to the 
relationship between culture and institutions is based on the 
assumption that culture and institutions develop elatively 
independent from each other. This strand of theorizing offers an 
adequate basis for the analysis of the relationship and the 
dynamics of change in the relationship between culture and 
institutions. 
The concept of ‘culture’ on which this essay is based are 
connected to this strand of theorising. I define ‘culture’ as a 
system of collective ideas related to the ideal of a ‘good’ society 
and morally good behaviour. The cultural ideas comprise cultural 
values, cultural models and belief systems. Cultural ideas can be 
coherent or contradictory, contested between social groups and 
actors, and they are changeable. Culture at the macro level of 
society frames the cultural ideas of individuals and organisations, 
but it does not determine them (Pfau-Effinger, 2005, 2008). It can 
be assumed that the prevailing cultural ideas restrict the ways in 
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which the relevant political actors perceive socio-economic 
change and their problem definition. 
My proposal for the definition of ‘institution’, which is based 
on common concepts of ‘institution’ in neo-institutionalism, 
corresponds with this definition of culture. According to this 
definition, institutions provide incentives and restrictions for 
action. These rules must be implemented (institutionalised) and 
legitimate. The compliance with the rules is reinforced with 
sanctions (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 12). Institutions rest on 
norms which determine what kind of behaviour is expected within 
the boundaries set by the institution (Hall, 1993; Lepsius, 1990). 
These norms are often based on specific cultural ideas. Besides 
cultural ideas, also interests of political actors and of the groups 
which they represent as well as power relations are relevant for 
change in social policy institutions. 
It is important to consider that culture and institutions can 
develop relatively independent from each other and with varying 
levels of dynamism in time. The reason is that cultural ideas enter 
the basic norms of an institution mainly only at the point of time 
when it is established or when it experiences fundamental change. 
Even if the main cultural ideas of political actors and in the 
society around the respective institution change fundamentally, 
this does not necessarily lead to change in the norms of the 
institution. On the other hand, it is also possible that a 
fundamental change of an institution takes places that is based on 
the introduction of new cultural ideas into the norms of this 
institution, even if the traditional cultural ideas in the population 
related to this institution persist. 
16.3.2 The role of social actors in the relationship between culture and 
welfare state change  
So far, the main focus of theorising and research about the 
relationship of culture and welfare state change is on the 
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development and explanation of public attitudes on one hand, and 
on the ways in which the political elites adapt and deal with public 
opinion and cultural ideas in the political process on the other. 
There is relatively little theorising and research about the various 
ways in which new cultural ideas in the population can enter the 
political arena, and about the role of actors outside the political 
arena in these processes.  
There are diverse types of actors outside the political arena (I 
use the term ‘social actors’ for them) who can introduce and push 
forward cultural change in the population and introduce new 
cultural ideas into the political arena. A common typology of 
social actors includes the distinction between individual, collective 
and corporative actors. Individual actors are intentionally acting 
subjects; collective actors comprise groups of individual actors 
who are visible as a unity on the basis of their coordinated action, 
and corporative actors include organisations ‘who on the basis of 
their inner hierarchical steering structure act like individual actors 
through persons who are appointed to represent them’ [my 
translation] (Huinink and Schröder, 2019: 16). These actors are 
embedded in the institutional and cultural societal context (March, 
1994) and in the social structures of the respective society. It 
should be considered, however, that their behavior is not 
determined by the societal context.  
Particularly, also social movements may introduce new cultural 
ideas and under certain conditions be able to broaden public 
support for these ideas over time. This is particularly also possible 
if the common cultural ideas are contradictory (Archer, 1995). 
The introduction and support of the idea of ‘gender equality’ by 
the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s is a good example 
(Pfau-Effinger, 2004). Such new ideas may influence welfare state 
policies on the basis of different processes in which social actors 
in the society outside the political arena are involved: 
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o First, social actors outside the political field may aim to 
introduce new cultural ideas into politics of the welfare state. 
On the basis of public discourses, these actors may try to 
introduce innovative cultural ideas in welfare state policies 
(see also Schmidt, 2008). Within such discourses, 
contradictions and conflicts with regard to the cultural values 
and models are resolved or strengthened; they can contribute 
to increase the chances for the introduction of new policies 
or to stabilise old policies (see also Kaufmann, 1991). The 
result largely depends on the potential of these social actors 
to mobilise broader parts of the population for the support 
of these cultural ideas in order to exert pressure on the 
political elites.  
o Second, social actors outside the political field who support 
new ideas may enter the political field as political actors in 
political parties and may try to find support for them in the 
political field. There are different positions of entry in the 
centre or at the margin of the policy field. The result largely 
depends on the potential of these social actors to convince 
broader parts of the political elites of the relevance of these 
cultural ideas. 
There might be more different types of processes which are also 
relevant and which should be explored in the future. 
16.4  Conclusion 
In the last two decades, the number of theoretical contributions 
and empirical studies that emphasise the causal force of cultural 
factors in social policy development has been growing. The main 
aim of this chapter was to discuss how cultural ideas can 
contribute to welfare state change and to demonstrate how Wim 
van Oorschot with his scientific work has contributed to the 
theorising and research in this field. It also introduced some 
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reflections about the possibility to introduce a more precise 
theoretical conceptualisation about culture, institutions and their 
relationship. Also, it suggests to include more systematically the 
role of social actors outside the political arena and the various 
ways in which new cultural ideas in the population can enter the 
political arena.  
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17.  Wim van Oorschot, the Politics of 
Deservingness and the Cultural 
Turn in Social Sciences 
Peter Taylor-Gooby 
17.1  Introduction 
I knew Wim van Oorschot as a friend and collaborator through 
Espanet and on various research projects over a considerable 
period. I benefited from his commitment to collegial work and his 
calm and always rational advice on a number of occasions, most 
recently in relation to the Norface Welfsoc: Our Children’s Europe 
programme in which he participated (www.welfsoc.eu). Looking 
back, I have become aware that he is someone who exerts a steady 
and positive influence, seemingly by osmosis, without apparently 
exerting effort or direction, but more by a large number of 
apparently minor interventions that add up to something much 
larger. Looking back over his impressive CV (18 books, more 
than 100 articles in top-rated journals, 28 major research grants, 
more than 150 scholarly presentations, and a very considerable 
number of graduate students and post-doctoral researchers 
supervised), I can see that that is also what he has done with his 
path-breaking insights into deservingness and his development of 
deservingness theory. He originally graduated in Horticultural 
Science. Slow growth, expansion and massive fruitfulness for a 
substantial period distinguishes many of the trees with which he 
originally worked. 
Wim made three signal contributions to social policy research: 
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o He established and developed the growth of a pool of young 
researchers, first at Tilburg University and then at Leuven 
University, developing cross-national work on social policy 
attitudes, poverty and employment. 
o He constructed a new approach to deservingness attitudes to 
social welfare, resting on five key criteria. He then went on 
to explore this in considerable theoretical and practical 
detail. The importance of this approach, building on 
previous work, is that it sets parameters to the factors that 
underlie deservingness judgements, and it points to ways 
forward in improving the willingness of national populations 
in accepting support for vulnerable outgroups and in 
welcoming immigrants in European countries. 
o He also opened the way to new theoretical approaches in 
this field of study. Social policy studies are multi- and inter-
disciplinary, drawing on political science, sociology, 
psychology, law, economics and other approaches. Issues of 
deservingness offer opportunities to build links between 
these approaches and to develop social policy theory. 
Many of the contributors to this volume have benefited, as 
developing scholars, from Wim’s encouragement and can discuss 
this area more closely than I can. I will focus on the second and 
third aspects mentioned above. 
17.2  Wim’s deservingness approach and policy feedback 
Wim used a range of national and particularly international 
attitude survey data to point to the importance of five separate 
factors associated with deservingness judgements. These are: 
1. Control: poor people’s control over their neediness, or their 
responsibility for it: the less control, the more deserving. 
2. Need: the greater the level of need, the more deserving. 
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3. Identity: the identity of the poor, that is, their proximity to 
the rich or their ‘pleasantness’: the closer to ‘us’, the more 
deserving. 
4. Attitude: poor people’s attitude towards support, or their 
docility or gratefulness: the more compliant, the more 
deserving. 
5. Reciprocity: the degree of reciprocation by the poor, or 
having earned support: the more reciprocation, the more 
deserving (van Oorschot, 2000). 
In his analysis Wim points to ‘three different sets of variables 
which can be used to explain patterns of answers to attitude 
survey questions: socioeconomic and demographic characteristics; 
opinions on and perceptions of social security and the welfare 
state; and basic values and attitudes’ (ibid). The third of these 
leads to an important policy implication. Politicians and policy 
makers typically take people’s policy attitudes as a given. They 
then either design policy to fit assumed attitudes and so seek 
popularity, or take a stance, based on principles or judgements 
about economic feasibility and show leadership in a particular 
direction irrespective of people’s attitudes and desires. Wim’s 
theory implies that welfare state institutions, in other words, 
policy itself feeds back to influence attitudes (van Oorschot and 
Meuleman, 2014; Uunk and van Oorschot, 2017). The 
relationship between the policies pursued and judgements of 
deservingness is a dialectic one. It is not possible to say simply 
that in a democracy the government should do what people want 
and that is all there is to say. What government does will influence 
what people want. A move in a particular direction will tend to 
shift attitudes that fit with it further in that direction and thus 
enhance support for that policy. 
This point is of particular relevance in current debates about 
the deservingness of immigrants. European countries need high 
levels of immigration if they are to retain their population size and 
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age balance. Because birth rates have fallen populations are ageing 
and in fact along the northern Mediterranean fringe (notably 
Spain, Italy and Greece) they are actually shrinking. 
One important issue is that in popular politics this argument is 
set against concerns about immigration partly for practical 
reasons, to do with competition in the labour and housing 
markets, and partly for ideological reasons to do with 
deservingness. Immigrants who are not refugees are seen as 
having a high degree of control over their need; they may not be 
seen as exhibiting genuine neediness; they are often seen as 
culturally different, not speaking the host country’s language or 
pursuing the lifestyle commonly perceived as normal (for example 
in gender relations); they may not be docile or compliant; and they 
may be seen as a burden rather than a benefit, offering little in the 
way of reciprocity. 
A policy programme that emphasizes these factors goes with 
the grain of attitudes that undermine the deservingness of new-
comers and strengthens these attitudes. Such a programme might, 
for example, sort immigrants into a majority of ‘economic’ 
migrants, seeking jobs and better living standards, and a minority 
of refugees, driven through fear of war, persecution or famine in 
their own country, and therefore needy and having little control. It 
might fail to address cultural difference through language, 
education and other measures. It might fail to accept and 
emphasize the economic value of immigrants by, for example, 
preventing them from getting access to education, training and 
jobs. On the other hand, a programme that pursues the converse 
direction, most importantly allowing good access to work and 
arguing for and demonstrating the reciprocal benefits to the host 
country of new younger workers and citizens offers the 
opportunity to gradually build support for the deservingness of 
immigrants over time and step by step shift public attitudes. 
From a policy point of view this shows what European 
governments who recognise the dilemmas of an ageing population 
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must do in order to make progress. Wim’s insights open the way 
to consider policy in this light and to carry out longitudinal studies 
that take policy shifts into account and attempt to unpick the 
chicken and egg problem of how far deservingness attitudes 
influence policy directions and how far policy operates to 
influence attitudes the other way about. As data sources such as 
Eurobarometer and particularly the European Social Survey (a 
study which Wim championed, supported and used, and also 
encouraged colleagues to use) build up over time, the potential for 
such longer-term studies becomes greater, taking the study of the 
development of deservingness attitudes even further. 
This is one illustration of the value of the framework which 
identifies the five-fold roots of deservingness. Others can be 
found in relation to other policy fields (studying particular needs 
such as social care, retirement pensions, housing poverty and 
unemployment), in more detailed small group social psychology 
and in the increasingly divided politics of many European 
countries. Current political struggles often involve differences in 
deservingness attitudes between different social groups.  
One powerful mechanism that emerges here is the way in 
which differences in judgements of deservingness between policy-
makers and many in the population may lead to mistrust of 
politicians seen as part of a distant and unsympathetic political 
elite, which ignores the views of ordinary people. 
The third area on which I want to comment follows on from 
the discussion of the relevance of accounts of deservingness to 
policy and to political trust. It concerns the development of social 
policy theory. There are at least three issues here: first, the 
interaction between the three sets of explanatory variables noted 
above and causal arguments as developed in different disciplines; 
secondly, the demonstration that the kinds of data typically taken 
seriously in one discipline can be of value in theory development 
in another discipline; and thirdly, the fact that deservingness 
theory has benefited enormously from the massive expansion of 
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structured social survey research in recent years and the 
widespread availability of data which can be fruitfully analysed. 
Here I will focus on one issue – the cultural turn in social science 
and how Wim’s work contributes in this area. 
17.3  Wim and the cultural turn in social sciences 
One feature of the development of social science during the past 
forty years has been what is sometimes described as the ‘cultural 
turn’. This refers to the recognition of the importance of cultural 
factors alongside material issues (class power, economic interest, 
political institutions, and social structures) in influencing people’s 
behaviour. These insights have led to rich areas of work which are 
continuing to expand especially in sociology. These include 
feminist approaches, the sociology of the body, identity politics, 
and, joined up with the emerging tradition of analysis of group 
behaviour, increasing interest in culture and attitudes in social 
psychology. 
The stress on culture originated in sociology as scholars 
grappled with the problem of balancing the evidence that social 
structures strongly influence outcomes (for example, the children 
of working class people tend to get working class jobs unless there 
is a massive social structural change which radically expands the 
proportion of middle class jobs) and the equally compelling 
evidence that individuals experience themselves as more or less 
rational and emotional agents making choices because they wish 
to do so and not because they occupy a particular class position 
(for example, Groh, 2019; Giddens, 1984). Essentially sociologists 
became more interested in the way individual behaviour could be 
understood in cultural terms in relation especially to consumption, 
values, identity and attitudes. 
This approach has also made major contributions in other 
disciplines. In political science, practitioners seek to discover the 
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origins of political identity, of racism or environmentalism and 
how they function in political movements and the interdisciplinary 
application of deservingness theory advances this work. In 
psychology, researchers note the importance of group effects on 
behaviour. More recently in economics, the neo-classical rational 
actor paradigm is increasingly eroded by evidence of the 
irrationality or rather non-rationality of the choices that people 
often in fact make and cultural factors are an important candidate 
in influencing peoples’ choices (Hargreaves Heap et al., 1992). 
Deservingness theory rests on strong evidence about the nature 
of attitudes to culturally identified groups of those perceived as 
‘others’ and the availability of a large and growing body of attitude 
data conveniently available for research. This approach offers 
another way of investigating the importance of culture across 
social science disciplines, and of linking disciplines. Identity 
emerges directly as relevant to deservingness in a way that varies 
between social groups, by age and education level and ethnicity. 
Reciprocity and grateful attitudes as indicated in immediate 
interpersonal behaviour are also operationalised as variables 
possessing cultural aspects and available in the survey data for 
analysis in relation to structural socio-demographic variables. This 
allows researchers to develop understanding of culture and social 
structural location in this field too. 
Attention to culture provides explanations of why the 
structural reciprocity arguments in favour of immigration (that 
developed Europe needs more immigrants because its population 
is ageing and dying) often fail to engage with anti-immigrant 
movements. The rejection of immigrants is not based on reason 
but on attitudes rooted in group culture, to do with identity. 
Emotion and, a social scientist might say, culture are upstream of 
reason (van Oorschot et al., 2017). 
Similarly the demonstration that adequate benefits plus 
investment, training and access to jobs offer an effective way to 
tackle unemployment and integrate young people into society fails 
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to connect with responses that are to do with judgements and 
perceptions that the jobless are lazy (and thus have control over 
their need) and are ungrateful. Culture is a powerful way of 
explaining developments and divisions in both these areas and 
deservingness theory offers a good way of pursuing this (Laenen 
et al., 2020). 
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18.  Social Psychological Aspects of a 
Cultural Approach to Welfare 
Attitudes 
Christian Staerklé 
18.1  Introduction 
In this essay, I wish to honour Wim van Oorschot’s contribution 
to a cultural analysis of welfare attitudes, and show its connections 
with my own research. In the first part, I will describe some 
commonalities between Wim’s cultural approach to welfare 
sociology and various theories in social psychology. In the second 
part, I will illustrate these linkages by integrating Wim’s five 
deservingness criteria in our own Social Order Representations 
Model. 
18.2  Conditional solidarity and the cultural approach to 
welfare attitudes 
The first text I found (in English) by Wim dates back to 1989 (van 
Oorschot and Schell, 1989) and is entitled ‘On the role of means-
testing: Its functions and dysfunctions: Recent developments in European 
social security systems’. In this chapter, Wim discusses the social 
implications of a political shift from universally oriented insurance 
to selective social assistance during the 1980s, taking Thatcher’s 
UK as a case in point. He lays out three perverse effects of 
means-testing, namely its contribution to the creation of a poverty 
trap (and thus the perpetuation of social injustice), the increasing 
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non take-up of benefits (due to a feeling of social degradation and 
the motivation to avoid being perceived a potential fraud), as well 
as the rampant stigmatisation of welfare beneficiaries. ‘Now, for 
everyone who is of the opinion that the broader aims of social 
policy should be to do away with poverty and social injustice, and 
to integrate all groups and classes into society on the basis of 
equality, these three general effects of means-testing constitute 
severe dysfunctions of the instrument.’ (van Oorschot and Schell, 
1989: 6). His critical stance towards means-tested policies and, 
more generally, selective social policies could hardly be clearer. He 
advocates that social policies should aim for social integration and 
greater equality, and he powerfully condemns the perverse effects 
of allegedly efficient and just (neo-liberal) policies in which only 
those ‘who really need it’ receive benefits. The consistency of 
Wim’s thinking about these issues is impressive. This early text 
indeed lays out many of the topics to which Wim would devote 
his career during the next three decades.  
Over the years, Wim has developed his ongoing concern with 
the conditionality of social solidarity within a broader framework 
of a ‘cultural’ analysis of social policies and welfare attitudes. In 
2007 he outlined four principles of a cultural approach to social 
policies (van Oorschot, 2007); principles that quite strikingly share 
important aspects with research in social psychology concerned 
with prejudice, social inequality and deservingness. They have also 
shaped my own research on welfare attitudes and beyond. 
The first principle concerns the importance of shared normative 
images of target groups and beneficiaries in the formation of welfare 
attitudes. This focus on representations of groups as drivers of 
welfare attitudes can easily be related to longstanding research on 
stereotyping, stigmatisation, and discrimination (see Dovidio et al., 
2013; Sibley and Barlow, 2016). Stigmatising judgements of 
welfare beneficiaries may, for example, allow individuals to 
compare favourably ‘downward’ along the social ladder, eventually 
yielding the benefit of enhancing self-esteem (Wood, 1989) or 
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creating a positive social identity (Tajfel, 1978). Stigmatising 
images of welfare beneficiaries further contribute to justify an 
unfair and unequal social system by providing legitimacy to the 
ethos of self-reliance and competition at the heart of 
contemporary societies (for example, Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost 
and Major, 2001). The importance of negative stereotypes 
associated with target groups has further been demonstrated by 
Gilens (1999) who has shown the key role of anti-Black prejudice 
in explaining deep and widespread opposition to welfare in the 
United States. 
A second feature highlighted by Wim in his outline of a cultural 
approach to social policies concerns perceptions of the causes of poverty. 
Here again, an enduring research tradition has studied ‘attribution’ 
processes that examine how people attribute responsibility to their 
own and others’ behaviours (Pettigrew, 1979; Weiner, 1995). The 
individual-blaming culture of poverty that has spread in the wake 
of the rise of neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideologies has 
produced ‘welfare dependency beliefs’ (Likki and Staerklé, 2015; 
Staerklé et al., 2020) that attribute the causes of poverty to the 
moral failings of individuals in need themselves.  
A third principle of the cultural approach concerns the impact 
of cultural diversity and migration on welfare legitimacy. The 
relationship between cultural diversity and welfare legitimacy 
involves intergroup processes of identification, categorisation and 
differentiation (Tajfel, 1978) that shape perceived entitlement of 
members of ethnocultural ingroups and outgroups (Green and 
Staerklé, 2013). Ingroup identification, for example, increases 
ingroup favouritism, thereby demonstrating a link between social 
identities and judgements of distributive justice (Wenzel, 2000). 
Welfare chauvinism, in turn, describes the tendency to allocate 
welfare resources primarily to members of one’s own ethnic group 
(Mewes and Mau, 2012) and constitutes a key issue linking welfare 
policies to right-wing populist ideologies (Greve, 2019). 
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The fourth principle underscores the role of national and other 
cultural contexts in the development of specific national welfare 
regime types, and, by extension, of welfare attitudes by national 
citizens. Collective norms, values, and ideologies have been shown 
not only to shape national welfare regimes, but also a country’s 
identity content (‘who we are’ and ‘what we stand for’), thereby 
providing guiding principles for the allocation of welfare resources 
within a country. These sociocultural and historical conditions 
also account, at least to some extent, for cross-national differences 
in welfare attitudes (Svallfors, 2012; van Oorschot, 2006). 
Following a general trend in social psychology towards 
contextualist approaches, our own research has also sought to 
gain a better understanding of the interplay between cultural 
contexts and psychological processes (Likki and Staerklé, 2015; 
Sarrasin et al., 2012; Staerklé et al., 2010; Thurre et al., 2020). 
18.3  A constructivist, normative approach to welfare 
attitudes 
Wim’s and his colleagues’ ongoing work on deservingness and 
entitlement (van Oorschot et al., 2017) seems to have derived 
both from his initial, critical focus on conditional solidarity as well 
as from his cultural approach to welfare attitudes. If anything, 
Wim’s work has taught us that the cultural approach is 
indispensable to provide answers to the ‘basic moral welfare 
question’ that has always been at the centre of his work, namely 
‘Who should get what, and why?’ (van Oorschot, 2007: 130). 
Wim’s insistence that citizens form their attitudes towards welfare 
policies within a symbolic environment of cultural values and 
shared norms has also influenced my own approach to welfare 
attitudes.  
Importantly, Wim also pointed out that such a cultural 
approach does not necessarily imply that people would be 
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deterministically and passively ‘influenced’ by external values and 
norms from which they cannot escape as members of cultural 
groups. Rather, in a stronger view of the cultural approach, 
individuals actively participate in the co-creation of their 
normative environment, as they pick up, discuss, negotiate and 
disseminate positions and opinions in their daily lives. Following 
Clarke (2004), van Oorschot (2007) suggests that in this 
constructivist ‘culture as practice’ approach ‘culture is 
manipulated, produced and reproduced actively by people in their 
daily lives. This social construction of reality is subjected to 
relations of power: some people or groups are more powerful in 
manifesting and enforcing their reality, than others.’ (van 
Oorschot, 2007: 137). There is little doubt that many would see an 
approach focused on meaning-giving and discourse as being 
epistemologically, theoretically and methodologically at odds with 
more ‘positivist’ approaches through which welfare attitudes have 
typically been analysed (including weaker forms of the cultural 
approach). Not so Wim: ‘In my view the difference between the 
“property” and “practice” approaches to studying the 
relationships between culture and social policy should not be 
exaggerated. […], both approaches are not in competition, but are 
complementary to each other.’ (van Oorschot, 2007: 137). 
18.4  Deservingness in the social order representations 
model  
I concur with Wim’s pragmatic stance that differences between 
approaches ‘should not be exaggerated’, but rather combined into 
a more comprehensive approach of a cultural, constructivist and 
normative view on social policies and welfare attitudes. In the 
remainder of this essay, I wish to illustrate such an undertaking by 
sketching out a link between Wim’s work on deservingness and 
our own Social Order Representations Model (SORM). 
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The SORM represents an attempt to conceptualise welfare 
attitudes in a comprehensive, normative approach (see Staerklé, 
2009; Staerklé et al., 2012). The model is based on the premise 
that individuals’ thinking and positioning towards the welfare state 
derives from broad and general ideas about what an ‘ideal society’ 
should look like, as revealed by its political priorities and its broad 
ideological orientations. Correspondingly, conceptions of an ideal 
society also define its main challenges and threats. In other words, 
we suggest that people hold lay theories of social order that are 
expressed in organized and systematic views about key divisions 
between members of a society. Such views about social cleavages 
may ultimately determine ‘who deserves what and why’. We 
therefore believe that this perspective may also help to reach a 
better understanding of different criteria and cognitive processes 
underlying perceived deservingness. 
The model puts forward four archetypal representations of 
social order, termed Moral Order, Free Market, Social Diversity, and 
Structural Inequality (see Table 18.1). They are structured as a 
function of two bipolar dimensions that determine how 
individuals construe and represent key divisions in society. The 
first dimension distinguishes social divisions based on perceived 
normative conformity of individual behaviour with commonly 
accepted norms and values (‘Normative differentiation’) from 
divisions based on (ascribed) group membership (‘Categorical 
differentiation’). The second criterion distinguishes divisions based 
on cultural and moral dimensions (‘Shared identity’) from divisions 
based on material and status-related dimensions (‘Social position’). 
The crossing of these two dimensions generates the four 
representations of social order. 
Each conception of social order is defined by a generic social 
division, reflecting the two dimensions described above. Moral 
Order yields a division between norm-conforming, morally upright, 
and ‘good’ people on one side, and immoral, norm-transgressing, 
‘bad’ people on the other. Free Market implies a division between 
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hard-working, productive, and responsible ‘winners’, who are 
opposed to lazy, scrounging, and irresponsible ‘losers’. Arguably, 
though, the difference between these two normative conceptions 
may easily be blurred as neo-liberal free market values are 
increasingly imbued with a moral dimension derived from the 
ethos of competitiveness and the moral duty of self-reliance 
(Amable, 2011). 
The two categorical conceptions, in turn, reflect views on social 
order in which divisions between social groups and categories (as 
opposed to individuals) organise social order. In Social Diversity, 
(mostly ethnic and cultural) groups are opposed to each other in a 
competitive intergroup relationship characterised by ingroup 
identification, ingroup favouritism and, possibly, outgroup 
discrimination (see Brewer, 2017). In Structural inequality, the 
intergroup relation is defined by structural inequality and social 
class cleavages, yielding a generic division opposing dominant and 
privileged groups to subordinate and disadvantaged groups.  
Table 18.1  The Social Order Representations Model (SORM) and its 
relationship to van Oorschot’s deservingness criteria 
 Shared identity Social position 
 Normative differentiation 
Social order conception MORAL                
ORDER 
FREE                
MARKET 
Core division ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ ‘Winners’ and ‘Losers’ 
Regulatory principle Conformity Individual responsibility 
Deservingness criteria ‘Attitude’, ‘Control’ ‘Reciprocity’, ‘Control’ 
 Categorical differentiation 




Core division Ingroup vs. outgroup Dominant vs. subordinate 
Regulatory principle Intergroup differentiation Inequality regulation 
Deservingness criteria ‘Identity’ ‘Level of need’ 
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These four basic forms of social divisions are evaluative (one 
group is more positively evaluated than the other) and imply 
hierarchical relationships in terms of power and social status. In 
most instances, one group or social category has greater (decision) 
power, more resources, higher social status, superior prestige, or a 
better reputation, compared to the opposite group of the division. 
This is why these representations of social divisions are relevant 
for the study of deservingness. We would expect that the more 
positively a group is evaluated compared to the antagonistic 
group, the more likely it is to be seen as deserving. The reasons 
for perceived deservingness, however, depend on the conception 
of social order. 
This is where the deservingness research by Wim and his 
colleagues comes into play. In various studies, five central 
deservingness criteria are used (van Oorschot, 2000): ‘attitude’ 
(needy people who are likeable, grateful, compliant and 
conforming to our standards are more deserving); ‘control over 
neediness’ (people who are personally responsible for their hardship 
are less deserving); ‘reciprocity’ (needy people who have contributed 
to our group before are more deserving); ‘identity’ (needy people 
who are closer to ‘us’, according to ethno-national criteria, are 
more deserving); and ‘level of need’ (people in greater need are more 
deserving).  
These five criteria match the four conceptions of social order 
reasonably well. Attitude corresponds to the Moral Order 
conception in which individuals expect conformity with 
established norms in order to be deserving (thereby linking this 
conception with the ideological beliefs of traditionalism, 
conservatism and authoritarianism). Reciprocity is implied by the 
Free Market conception in which individuals are expected to be 
self-reliant and engaging in reciprocal social exchange in order to 
be deserving (thereby linking this conception with economic 
individualism). Identity is part of the Social Diversity conception in 
which individuals affiliate with and support (similar) members of 
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their own groups (thereby linking it to ingroup favouritism). 
Control over neediness fits both conceptions of normative 
differentiation (Moral Order and Free Market). Indeed, being 
personally responsible for one’s needs has a moral dimension as it 
implies ‘wrong choices’ and a moral failing (such as an unhealthy 
lifestyle) as well as an economic dimension of not being able or 
unwilling to materially support oneself (Joffe and Staerklé, 2007). 
Level of need, finally, can be seen as an acknowledgement that for 
subordinate categories such as jobless people and single mothers 
(see van Oorschot, 2000), the need is real and legitimate. It 
therefore fits with the Structural Inequality conception. 
This model can also be linked to the four guiding principles of 
Wim’s cultural approach outlined above. Stereotypical images of 
antagonistic groups are a central component of the model, 
attributions of responsibility for poverty are an important 
component of conceptions of social order, cultural diversity is 
captured by the social diversity conception, and the strong 
contextual and national contingence of the four conceptions is 
acknowledged. 
Deservingness judgements are thus part of the wider social 
fabric where people judge and evaluate groups in light of their 
position and their function in the (desired) social order. Groups 
considered useful for the desired social order are likely perceived 
as deserving. Conversely, groups that challenge or threaten the 
principles underlying a given social order are likely considered as 
undeserving. Deservingness judgements are therefore not only 
judgements of groups as such, but also judgements of the 
legitimacy of the hierarchy between groups, either contesting or 
justifying it. Perceived deservingness of a group thus reflects the 
perceiver’s motivation to legitimise or to reinforce a given social 
division underlying social order (through high deservingness of 
the positively evaluated group and low deservingness of the 
negatively evaluated group), or on the contrary, to contest and 
reduce the cleavage (through relatively high deservingness of the 
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negatively evaluated groups). Deservingness judgements thereby 
contribute to justify or to contest different forms of social 
inequality. 
The Social Order Representations Model is inspired by work in 
political theory suggesting that politics is primarily a struggle over 
meanings associated with antagonistic social groups and categories 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Many social policies are designed to 
regulate differences between antagonistic social categories (for 
example, young versus old; women versus men; employed versus 
unemployed). It seems therefore plausible that deservingness 
judgements are the outcome of social and cognitive processes of 
differentiation between social categories (Tajfel, 1978) and are 
thus based on collective representations of differences between 
individuals and groups. 
18.5  Conclusion 
To conclude, I wish to emphasise two major perspectives that 
transcend Wim’s work and that have impregnated my own 
research. First, his firm conviction that human thought and 
behaviour, and more specifically our thinking about welfare 
arrangements, needs to be understood and analysed on the basis 
of a conception of ‘homo sociologicus’ (as opposed to ‘homo 
economicus’). In this cultural, normative and constructivist view, 
‘individuals are seen as essentially social beings, who act in 
accordance with their affections for others and internalized 
cultural norms and values’ (van Oorschot and Komter, 1998: 18). 
This perspective resonates with social representations theory 
(Moscovici, 1961/2008) that is the foundation of my own work 
on welfare attitudes and political legitimacy (Staerklé, 2015). 
The second inspiring perspective concerns Wim’s unwavering 
conception of the interdependence between social inclusion and 
social exclusion. In 1998, van Oorschot and Komter wrote that 
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‘as a general rule, the more inclusive solidarity is, the more 
pronounced the group’s confines will be and the stronger the 
exclusion of “the others”.’ (van Oorschot and Komter, 1998: 20). 
Such a statement reflects a social psychological (intergroup) logic 
underlying solidarity and welfare in which the two basic 
psychological processes of social categorisation and differentiation 
play a key role. It also encapsulates the paradox of inclusive and 
exclusive effects of solidarity, and emphasizes not only the 
perverse effects of inclusion, but also the ambiguity of solidarity 
and the roots of stigmatization of welfare beneficiaries. 
In sum, Wim has taught us that social attitudes need to be 
understood and analysed as a function of the interplay between 
the cultural, historical and political contexts in which they arise on 
the one hand, and the social conditions in which citizens form 
their opinions on the other. I hope to have shown in this 
contribution that much of Wim’s research resonates with a social 
psychological perspective. Come to think of it, it could well be 
that Wim is actually a social psychologist in disguise. 
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19.  How to Study Welfare State 
Legitimacy. An Analytical Model 
Inspired by the Work of Wim van 
Oorschot 
Tijs Laenen and Femke Roosma  
19.1  Introduction 
In the year 1979 the world was in crisis. Only a few years after the 
‘first oil shock’, the global economy was rattled once more by the 
rapidly rising oil prices. At the time, Wim van Oorschot was 
working as a young consultant at the Dutch Ministry of 
Agriculture. Little did he know back then that the oil crises would 
have a major impact on its future career as a sociological scholar. 
In addition to exacerbating the longer-term pressures on the 
financial sustainability of welfare states, the economic uncertainty 
brought about by the oil shocks intensified concerns about their 
social legitimacy. It is mainly on this latter issue – welfare state 
legitimacy – that Wim has spent most of his career. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was widespread belief that a 
‘welfare backlash’ was inevitable: the economically hard times 
would make citizens both ideologically and materially opposed to 
high-spending welfare states, and tax revolts would soon follow 
(Murray, 1984; Wilensky, 1975). To test these assumptions, 
scholars started measuring popular support for the welfare state, 
using national and cross-national public opinion surveys. One of 
the most consistent conclusions of these early studies was that the 
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front 
 
 218 
welfare state is widely and persistently supported by large sections 
of the general population in almost all countries (Coughlin, 1980; 
Roller, 1995; Taylor-Gooby, 1985). However, according to some, 
these studies might have painted a ‘too rosy picture’ of welfare 
state legitimacy, because they only asked questions to which 
people easily agree, without much critical reflection (Ervasti, 1998: 
288). For example, a common procedure to measure welfare 
legitimacy was to ask whether the government should spend more 
on various social benefits and services, to which most people 
readily say ‘yes’ if they are not reminded of the fact that more 
spending usually implies higher taxes.  
Wim van Oorschot was one of the first to recognize that also 
critical welfare attitudes should be probed in order to get a more 
accurate (and perhaps less rosy) picture of the social legitimacy of 
the welfare state. He is a firm believer of the idea that welfare 
state legitimacy is a multidimensional concept, and should be 
measured accordingly (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012b). Of 
course, the idea to study welfare state legitimacy from a 
multidimensional perspective was not a new one (see, for 
example, Cnaan, 1989; Sihvo and Uusitalo, 1995; Svallfors, 1991). 
Wim’s main contribution in this regard is that he took the idea 
several steps further than all others, by initiating and supervising a 
4-year PhD project that was fully focused on the topic of the 
multidimensionality of welfare state legitimacy (Roosma, 2016). In 
short, Wim and his former PhD candidate Femke Roosma argue 
that in order to answer the all-important question whether a given 
welfare state is socially legitimate, one should explore popular 
attitudes towards all of its dimensions – which include its goals, 
range, degree, redistribution design, implementation and 
outcomes – and subsequently study how different groups of 
people combine attitudes towards these dimensions (Roosma, 
Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2013). 
However, having an eye for the multidimensionality of welfare 
state legitimacy is arguably only one of the many contributions 
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Wim has made to the broader welfare attitudes literature. Another 
important contribution is his seminal work on welfare 
deservingness (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006; van Oorschot et al., 
2017). Although the concept of deservingness already featured 
prominently in some prior (mainly American) welfare attitudes 
studies (for example, Cook, 1979; Gilens, 1999; Will, 1993), Wim 
deserves full credit for turning it into a structured theoretical 
framework, by distinguishing five criteria underlying popular 
attitudes towards the deservingness of different target groups 
(control, attitude, reciprocity, identity and need). Initially, these 
CARIN criteria were used to explain why the general public 
considers some groups (such as the old and the sick) as more 
deserving than others (such as unemployed people and 
immigrants). Over the years, however, the CARIN model has 
been applied by many others as a source of inspiration to build 
different types of theoretical propositions and perform empirical 
analyses (for example, Buss, 2019; Hrast et al., 2018; Kallio and 
Kouvo, 2015; Kootstra, 2016; Larsen, 2008). Most notably, Wim 
supervised two different 4-year PhD projects that both brought 
greater conceptual clarification and empirical examination to the 
deservingness framework, each in their own unique way. The first, 
by Marjolein Jeene (2015), focused mainly on studying the 
individual and contextual determinants of people’s deservingness 
opinions. The second PhD project, by Tijs Laenen (2020), added a 
specific focus on the complex interplay between popular 
deservingness opinions and welfare state policies. 
Importantly for this essay, Wim’s work on deservingness 
implies that people tend to have very diverging opinions towards 
different target groups of the welfare state. It is very clear, for 
example, that they do not think the same way about the elderly as 
they do about the unemployed, which are usually viewed more 
negatively in terms of their deservingness (van Oorschot, 2006). 
Accordingly, one should try to avoid using generalized measures 
of welfare state legitimacy, capturing public support for the 
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welfare state as a whole. Although the use of such generalized 
measures is quite common in the welfare attitudes literature 
(Svallfors, 2012), it has also been criticized for neglecting the 
immense internal complexity and heterogeneity characteristic of 
real-world welfare states (Jordan, 2013). In this view, the welfare 
state is not seen as a single entity but as an aggregate of a broader 
range of differently targeted benefits and services, about which 
people are likely to have independent opinions (Taylor-Gooby, 
1985). To capture this, one should ideally measure popular 
opinions towards all of the welfare state’s different provisions 
targeted at different social groups (or at least the most important 
ones) when studying its social legitimacy (Cnaan, 1989).  
Remarkably, Wim did not always differentiate between 
provisions for various target groups in his work on the 
multidimensionality of welfare state legitimacy, in which he mainly 
examined popular attitudes towards the entire welfare state 
(generally referred to as ‘social benefits and services’). A case in 
point are his analyses of what people think about the economic, 
moral and social consequences of the welfare state (van Oorschot, 
2010; van Oorschot et al., 2012), in which he does not pay 
attention to the possibility that such popular perceptions might 
vary across policy domains targeted at different social groups. It 
seems plausible, for example, that people are much more negative 
about unemployment benefits than they are about old-age 
pensions when it comes to moral consequences, given the oft-
cited assumption that unemployment protection, if too generous 
and unconditional, is detrimental to the job search activities and 
work willingness of the unemployed. With regard to economic 
consequences, it might be that pensions are judged more 
negatively, as they usually take up a considerably larger share of 
the public budget than unemployment benefits (Laenen, 2020), 
and might thus be perceived as more expensive and worse for the 
economy. Another example in which the studies on 
multidimensionality of welfare state legitimacy do not take into 
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account differentiating opinions towards policies directed at 
different target groups is the study into the preferred role and 
perceived performance of the welfare state, co-authored with 
Femke Roosma and John Gelissen (see Roosma et al., 2014). In 
this study, combinations of attitudes towards the role of 
government in providing different types of benefits and services 
and the evaluation of these benefits and services are analyzed in 
sum scales, thereby seemingly ignoring the fact that attitudes 
towards for instance the preferred role of the welfare state are 
more supportive regarding health care provisions than they are 
regarding governments’ responsibility to provide jobs for 
everyone who want one. 
In the essay, we aim to merge Wim’s two main contributions to 
the welfare attitudes literature in one analytical framework, which 
asserts that in order to fully grasp the social legitimacy of a welfare 
state, one should study popular attitudes towards its various 
provisions directed at different target groups (for example, 
unemployment benefits and social assistance), and within these 
provisions, towards its different dimensions (for example, 
redistribution design and intended and unintended outcomes). We 
hope this framework will serve as a valuable roadmap for future 
researchers interested in charting the social legitimacy of any given 
welfare state. 
19.2  An analytical model to study welfare state legitimacy 
In Figure 19.1 we present a schematic overview of our analytical 
model to study welfare state legitimacy, combining Wim’s two 
major contributions to the welfare attitudes literature. 
On the vertical axis, we refer to the multidimensional 
framework of Roosma et al. (2013). This framework departs from 
four conditions of welfare state legitimacy (Roosma, 2016; 
Rothstein, 1998): substantive justice, redistributional justice, procedural 
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justice and just outcomes. The condition of substantive justice 
demands that people consider the goals of the welfare state and its 
specific welfare provisions as just and fair. Redistributional justice 
requires that people perceive a just distribution of burdens (in 
terms of taxes and contributions) and benefits. Procedural justice 
refers to an efficient and effective implementation of welfare 
provisions; people must perceive their implementation as fair, 
simple and cheap. Just outcomes require that the outcomes are in 
line with the intentions of the policy goals. Based on these four 
conditions, Roosma et al. (2013) distinguished the following 
dimensions of welfare support, by which welfare state legitimacy 
should be assessed: the goals of the welfare state, the range of 
welfare provisions provided, the degree of government activity in 
terms of spending or investments (substantive justice); 
redistributional design (who contributes and who benefits and under 
what conditions?) (redistributional justice); efficiency of the 
implementation (is implementation cheap and simple?) and 
effectiveness of the implementation (do those who deserve benefits 
actually receive them and is misuse prevented?) (procedural 
justice); intended and unintended outcomes of the welfare efforts in 
terms of both policy outcomes and consequences (just outcomes) 
(Roosma et al., 2013).  
For each differently targeted welfare provision (horizontal 
axis), we can assess its legitimacy referring to the eight welfare 
dimensions (vertical axis), with one adaptation. The range 
dimension in the multidimensional model cannot be directly 
applied to the assessment of specific welfare provisions, because 
this dimension inventories in which policy areas the welfare state 
should be involved. It thus refers directly to the welfare state as a 
whole, instead of a specific provision within the welfare state. We 
therefore suggest to rather assess whether people believe it should 
be the welfare state who provides this benefit or service, or 
another actor such as the market, civil society or families. In this 
way we refer to the welfare mix, a dimension that was also 
How to Study Welfare State Legitimacy 
 223 
Welfare state provision Z 
(e.g. social assistance) 
 



























Welfare state provision A 
(e.g. unemployment benefit) 
 












distinguished by Roosma et al. (2013), but kept out of the 
multidimensional analysis, as it assessed legitimacy of redistribution 
beyond the scope of the welfare state. With this small adaptation 
we apply our analytical model to an example in which we compare 













Figure 19.1  An analytical model to study welfare state legitimacy 
19.3  Application of the analytical model: unemployment 
benefits and social assistance 
To illustrate the usefulness of our analytical model, Table 19.1 
provides a comparison between two different welfare provisions: 
unemployment benefits and social assistance benefits. 
Unemployment benefits are typically targeted at able-bodied 
workers that have earned the right to compensation of income 
loss during periods of unemployment through the social security 
contributions they paid prior to becoming unemployed. In most 
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unemployment schemes, benefits are restricted to those who are 
not responsible for their joblessness (for example, by resigning for 
a legally accepted reason) and demonstrate sufficient willingness 
to work (for example, by participating in training activities). Social 
assistance benefits are targeted at low-income people through the 
use of means-testing, to ensure that these people reach a socially 
acceptable standard of living. Social assistance schemes may also 
include other categories than the able-bodied and working-aged 
unemployed, such as low-wage workers (for example, in low-
skilled, part-time jobs) or elderly people (for example, elderly 
migrants who do not qualify for old-age pensions).  
Importantly, these two differently targeted welfare provisions 
are likely to differ on the various dimensions of the 
multidimensional framework of welfare legitimacy. In Table 19.1, 
we present for each dimension the main question(s) that could 
measure the legitimacy of the two provisions. Although it can be 
expected that there are important differences between the social 
legitimacy of unemployment benefits and social assistance, these 
are often not analyzed in detail, especially not in comparative 
perspective, because such detailed data are generally lacking. Here, 
we just briefly outline some of the main findings of previous 
empirical research, which leaves still many questions unanswered. 
The goals and range dimensions show differences between the two 
provisions: where the unemployment benefit provides income 
security for those who become unemployed, the social assistance 
provision has a broader aim to prevent poverty and guarantee a 
minimum income. We know from previous studies that public 
support for the latter goal is very high (Arts and Gelissen, 2001; 
Forsé and Parodi, 2009; Pfeifer, 2009). Most people also believe 
that the government should be responsible for providing benefits 
and services for the unemployed. However, support for this 
provision is often lower than support to provide for instance 
health care or old age pensions (Laenen, 2020; Roosma et al., 
2014).  
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Table 19.1  An application of the analytical model of welfare state 
legitimacy, for two examples of social provisions 
 Welfare provisions 
Welfare dimensions  Unemployment benefit  Social assistance 
Goals Is the goal of providing 
income security after 
becoming unemployed just? 
 Is the goal of preventing 
people to live below the 
poverty line just? 
Range/welfare mix Should the welfare state 
provide/coordinate 
unemployment benefits? 
 Should the welfare state 
provide/coordinate social 
assistance benefits? 
Degree The level of unemployment 
benefit/expenses is too high 
or too low? Are government 
investments in job activation 
too high or too low?  
 The level of social assistance 
benefit/expenses is too high 
or too low? Are government 
investments in job activation 
to high or too low? 
Redistributional design Are contributions and 
benefits distributed fairly and 
under fair conditions? 
* Contributions from 
employees and employers. 
* Benefits for the able-
bodied unemployed of 
working age. 
* Benefit level is related to 
previous wage. 
* Recipients have to be 
available for work and be 
actively engaged in seeking 
new employment. 
 Are contributions and 
benefits distributed fairly and 
under fair conditions? 
* Contributions from 
taxpayers. 
* Benefits for various low-
income categories. 
* Benefit is means-tested and 
level is related to household 
size. 
* Recipients have an 
obligation to actively look 
for paid employment. 
Efficiency Are access and procedures 
easy? Are the administrative 
costs low?  
 Are access and procedures 
easy? Are the administrative 
costs low? 
Effectiveness Do deserving people receive 
the benefit? Is there no 
misuse by employers or 
undeserving employees? 
 Do deserving people receive 
the benefit? Is there no 
misuse by undeserving 
people? 
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Table 19.1  (contimued) 
 Welfare provisions 
Welfare dimensions  Unemployment benefit  Social assistance 
Intended outcomes Is the benefit sufficient to 
provide income security for 
the unemployed? 
 Is the benefit sufficient to 
prevent poverty? 
Unintended outcomes Does the benefit cause 
negative moral consequences 
(such as dependency, 
inactivity and moral hazard) 
or negative economic effects 
(such as adverse work 
incentives or higher labour 
costs)? 
 Does the benefit cause 
negative moral consequences 
(such as dependency, 
inactivity and moral hazard) 
or negative economic effects 
(such as adverse work 
incentives or higher labour 
costs)? 
 
When we look at the redistributional design, social assistance schemes 
have characteristics that usually lead to less support. The strict 
eligibility criteria of means-testing can lead to stigma as it unveils 
that its claimants are not able to provide a sufficient income 
themselves, which undermines the much-valued ethic of self-
responsibility (van Oorschot, 2002). And because of the fact that 
social assistance benefits are usually paid for by (progressive) 
income taxes, the deservingness criterion of reciprocity is violated 
as well: social assistance is mostly funded by higher-income 
earners, but only paid out to low-income recipients. 
Unemployment benefits instead, are (partially) paid for by 
employees themselves through their social security contributions 
and are most often related to previous wages. These tend to be 
more favorable markers of welfare deservingness in the eyes of 
the public. When it comes to the implementation of unemployment 
and social assistance benefits, there is little (recent) data that 
distinguishes between both types of benefits. ‘The unemployed’ in 
general are associated with ‘being lazy’ and with welfare abuse 
(Larsen, 2002; Roosma et al, 2016), but no clear differentiation is 
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made between those relying on unemployment benefits and those 
relying on social assistance. We know however that means-tested 
benefits are more often associated with welfare abuse and 
bureaucracy (Goul Andersen, 1999; Rothstein, 2001). There are 
also doubts about the effectiveness of means-testing to tackle 
poverty, among academics (Gugushvili and Laenen, 2019; Korpi 
and Palme, 1998) as well as among the general public (Rossetti et 
al., 2020). Regarding the outcomes of unemployment benefits and 
social assistance, we see in general that people are relatively 
satisfied about the poverty-reducing capacity of the welfare state. 
People are generally more critical, however, about the standard of 
living of the unemployed in their country (van Oorschot and 
Meuleman, 2012a).  
19.4  Discussion 
Our analytical model of welfare state legitimacy, in which all 
dimensions and provisions of the welfare state are considered, 
leads to a detailed assessment and more fine-grained knowledge of 
popular support for the welfare state and its differently targeted 
social provisions. This permits us to better compare support for 
different welfare states and different types of social provision. It 
also allows policymakers to evaluate strong and weak points in the 
social legitimacy of the specific welfare policies actually in place, 
instead of only providing more-general accounts of support for 
the whole system of benefits and services. 
We do note that this requires that people are to some extent 
informed about the specific details of different social provisions. 
Survey respondents might not always be aware of the specificities 
of social policy arrangements. Asking questions about these 
provisions without informing respondents could lead to non-
attitudes or assessments based on false assumptions. Therefore, 
we argue to inform respondents well in survey questions and to 
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also assess respondents’ prior knowledge of social provisions in 
quantitative surveys.  
However, we argue even more for qualitative studies in the 
field of welfare attitudes, because the reasoning underlying such 
attitudes is often more complex than simply stating answers in 
fixed-response categories. Wim van Oorschot, who spend a long 
time in his career analyzing quantitative data, at the end of his 
career got convinced of the need of a ‘qualitative turn’ in studying 
the social legitimacy of the welfare state (see, for example, Laenen, 
Rossetti and van Oorschot, 2019). Together with him, we believe 
that it is necessary to lift the veil of the statistics, and to further 
explore the underlying reasoning behind the numbers. Our 
analytical model, which is based on the two main pillars of Wim’s 
work on welfare legitimacy, could be a useful framework to 
explore popular thinking about social welfare on a deeper level. 
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20.  Unpacking CARIN:                  
Four Questions on the Study of 
Perceptions of Deservingness to 
Social Benefits  
Giuliano Bonoli 
20.1  Introduction 
The study of perceptions of deservingness is an important 
component of current scholarship on the welfare state and its 
public acceptability, especially at times when the legitimacy of 
redistributive mechanisms is being questioned. Public opinion 
data allows us to map these perceptions and presents a number of 
puzzles. Why are some groups systematically considered as being 
more deserving than other ones? What mechanisms determine 
whether a person is considered deserving or not? Wim van 
Oorschot has made an immense contribution to this debate in 
several papers published since his seminal article entitled Who 
should get what and why? (van Oorschot, 2000).  
In this article Wim identified five factors that seem to 
determine the way people feel about providing social benefits to 
individuals: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need. 
These are conveniently summed up by the acronym ‘CARIN’ (van 
Oorschot et al., 2017). CARIN has proved an immensely helpful 
framework for studying perceptions of deservingness. In fact, 
strongly inspired by Wim van Oorschot’s work, a large corpus of 
literature has developed over the past twenty years. Thanks to the 
scholars who have contributed to this strand of literature, we now 
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have a fairly good understanding of what determines people’s 
perceptions of deservingness to social welfare benefits (see among 
other: van Oorschot, 2006; Larsen, 2008; Reeskens and van 
Oorschot, 2012; Kootstra, 2016; Reeskens and van der Meer, 
2019). However, this is my main contention in this chapter, some 
questions remain unanswered in the current literature. In the rest 
of the chapter, I first briefly summarise the CARIN framework. 
This is followed by a discussion of four open questions that in my 
view have yet to be answered satisfactorily. I conclude by arguing 
that we need to continue working along the lines indicated in the 
seminal work by Wim van Oorschot on deservingness 
perceptions.  
20.2  CARIN and the study of deservingness perceptions 
A substantial corpus of literature exists in relation to popular 
perceptions of deservingness. Early studies on social policies 
already noted that both in legislation and among the general 
public, some needy people were considered more deserving of 
state (or collective) help than others. This is the case of, for 
example, the disabled and the old and much less of able-bodied 
working age individuals. De Swaan developed a somewhat larger 
framework based on three elements: disability, proximity and 
docility (de Swaan, 1988). According to him, the three criteria are 
applied in the order above: first disability, then if so, proximity 
and finally docility. To be considered as deserving, a needy person 
must fulfil the three.  
These approaches were systematised in an article by Wim van 
Oorschot (2000) which has significantly influenced research on 
perceptions of deservingness in subsequent years. He identified 
five criteria that individuals use to decide the level of 
deservingness to welfare benefits: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity 
Identity and Need, known as the CARIN criteria (van Oorschot, 
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2000; van Oorschot et al., 2017). The criteria can be defined in the 
following terms: 
o Control: Is the person in a situation of need because of some 
event he or she could not control (for example, disability, 
old age) or because of an event he or she could have had 
some control over (unemployment, low income)? 
o Attitude: Is the needy person friendly and thankful to the 
state and/or the contributors to the welfare state, or does he 
or she have an attitude of entitlement and carelessness? 
o Reciprocity: Has the person in need done something for 
society before asking for help, such as paid contribution or 
taxes?  
o Identity: Is the recipient of the benefit ‘similar’ to the giver, in 
terms of ethnic, professional, regional or other identity? 
o Need: Is the beneficiary really in need?  
The list, put forward in 2000, is still widely used by those who 
study perceptions of deservingness of social benefits and has not 
been substantially amended or complemented by other scholars. 
However, as hinted above, a number of questions relating to the 
study of deservingness perceptions remain unanswered. Four such 
questions are discussed next.  
20.3  Question #1: Does CARIN really cover everything 
and are its components sufficiently distinctive? 
As mentioned above, the CARIN criteria are widely accepted, 
suggesting that they cover rather well the various dimensions of 
deservingness perceptions. However, like in any categorisation 
effort, we can ask two questions referring to comprehensiveness 
and coherence. First, with regard to comprehensiveness, we can 
ask if CARIN covers everything. Are there some factors that may 
impact on perception of deservingness that are not covered in the 
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CARIN framework? The second question refers to internal 
coherence and more specifically to whether or not the five 
constituting elements of CARIN are sufficiently distinctive to 
justify their separation on the classification. 
With regard to the first question, it may be hypothesised that 
other factors, not covered or only partly covered by CARIN could 
play a role as determinants of deservingness perceptions. For 
example: 
o Alternatives: Does the needy person have alternatives other 
than asking for help? Possibly this factor is covered by 
control and need, but may gain from being examined 
separately. 
o Effort to reduce need: Is the person doing what can be 
reasonably expected from him/her to reduce need, that is, 
earn money? For example, find a job, be active in the gig 
economy, or become self-employed? In the literature above 
‘effort to reduce need’ is considered as a component of 
reciprocity but this may be problematic.  
With regard to the second question, in many studies using the 
CARIN framework, reciprocity is used both to refer to the 
payment of taxes and/or contribution prior to claiming welfare 
AND in relation to re-integration efforts. These two components 
of the reciprocity criterion seem in reality rather different. First, 
they take place at different points in time: before need arises or 
after need has arisen. Second, they probably refer to two different 
moral principles:  
o In the case of the payment of contributions, reference is 
made to reciprocity in a strict sense. ‘You have contributed 
in the past, so now you deserve help’. 
o In the case of effort to reduce need, instead, reference is 
made to some sort of ‘conditional altruism’. ‘I will help you 
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only if you do whatever it takes to be self-sufficient and in 
spite of that you do not manage’. 
It may be the case that ‘alternatives’ and especially ‘effort to 
reduce need’ may gain from being examined separately from 
reciprocity/control/need because they can be very different from 
the reciprocity involved in paying social insurance contributions. 
These two criteria might acquire some additional salience with the 
emergence of new technologies that are transforming the way 
work is being performed (for example, gig economy) and 
particularly the emergence of new forms of work that allow access 
to income streams to individuals who, for example, because of 
low human capital, tend to be excluded from standard 
employment.  
20.4  Question #2: Is there a ranking of the five factors? 
Using survey data from the Netherlands, van Oorschot (2000) 
found that all factors matter, that is, he finds statistically significant 
differences between the perceived deservingness of different 
potential welfare clients located at opposite extreme on the 
dimensions implied by the CARIN criteria (actually, he has no 
data on attitude, so only tests ‘CRIN’). In this analysis, control is 
by far the most important factor, followed by identity and 
reciprocity. However, the differences could be very dependent on 
the formulations used in the questions. For example, on control, 
one variable, the contrast between: ‘not able to work’ and not 
‘willing to work’ drives the effect. For identity, it is illegal 
immigrants. Therefore, it may be the case that this ranking tells us 
more about how the criteria have been operationalised than about a hierarchy 
of the criteria themselves.  
The same problem is found also in other studies which attempt 
to identify a ranking or hierarchy of the factors (for example 
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Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019). In reality, we lack a metric that 
would allow us to compare the impact of the various factors. 
Differences in coefficients are as likely to depend on variation in 
question formulation as they are to reflect different levels of 
importance attributed to the five criteria by respondents. The lack 
of a common metric means that the relative importance of the 
five criteria cannot be ranked per se.  
20.5  Question # 3: Does CARIN apply to services as well 
as to cash benefits? 
Research on deservingness within the CARIN framework refers 
to help provided in the form of income transfers or cash benefits. 
However, increasingly, Western welfare states are reconfigured 
towards the provision of services such as active labour market 
policies, childcare, and services for the elderly. The literature on 
deservingness has not focused so much on this form of 
redistribution, which can have an important impact on people’s 
life chances. One exception is a vignette-study by Heuer and 
Zimmermann (2020): based on qualitative methods (focus group) 
they find that CARIN reflects pretty well the way in which focus 
group participants think about deservingness except in relation to 
a criterion that they call ‘social investment’. Some needy persons 
are considered deserving not so much of income transfers but of 
investment in their human capital. The authors treat social 
investment as a new criterion that implies ‘potentiality’ in contrast 
to the CARIN criteria that are based on ‘conditionality’. 
Investment is invoked as a justification for support for two 
person-vignettes: a low-income earner and an immigrant. The 
reasoning that respondents make goes something like this: ‘if we 
invest now in their training, they will eventually cost less’.  
But is the treatment of ‘social investment’ as a deservingness 
criterion appropriate? Or should it be considered on a different 
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conceptual level? The CARIN criteria are about motivation for 
altruism, for giving. Social investment is not necessarily altruistic, 
as it can be motivated by self-interest (pay less in the future). 
Second, while CARIN is about cash transfers, social investment is 
about the provision of enabling services, and here too there may 
be some essential differences in relation to, for example, the scope 
for cheating.  
Given the importance that social investment as a policy 
orientation acquired over the last few years, it seems essential to 
include social investment interventions in the study of 
deservingness. How to do that is still an open question. 
Conceptually, social investment does not fit into the same 
category as the deservingness principles that constitute the 
CARIN framework. The study of deservingness, thus, should be 
adapted in other ways to be able to accommodate perceptions of 
deservingness in relation to social investment interventions.  
20.6  Question # 4: What is the theory behind CARIN? 
The CARIN criteria have been essentially identified on the basis 
of empirical analysis, and little advance has been made in the 
search of a theory that could explain why it is these five factors 
that matter and not other ones. One exception is the work by 
Petersen who, although not applying the CARIN framework 
directly, has put forward a theory-based interpretation of 
perception of deservingness, called ‘deservingness heuristic’. 
Petersen’s theory is based on evolutionary psychology and on the 
idea that humans have developed rules that help them decide with 
whom they should share resources and with whom they should 
not. In Petersen’s view, humans are programmed to share 
resources with reciprocators and not to share them with cheaters, 
that is, individuals who are likely to take advantage of the givers 
(see Petersen et al., 2010, 2012; Aarøe and Petersen, 2014). 
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These attitudes have allowed groups of humans to protect 
themselves from free-riders and keep resources within the group. 
Empirical work by Petersen and colleagues suggest that 
deservingness perceptions are deeply engrained in people’s minds, 
and are not fundamentally affected by differences in institutions. 
One of their main pieces of evidence is a Denmark – US 
comparison showing that a reciprocator is deemed more 
deserving than a cheater in either of the two countries, which are 
as different as possible in relation to most welfare state related 
issues (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014). 
20.7  Conclusion 
CARIN has been an immensely helpful framework for the study 
of deservingness perceptions. It has allowed many researchers to 
systematise the results of their empirical analyses in a rather 
coherent way. However, the fact that CARIN is essentially 
empirically driven limits the extent to which our knowledge of 
deservingness perceptions can move further forward. In addition, 
the study of deservingness perceptions has some unanswered 
puzzles, such as the ranking of the criteria or how to integrate 
social investment. In spite of the fact that much has been written 
on the determinants of deservingness perception, more research is 
needed to understand the drivers of public acceptability of 
modern welfare states. This question is more important than ever 
as we are witnessing the emergence of multicultural societies 
throughout Europe, a development that is putting strains on 
welfare states and on the extent to which they are accepted by the 
general public. Further research along the lines of Wim’s work 
could contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms that 
are at play and to the development of social institutions that are 
suitable for a multicultural society.  
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21.  Is CARIN Alive and Well? 
Revisiting the Relationship between 
Stereotypes and Identity as the 
Foundations of Welfare 
Deservingness 
Wouter De Tavernier and Veerle Draulans 
21.1  Introduction 
One of Wim van Oorschot’s main contributions to the field of 
welfare state studies is his work on welfare state legitimacy1	– that 
is, public support for certain social policies. In particular, his name 
has become synonymous with deservingness: the extent to which 
certain individuals are considered ‘deserving’ of public support, 
for instance through welfare benefits (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006). 
Deservingness perceptions are largely affected by two aspects: 
the institutional design of a benefit and the public image of its 
target group (Laenen et al., 2019; van Oorschot and Roosma 
2017). The latter means that perceptions of deservingness are 
based on stereotypes about (possible) benefit recipients: a negative 
collective image of a certain social group means it is less 
favourably judged in terms of (some of) the deservingness criteria, 
thereby lowering public support for benefits targeting this 
particular group. The stereotypes about a group affecting its 
deservingness refer in particular to five perceived characteristics 
of the members of this group, which are known as ‘deservingness 
criteria’ or ‘CARIN criteria’ and which are a set of ‘rules’ people 
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use to determine who is ‘deserving’ of public support and who is 
not (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006). 
The more control an individual is perceived to have over one’s 
situation, the less inclined people will be to argue that this 
individual should be entitled to a benefit. van Oorschot (2000) 
finds that control is particularly important for deservingness, 
confirming earlier research. For instance, Will (1993: 330) found 
that ‘Those who try to improve their lot in life and still fall short 
are shown much higher levels of generosity than those who 
appear not to try.’ Attitude refers in particular to the level of 
gratefulness of the benefit recipient, with more grateful individuals 
being perceived as more deserving of the benefit. Reciprocity 
affects deservingness in the sense that people are more inclined to 
support benefits for individuals who are perceived as having 
contributed before (or will do so later on). Identity is about 
whether one can identify oneself with the recipient: one is more 
inclined to support benefits for individuals one can relate to, 
individuals that resemble oneself. Finally, need refers to the extent 
to which the individual requires a benefit to foresee in one’s 
subsistence, with more needy individuals being seen as more 
deserving. 
Stereotypes are considered to be one of the foundations of 
deservingness, as the latter strongly relies on perceptions and 
opinions about individuals or groups. However, the link with the 
social-psychological literature on stereotypes is rarely made 
explicit in writings on deservingness – a rare exception being a 
footnote in van Oorschot (2006). Bridging the gap between both 
literatures, we argue in this contribution that this link is not as 
straightforward as might have been assumed. In doing so, it will 
become clear that the role of ‘identity’ is not as clear-cut as it is 
presented in the deservingness literature. In the following, we 
briefly present the concepts of stereotypes, prejudice and 
discrimination, and discuss the role of proximity for their 
development. Then, we discuss the nature of identity in relation to 
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the other four CARIN criteria and deservingness itself. Finally, 
the chapter presents some new roads for future research springing 
from linking both strands of literature. 
21.2  Identity criterion: the odd one out 
All deservingness criteria have in common that individuals use 
them as guiding principles in deciding who should receive more or 
less support. However, while the other four deservingness criteria 
deal with assumptions about who benefit recipients are and how 
they behave (Are they needy? Do they try? Are they grateful? Did 
they contribute?), identity refers to social or geographical 
proximity or distance between contributors and welfare recipients. 
Distance can be understood in terms of socio-economic status 
(Carriero and Filandri, 2019), unemployment (Uunk and van 
Oorschot, 2019) or migration status (Meuleman et al., 2020). 
Moreover, while identity is conceptualised as one of the 
deservingness criteria and therefore a consequence of stereotypes in 
the deservingness literature, the literature on stereotypes describes 
it as a cause of stereotypes. To shed light on the causal relationship, 
we build the argument from the basics: what are stereotypes? 
21.2.1 Stereotypes 
Prejudice refers to positive or negative attitudes individuals hold 
towards a social group, creating or maintaining hierarchical status 
relations between groups (Dovidio et al., 2010: 7). The concept 
encompasses affective, cognitive and behavioural aspects (Maio et 
al., 2010: 264–266). In a narrow understanding of the concept, 
prejudice only refers to the affective aspect, while stereotyping 
and discrimination refer to the cognitive and behavioural aspects, 
respectively. McGarty and colleagues (2002: 5) define the term 
stereotype as ‘any impression of groups held by anybody’ and 
individuals do so ‘regardless of whether the accuracy of that belief 
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is disputed.’ Hence, they contain supposed ‘knowledge’ about a 
group. Stereotypes can be descriptive, expressing how groups are 
or how likely their members are supposed to behave in a certain 
way,2 or prescriptive, expressing how they ought to be (Glick and 
Rudman, 2010: 337). Stereotyping can be described as ‘complexity 
reduction’ or ‘energy saving devices’ (McGarty et al., 2002: 35), by 
means of categorisation and minimising detailed information or 
individuality. Discrimination, finally, is ‘behavior that creates, 
maintains, or reinforces advantage for some groups and their 
members over other groups and their members’ (Dovidio et al., 
2010: 10). Deservingness essentially is a form of discrimination: it 
is about deciding which groups should be treated better than 
others. Though not the same, prejudice, stereotypes and 
discrimination are tied to one another. For instance, stereotypes 
serve to rationalise and justify prejudice and discrimination 
(McGarty, 2002: 25; Crandall et al., 2011). 
21.2.2 Proximity 
According to the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), an 
individual’s feelings toward (prejudice) and views of (stereotypes) 
a certain social group become more positive as the individual has 
more contact with individuals belonging to this specific group. It 
is not just contact that causes individuals to alter their views in a 
positive direction, but the quality of contact appears to be 
particularly important (Drury et al., 2016; Hale, 1998). Stereotypes 
are mainly applied in contexts where little information is available 
about the other person, situations in which this ‘Other’ is 
anonymous. In other words, stereotyping depends on proximity – 
or distance – and thus on the identity dimension. As such, identity 
is not simply a deservingness criterion like all the other four 
(control, attitude, reciprocity, need). Instead, it precedes the 
stereotypes from which the other deservingness criteria are 
derived. 









However, if identity precedes stereotypes, and hence 
deservingness criteria, then how can it affect deservingness 
opinions when other deservingness criteria are controlled for? It is 
possible that the effects identified for identity in the deservingness 
literature rather reflect prejudice – in the narrow, affective sense – 
towards other social groups. This makes the concept very 
different in nature from the other deservingness criteria as they 
are about stereotypes. Following this rationale, identity as a 
concept in the deservingness literature in fact should be split into 
two: an indirect and a direct component. On the one hand, (the 
lack of) identification with a certain social group triggers 
stereotypes to be used against this group, stereotypes that are 
reflected in the scores the social group receives on the 
deservingness criteria of control, attitude, reciprocity and need. 
On the other, it could affect deservingness more directly though 











Figure 21.1 Identity, stereotypes and deservingness 
As a meta-analysis of racial discrimination found that the impact 
of emotional prejudice on discrimination is twice as big as that of 
stereotypes (Talaska et al., 2008), the impact of prejudice on 
deservingness could be substantial. 
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21.3  A new research agenda 
Linking deservingness more explicitly to the literature on 
stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination would extend the 
research agenda well beyond the position of identity and prejudice 
in the causal diagram. By bringing in insights from the 
psychological literature, new questions emerge. More specifically, 
we suggest two paths for future research. 
First, according to the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 
2002), stereotypes as an instrument of categorisation can be boiled 
down to two dimensions: warmth and competence. While older 
people are seen as warm but incompetent (classified as 
‘paternalistic prejudice’), poor people and ‘welfare recipients’3 are 
seen as lacking both warmth and competence (‘contemptuous 
prejudice’). Disabled people are considered as equally incompetent 
but placed a bit lower than older people on the warmth scale. This 
order corresponds to the one found by van Oorschot (2006) in 
deservingness of these groups all across Europe: older people are 
most deserving, followed by the disabled, and unemployed people 
follow at a distance. Potentially, this difference in warmth could 
explain the finding that older people are the most deserving social 
group across Europe (van Oorschot, 2006). Moreover, there 
seems to be an overlap between the concepts of warmth and 
competence in the psychological literature, and attitude and 
control in the deservingness literature, that could be the subject of 
further exploration.4 
Second, the stereotype literature could also add to our 
understanding of how policies affect deservingness (for example 
Laenen, 2018). Social policies institutionalise social differences, 
establishing distance between social groups. This is not only the 
case for stratification of social classes (Esping-Andersen, 1990) 
but for instance also of age groups through the institutionalisation 
of the life course and its tri-partition into education, work and 
retirement (Kohli, 1978). Due to the importance of contact for 
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stereotypes, the welfare state has therefore been seen as a source 
of stereotyping and prejudice, in particular towards older 
individuals (De Tavernier et al., 2019; Hagestad and Uhlenberg, 
2005). As such, stereotypes can serve as a policy feedback 
mechanism: when policies such as pensions separate older people 
from other social groups in society, this can strengthen views of 
older people as being incapable of earning an income and 
therefore deserving of a social benefit. On the other hand, as the 
share of older people in society increases, they are perceived less 
as a particularly needy group and are faced with similar 
deservingness levels as younger people (Naumann et al., 2020). 
21.4  Conclusion 
So, is CARIN alive and well? From the literature, this question 
can be answered with a resounding yes: ‘She is alive and well, as 
she inhabits our hearts and thus shapes our minds’ (Castells, 2010: 
xviii). However, if we take the deservingness criteria out of their 
theoretical vacuum and build them into the literature on 
stereotypes, a whole new research agenda emerges allowing for a 
deeper understanding of welfare state legitimacy. 
From the theoretical argument made, it appears that identity 
might play a much more central role than has been assumed so 
far. As illustrated in Figure 21.1, rather than being one of the five 
deservingness criteria theorised by Wim van Oorschot as being on 
equal footing, identity might precede the others by triggering the 
stereotyping the other criteria are derived from. The direct effect 
established between identity and deservingness would then rather 
reflect the affection an individual holds towards a certain social 
group, that is, prejudice. Hence, maybe the acronym ‘IS-CARIN’ 
would more accurately reflect the causal mechanism at play: it 
acknowledges that identity (I) causally precedes the CARIN 
criteria through triggering stereotyping (S), yet that there is an 
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effect of identity on deservingness independent of the other 
criteria through prejudice (the I remaining in CARIN).5 In this 
model, deservingness is a specific form of discrimination. 
Furthermore, we also briefly illustrated two other ways in 
which the stereotypes literature could enrich our understanding of 
deservingness. First, perceived warmth and competence of 
individuals belonging to specific social groups could potentially go 
a long way in explaining whether or not these people are 
perceived as deserving support of society. Second, stereotypes 
could be a supplementary policy feedback mechanism through 
which stereotypes legitimise existing forms of discrimination and 
social policies create their own support. In order to test these 
ideas, surveys analysing deservingness should also include 
measures of stereotyping and prejudice towards the social groups 
whose deservingness is being assessed. Hence, more than 
providing answers, this contribution aims to be the start of a new 
research agenda on deservingness by approaching it from a 
perspective of prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination. 
NOTES 
1. For a state-of-the-art of the literature on welfare state legitimacy, see van 
Oorschot and Roosma (2017). 
2. Note that, unlike identity, the other four deservingness criteria are descriptive 
stereotypes. 
3. Fiske et al. (2002) do not define the concept of welfare recipients, but it is 
likely to refer to unemployment benefit and/or social assistance recipients. 
4. Also the study by Menec and Perry (1995) could be very relevant here. They 
link the perceived control individuals with specific ‘stigmas’ (for example, 
unemployment, obesity and heart disease) have over their situation, with the 
willingness to help those individuals, through attribution theory. 
5. Technically, it would be more correct to replace the last I in ‘IS-CARIN’ by a 
P, as it reflects the idea that it is not identity itself, but rather the prejudice it 
triggers, that would affect perceptions of deservingness. However, that would 
leave us with the somewhat unfortunate and less scientifically sounding 
acronym ‘IS-PRANC’. 
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22.  From Who Deserves to What 
Deserves. Post-Material Encounters 
with Other-Than-Human Subjects 
Karin Hannes 
I don’t think there is anything accidental in meeting some-thing or 
some-one. As researchers, we naturally develop an interest in 
things, people and how both influence each other. Social scientists 
study phenomena. These phenomena do not seem to have a 
tactile dimension, at least not at first sight [Sight, the most prevailing 
human sense that both enlightens and deceives us, as it pleases]. We have 
developed a jargon to speak about structures, cultures and 
systems, so that we can enlighten each other on new concepts 
invented to make sense out of the world, more particularly our 
place in it. We speak about facts, figures, and systems, in the case 
of Wim van Oorschot the welfare system. We share data with 
likeminded persons, in some occasions also with those who hold a 
different viewpoint. Conversations with a purpose we call them. 
This purpose can be of a scientific or an economic-political 
nature. Such conversations, Wim and I almost had none. If this 
has any reason at all, it is because in the years that we shared a 
common workspace I have appreciated Wim as a ‘presence’ rather 
than a person. The good thing about being a ‘presence’ in 
someone’s life is that when you are absent it immediately 
introduces an emptiness. A ‘presence’ fills a space in silence. One 
only comes to appreciate a ‘presence’ when its absence is not met 
with indifference or relief. There is something infinite in a 
‘presence’. What this means is potentially better explained through 
a visual modality than in language (Figure 22.1). 













Figure 22.1 A ‘presence’ (by courtesy of Chloé Dierckx) 
When two ideas or arguments are presented as extreme poles of 
the same phenomenon, a ‘presence’ does not necessarily focus on 
one or the other side of the continuum. In this case, it would only 
lose itself in a quarrel about an issue that, in most cases, is a 
simple problem that becomes complicated due to a process of 
binary thinking. This binary thinking is ‘everywhere’. It has been 
particularly strong in our own department and in our personal 
work sphere. It is also there when we look into topics such as who 
deserves to be supported through the welfare system. Thinking 
about ‘who’ implies an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, so it seems. Usually the 
‘us’ refers to the ones who consider themselves and their own 
thinking patterns as the norm. With ‘them’ they refer to groups of 
people or profiles that differ from this norm. In a social welfare 
context, ‘them’ tends to refers to those potentially in need. 
Consequently, we put ‘them’ on the demand side of the social 
welfare system and ‘us’ on the supply side. This is how we choose 
to look at a phenomenon like the welfare system in relation to 
deservingness. A general lack of resources invites us into making 
choices about how to invest them. It is the policymaker who 
decides on who gets what. He or she may choose to do so in line 
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with public opinion, an area that Wim has carefully studied in his 
academic career. Tracing his studies back over the years, I noticed 
that people’s opinion about who deserves has not changed too 
much. Surely, there are differences related to the perspective 
taken; an economic or a social justice one. But overall, those who 
were privileged beneficiaries ten years ago keep their place in the 
ranking; the elderly, the disabled or diseased and to a certain 
extent the unemployed (Laenen and Meuleman, 2017; Meuleman 
et. al., 2018), the latter more outspoken in times of economic 
recession. Humans seem to have a natural tendency to assign 
advantages to people close to what they will most likely become 
one day; old, either with or without diseases or disabilities, and 
unemployed. Solidarity, in most cases, is limited to those who are 
‘like us’, and this seems to be universal.  
Common courtesy requires me to mention that there are, of 
course, one million ‘situations’ in which humans have proven to 
successfully bond with people who are different or in need, at 
least in a real life context. I cannot stress enough that acting upon 
such people in a real life context is quite different from sharing 
information about thoughts and opinions in a survey context, 
from behind our desk, pretty much similar to how some 
researchers gather and analyze data, from behind their desk. 
Perhaps it is because we prefer to speak about solidarity 
mechanisms more than to actually live our principles in practice. 
Or we might be too limited or discouraged from within our 
scientifically inspired environment to actually act upon others. I 
guess this is because bonding needs a physical ‘presence’, some-
thing or some-one that you run into; an encounter of bodies with 
or without a predefined purpose. The most interesting encounters 
are usually the non-intentional ones, the type of informally guided 
nodding acquaintances. Wim and I had many of those over the 
years. I remember this one particular moment where I actually díd 
meet Wim [or rather succeeded in connecting the dots between his work and 
some of the questions that sit on my scientific radar]. It was in the 
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presence of two other colleagues and a student. The line of 
inquiry on deservingness suddenly began to spark my interest 
when the rights of animals became a subject of discussion during 
a master thesis defense in June 2019. The student pleaded for an 
extension of the human rights declaration and emphasized the 
important role of social welfare workers in creating a momentum 
for the animal rights movement. The societal shift she promoted 
towards positive change was in line with the core principles of 
empowerment and liberation that underpins the social work 
profession. Her argument was focused on enhancing the 
wellbeing of animals. It was not a surprising conclusion, given the 
nature of the social welfare profession. However, it was the 
introduction of the element ‘nature’ itself that opened up an 
interesting new perspective. It moved my focus from who 
deserves to what deserves support on this planet; a what that 
according to the student deserved a right to be defended and 
legally represented. From animal rights over Mount Taranaki, Te 
Urewera national park and the Whanganui river in New Zealand 
to the complete ecosystem of the Himalayan mountains in North 
India; in the last couple of years the idea that nature deserves 
better has moved from being a statement initially proposed by 
Christopher Stone in a lawsuit as early as 1972 (Sierra Club v 
Morton, 1972) to a statement integrated in the law system. Legal 
rights are now assigned to many natural objects in our living 
environment, which suggest that our research relation with 
‘things’ will become more relevant under the impulse of 
sustainability discourses and ecologically inspired movements 
worldwide, not necessarily with the intention to enforce a status 
of full personhood on non-human elements but rather to seek 
recognition for the rights of ‘others’ (Colwell et al., 2017; Morris 
and Ruru, 2010). 
It is precisely at this cross-road between the human and the 
non-human that our ways of approaching the concept 
deservingness is challenged, up to the point where conventional 
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social-political, economic and behavioral theories fall short in 
providing accurate answers to the many questions we are asked to 
deal with. How should we best relate to these not all human 
‘others’ with whom we geographically share common ground? Are 
there valid reasons to assume that non-human entities deserve to 
be considered as a relevant category of beneficiaries of a welfare 
system in our questionnaires? Can a river be sick, stressed, 
disabled or enabled? Does it deserve to be treated, at what cost? 
Who represents rivers, mountains or animals? Which rights do we 
allow them to have? How do we secure these rights and what 
should be done if these rights are violated? How do we balance 
the negative effects of polluted rivers on the health of many with 
economic advantages of the companies located at our water 
fronts? What is more important; health or employment, which 
creates the ability to pay for health care?  
As much as we applaud the movement to protect animals, 
natural resources and to restore ecological systems, we are 
increasingly aware of the tensions this creates, particularly on a 
political-economic level. To put it simple, broadening the focus 
from who deserves to what deserves might ‘get in the way’ of 
those pulling the political, economic strings. Humanism has its 
own prospects. However, the crisis related to the corona virus 
outbreak in the year 2020 has sparked people’s interest into how 
to restore the balance with our natural environment, as it became 
clear that human interference in nature was one of the triggers for 
the COVID-19 virus outbreak (Afelt et al., 2018). Several activists 
have issued a call to start focusing on the bigger issue related to 
mankind’s survival. ‘Our planet deserves to be saved!’ ‘Future 
generations will benefit from our collective effort and investment!’ 
However, what does a fishing embargo to ‘save the fish 
population’ mean for those who earn a living through fishing, 
even when restoring the fish population to achieve a healthier 
ecosystem is beneficial for them in the long term? What does this 
all imply for the social welfare worker guiding people through the 
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complexities of daily life struggle, trying to secure a chance for 
them to earn a living in line with these people’s competences? 
As researchers, we inventory opinions, compare, contrast, and 
where necessary calculate. We search for meaning in numbers and 
grand narratives, more often than not from a distant perspective. 
The social workers we train operate in real life, on the ground 
floor or on a policy level, doing the same thing, that is, to 
inventory, compare, and contrast. Their ‘presence’ on-site teaches 
us what our absence in the field often cannot, namely that from a 
perspective of hope, it is always better to move on, than to hold on to 
what you are, what others think you are or to the disadvantaged 
place you occupy in society. Have we been responsive enough to 
the dynamics of identity formation and the type of relationships 
through which they are shaped in our own scientific work? To be 
able to measure we categorize, or at least this is how we are 
trained to measure, particularly in a survey context. We tend to 
use binary logic to describe respondents based on race, sex, social 
status and other identity characteristics. These categories have 
been quite stable over time. Ironically, this is often the one thing 
people in need are desperately trying to escape; to be boxed in as a 
category, to occupy a thick box that they do not necessarily 
choose to relate to. But we ‘hold on’ to our thick box logic. It 
characterizes our Western, cultural and philosophical thought 
pattern. And we often do so for other than theoretical reasons: 
traditions, pragmatics, operationalization conventions, a concern 
about quality in relation to standards of practice and 
generalizability, or simply a lack of inspiration about how to 
measure dynamics and identities in a permanent status of 
becoming. Our standard forms of representation are increasingly 
being subjected to critiques from amongst others cis- and creative 
genders (Butler, 2004; Wallach Scott, 2010), those who think and 
work from a decolonialization perspective (Hendricks et al., 2019; 
Yanow, 2015) and those who oppose anthropocentrism in the 
context of destructive forms of speciesm (Braidotti, 2016, Trzak, 
From Who Deserves to What Deserves 
 
 259 
2015). These studies invite us into rethinking difference and 
transformation in non-negative terms. They encourage us to move 
away from the Same/Other binary logic or at least to avoid a 
situation in which target groups are gender-ed, race-d or specie-d: 
female/male, white/black, human/non-human.  
Identities, according to Braidotti (2011), are always in the 
process of becoming. This process is not exclusive to the mots 
and butterflies we see evolve from a cocoon and a caterpillar into 
the beautiful creatures they are. Human subjective identity is 
flexible. The boundaries within which we move from one status 
to another, one category to another are not fixed in time or space. 
We are sometimes more of the one and less of the other. This 
introduces an important challenge to consider, namely, how does 
one capture a process of becoming or a metamorphosis that 
progresses as a representational modus in a measurement 
instrument? A process of a metamorphosis usually is a painful 
endeavor, in which we have to give up what we were to become 
something else. With human enhancement technologies we enter 
yet another exiting area of being that will challenge our thick box 
logic. Until recently, technology has mainly functioned as a means 
to facilitate humans. It serves us, from an instrumental point of 
view. We are now seeing a generation of people starting to design 
themselves, using implants to extent the range of their senses, for 
example, to listen to the sound of colors or to capture vibrations 
of earth and moon through the soles of their feet. They connect 
their nerve system with an external computer or device. 
Increasingly, we move into an area where we all will become 
makers. It allows us to build a better or a different version of 
ourselves, by choice rather than from a disadvantage perspective. 
Humans are ‘becoming’ machine, hereby escaping all types of 
categories humanism has previously provided us with, so it seems. 
I am chasing these cyborgs merely out of curiosity. At the same 
time I imagine a new generation of experts in deservingness 
research breaking their head over the same type of questions Wim 
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has answered over the years: Who deserves? What deserves? 
Under which conditions? Is there a difference between humans, 
more-than-humans and non-humans in what we expect them to 
contribute to our welfare state? When does one become a 
machine that does no longer fit our category of ‘human’ or when 
does one become a machine that is declared eligible to pay taxes 
or deserves to be taken care of? Most importantly, when will we, 
as researchers, have to let go to what we are familiar with 
ourselves in terms of trying to make sense out of the social world?  
I also look forward to the day when such discussions can be 
held and we will start to challenge the idea of how we represent 
things, humans or others, in our surveys and in our 
conceptualization, comparison, contrasting and calculating 
exercises. On that day, I would happily applaud the many social 
workers I have had the pleasure to work with, for refusing the 
idea of categorization and for promoting a paradigm of hope; for 
holding on to the idea that there is an opportunity for every 
human to ‘become’ a better version of themselves. I issue a 
challenge to all survey specialists to rethink categorization from 
the perspective of becoming and to develop analytical means to 
study identities in flux. The cyborg revolution will be a good 
starting point. It requires us to relate to ‘some-thing’ that escapes 
all our existing categories. Their ‘presence’ brings us back where 
we started (Figure 22.1); the sign of infinity that simultaneously 
deceives and enlightens us, depending on the angle from which 
we are looking at it. ‘What might make us “post human” is in fact 
that which makes us (merely!) “human”, amplified perhaps; but 
the same collection of traits, characteristics, and measures of 
moral value as we have ever aspired to possess as markers of our 
humanity’ (Lawrence, 2017: 172). Consequently, all binary 
categories are simply extremes of one and the same phenomenon. 
The Likert scales we favor in our research would make more 
sense if the two extreme poles on each end of the spectrum would 
fold into each other. Most phenomena, things, events, the relation 




between future, past and present are of an entangled rather than a 
linear nature. They are permanently being reworked, hereby 
escaping the correlational and causality logic we impose on them. 
What I intend to say is that this might mean that our responsibility 
to questions of social justice has to be reworked as well. The 
question ‘who or what deserves’ is therefore not simply one about 
who gets more or less or how to best discriminate between groups 
of radically exteriorized ‘others’ in need. It is about taking up the 
responsibility to respond to new configurations and new types of 
subjectivities. The cyborg’s presence issues a gentle invitation to 
start reshaping our scientific toolbox. The cyborg displays no 
signs of bitterness, regrets or negativity caused by too much past 
in its life. It does not display signals of unease, anxiety or tensions 
either, as these are things that belong to persons with too much of 
a future left. The cyborg is at the very point where present, past 
and future meet and where the potential for transformation sits. If 
we consider society as something dynamic that escapes 
categorization, then the very idea that patterns remain stable 
should be problematized. The foundational categorical thinking 
that constraints and prevents us from seeing some-thing or some-
one from a different perspective then becomes a matter of 
concern.  
In the prospect of further debate, I wish to end with a 
statement from the last part of the Four Quartets from T.S. Eliot 




‘We shall not cease from exploration  
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time.’ 
― T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets. 
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23.  Does the Concept of Deservingness 
Apply to Migrant Settlement? 
David De Coninck, Gray Swicegood and Koen Matthijs 
23.1  Introduction 
European integration efforts have come under increased scrutiny 
following the entry of large numbers of migrants in 2014–2016 
(d’Haenens et al., 2019). Dealing with this diverse group of 
economic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and transmigrants, is 
one of the major issues facing Europe today. If the sheer number 
of migrants is challenging, their integration into (local) society is 
even more so. Several European politicians and media have used 
the terminology of ‘economic migrants’ to cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of their claims to protection (Crawley and Skleparis, 
2018). Thus, public opinion may today be more restrictive in 
terms of which migrants should be allowed to settle in their 
country than in the past. The increased emphasis on the legitimacy 
of migrants may stimulate feelings of (un)deservingness among 
the public towards migrant settlement in the destination country 
(De Coninck, 2020).  
In the field of social policy, van Oorschot and colleagues have 
made important contributions to the literature on welfare 
deservingness, focusing on the differential support among the 
public for welfare provisions for different social groups based on 
the so-called CARIN criteria: control, attitude, reciprocity, identity, and 
need (Jeene et al., 2011; Jensen and Pedersen, 2016; van Oorschot, 
2000, 2006). We argue that this model can be usefully extended to 
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the investigation of the public’s conditional support towards the 
settlement of migrants in their country. 
Our goal is to obtain greater insight into the public’s 
conditional attitudes towards migrants, using the CARIN criteria 
and deservingness framework as a point of departure. This 
approach highlights challenges and opportunities for policymakers 
who struggle to meet their responsibilities to protect refugees 
while simultaneously respecting public attitudes on this salient and 
divisive issue (Bansak et al., 2016).  
23.2  From welfare deservingness to settlement 
deservingness 
The adult population’s attitudes regarding the distribution of 
welfare benefits are influenced by a simple question: are the 
recipients of social benefits deserving or not? Scholars of 
deservingness have investigated the differential support among 
the adult population for welfare provisions for different groups 
(for example, immigrants, the elderly, the sick and disabled) 
(Jensen and Pedersen, 2016). To understand how these attitudes 
are shaped, van Oorschot (2000) draws attention to both 
institutional and cultural factors. Prior research indicates that 
public support depends on the perception of a welfare scheme’s 
financial burden on the population, which in turn relates to the 
possible number of claimants (Hills, 2002). The economic 
conditions of a region are a key contextual factor. Regions with 
poor economic conditions experience greater competition for 
scarce economic resources ‘such as well-paid jobs, jobs that are 
secure, affordable housing, or welfare-state resources’ (Billiet et 
al., 2014: 136), which may increase the degree to which migrants 
are perceived as a financial burden. Although country- and 
regional-level indicators contextualize the broad integration 
climate, the integration of migrants almost exclusively takes place 
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at the local level. Doomernik and Ardon (2018) found that most 
recent migrants settle in urban areas to seek employment and 
housing or to reconnect with family and friends. Deservingness 
will therefore be a framework that mostly applies to a local 
context, as perceptions of (small) communities or individuals are 
more likely to stimulate the successful settlement and integration 
of migrants in a local context than country-wide indications of 
deservingness perceptions. 
From the cultural domain, van Oorschot (2000; 2006) 
developed five basic deservingness criteria: control, attitude, 
reciprocity, identity, and need (van Oorschot et al., 2017). Need 
postulates that those with higher needs are met with more 
sympathy, while control predicts that those who are perceived to be 
in control of (or responsible for) their situation, will be met with 
less sympathy. The identity condition implies that deservingness 
increases as the cultural distance between those in need and the 
native population decreases. Those who are considered ‘one of 
us’, will be perceived as more deserving. According to the attitude 
criterion, individuals who are thankful for the support they receive 
will also be perceived as more deserving. Finally, the reciprocity 
criterion states that deservingness depends on the extent to which 
the support has been ‘earned’, for example, by contributing to a 
country’s welfare by their labour market activity (Reeskens and 
van der Meer, 2019; van Oorschot, 2002, 2006). 
Although this framework has been widely used in the evaluation 
of the deservingness of welfare recipiency, it is clearly relevant to 
understanding attitudes towards the settlement of migrants. 
Refugees or asylum seekers in need of protection have been 
dismissed as ‘economic migrants’ by Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban and former Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, 
amongst others (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018). One purpose of this 
social construct is to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate 
migrants, and to demarcate ‘the population’ from ‘the other’ 
(Foucault et al., 2007). The use of such categorizations may be 
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related to specific actions such as discrimination, because 
‘language, thought, and actions are inextricably linked’ (Hardy, 
2003: 19). Studies have shown that the way in which refugees are 
represented in media and politics is related to attitudes about how 
they should be treated (De Coninck, 2020). The emphasis on the 
(il)legitimacy of particular ‘types’ of migrants based on criteria such 
as religion and ethnicity may result in feelings of (un)deservingness 
towards them. Currently, no approach exists that provides a 
satisfactory answer to the question: does the public believe that 
migrants deserve to settle in a country? We hypothesize that the 
mechanisms shaping perceptions of welfare deservingness among 
the public also apply to this question – albeit with some 

















Note: Ma = position migrant group on ‘negative-positive’ dimension of a 
deservingness criterion (Laenen, Rossetti and van Oorschot, 2019). 
Figure 23.1  The basic settlement deservingness model 
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of settlement deservingness (Figure 23.1). Although cultural and 
institutional factors that explain deservingness hold a central 
position in this model, differences by gender, age structure, 
religious denomination, and socioeconomic status may be 
expected based on previous differences in intergroup attitudes and 
deservingness perceptions (De Coninck, 2020; Reeskens and van 
Oorschot, 2012).  
23.3  Re-interpreting the CARIN criteria 
How do the CARIN criteria apply to settlement deservingness 
perceptions towards different ‘types’ of migrants? And what is 
meant by ‘type’ of migrant? Social constructs such as ‘(economic) 
migrant’, ‘refugee’, ‘asylum seeker’, and ‘transmigrant’ have been 
used to categorize migrants for many decades, but this practice 
has become increasingly politicized since the refugee crisis in an 
effort to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate migrants 
(Foucault et al., 2007; Crawley and Skleparis, 2018). Following the 
signing of the Refugee Convention in 1951, a refugee is legally 
defined as ‘someone who has been forced to flee his or her 
country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a 
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social 
group’ (United Nations, 1951: 14). Migrants are defined as 
individuals ‘who decide to move, based on their free will, for 
reasons of personal convenience, and without the intervention of 
an external compelling reason such as war or a natural disaster’ 
(UNESCO, 2017: para. 3).  
These definitions and categories are somewhat arbitrary. They 
do not incorporate the complex realities of migrant motives and 
movements across time, cultures, and countries. Nevertheless, 
their use clearly has important legal and social consequences for 
those involved. People make a distinction between migrants in 
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terms of both perceived control over the neediness of support, 
and the level of need. When we consider the control criterion, 
studies indicate that certain migrants, like refugees, tend to receive 
more sympathy than others (for example economic migrants), as 
refugees’ motives to migrate are largely outside of their control 
(Crawley and Skleparis, 2018; De Coninck, 2020). This directly ties 
into the need criterion because refugees are also perceived as in 
greater need of the protection they receive than other migrant 
groups (De Coninck, 2020). It is important to note that there are 
subcategories of migrants that are not discussed here, such as 
climate refugees and transmigrants, for whom perceived control 
and type of need are even more difficult to determine.  
Migrants with less perceived cultural distance from the majority 
population are more likely to be considered as deserving than 
others (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019) – in line with the identity 
criterion –, but what factors are important in defining ‘us’ versus 
‘others’? Ethnicity and religion have received attention, but 
additional axes involving language and country of birth are also 
possible. These factors are consequential for the particular 
substantive composition of two distinctive dimensions of 
(national) identity: ethnic national identity (focusing on ethno-cultural 
characteristics such as religion and language) and civic national 
identity (related to citizenship and allegiance to political 
institutions) (Kunovich, 2009). Wright (2011) proposes an 
alternative way of interpreting national identity: whether a 
criterion is ascribed, or whether it can be achieved. For example, 
nativity and ancestry are characterized as ascribed criteria, whereas 
learning a country’s official language is achievable (Wright, 2011). 
This ascription-achievement-dichotomy offers an alternate lens on 
how the in-group (the majority population) believes the out-group 
(migrants) fits into the national identity (Wright, 2011). Previous 
studies indicate that the importance of attributed to achievable (or 
civic) aspects outweighs that of ascribed (or ethnic) ones in most 
European countries. However, ascribed aspects (for example 
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country of birth) do seem to gain more traction in specific 
countries between 1995 and 2003: adult respondents from 
Germany, Austria, Ireland, Norway, and Spain consider country 
of birth to be an increasingly important marker of nationhood, 
while those attitudes did not shift significantly among respondents 
from Sweden and the United Kingdom (Wright, 2011). A 
potential explanation ‘could be the way that diversity is treated 
through policy regimes in the domains of multiculturalism, 
immigrant incorporation, and even welfare redistribution’ (Wright, 
2011: 855). Citizens of some countries may have become relatively 
more ascriptive than one would expect, in part because of their 
country’s ‘unparalleled emphasis on immigrant multiculturalism, 
which some have argued increases the salience of intergroup 
distinctions, and may be identity-threatening from the standpoint 
of majority-members’ (Wright, 2011: 855). 
Van Oorschot (2006) found that those who are likeable, 
grateful, and perceived to be conforming to the dominant 
standards of society are considered more deserving. The migrant’s 
acculturation strategy is therefore crucial. Berry (1980) identifies 
four types of acculturation strategies: assimilation, integration, 
separation, and marginalization. Assimilation is the strategy in 
which migrants want to adopt the majority group culture, while 
the heritage culture is considered less important. Integration 
indicates that migrants feel that contact with the majority culture 
is important, but they also aim to maintain their original culture. 
When migrants use the separation strategy, they do not seek 
contact with the majority culture, but instead focus on 
maintaining their original culture. Migrants who do not want to 
associate themselves with either the dominant culture or their 
original culture follow the marginalization strategy (Berry, 1980). 
Not surprisingly, assimilation is the strategy that is evaluated most 
positively by the native public (Verkuyten, 2005). Those who 
choose the assimilation strategy will likely be considered as the 
most deserving given their preference for adaptation to the host 
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culture and willingness to ‘reject’ the heritage culture, which 
highlights their attitude of conformity. 
The final cultural criterion of settlement deservingness is the 
perceived degree of reciprocity. In the context of settlement 
deservingness, it is difficult to argue that those in need have 
previously contributed to society, since they are recent arrivals 
from a different country or region. However, Reeskens and van 
Oorschot (2012) found that people’s welfare deservingness 
preferences towards immigrants are also ‘conditional upon 
reciprocity’, indicating that individuals believe immigrants should 
have access to social rights if they work and pay taxes first. This 
means that rather than reflecting on people’s deservingness 
preferences based on past reciprocity, the perception of future 
reciprocity may be more relevant in this regard: will migrants who 
settle in the host country be able to contribute to society in the 
future? Their current situation sometimes prevents them from 
doing so upon arrival, but certain characteristics or skills could 
affect the public’s perception of how this reciprocity may evolve 
in the future. For example, learning the official language is a vital 
step for employment, educational enrolment, and successful 
everyday interaction in the public sphere. This requisite is also 
related to the attitude criterion. Not learning (or not wanting to 
learn) the official language of the host country can easily be taken 
as a sign that someone is unwilling to integrate or assimilate. The 
presence of educational attainment and relevant work skills will 
also affect the perceived degree of (potential) reciprocity. These 
have not been an integral part in the study of deservingness so far, 
which is somewhat surprising as both are – particularly in North 
America and Western Europe – key aspects in determining 
whether or not an individual can contribute to society in a 
meaningful way (Amit and Chachashvili-Bolotin, 2018).  
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23.4  Conclusion 
In this essay, we have argued that the welfare deservingness 
framework developed by van Oorschot (2002, 2006) has a direct 
applicability to settlement deservingness and that this approach 
can provide new insights into the conditional attitudes of the 
population towards the settlement of migrants. This is especially 
important in light of the European refugee crisis and the increased 
emphasis by certain media and political actors on the (il)legitimacy 
or (un)deservingness of types of migrants. 
Although some of the CARIN criteria are conceptualized 
somewhat differently for settlement deservingness, this 
conceptualization enriches deservingness literature by illustrating 
its wider application. For the study of intergroup relations, this 
model can help conceptualize intergroup attitudes with greater 
nuance. The criterion that most closely aligns with deservingness 
is that of national identity, which deals with the ‘normative 
boundaries that demarcate inclusion in versus exclusion from the 
national in-group’ (Wright, 2011: 838). Although the way in which 
these concepts are measured is the subject of much debate among 
national identity scholars (Wright, 2011), it is clear that nation-
building and in-group belonging are key to this framework. The 
inclusion of ethnic and civic aspects to explain national identity 
attitudes in individuals aligns with deservingness, but the focus on 
answering the question of who belongs to the national in-group is 
different. Migrants do not necessarily have to be perceived as 
belonging to the national in-group in order to be perceived as 
deserving of settling in the country. Furthermore, the perceived 
control and need of migrants are seldom addressed in the national 
identity literature, but they do play a vital role in the deservingness 
approach. 
Our effort to develop this explanatory framework is concurrent 
with survey research in several European countries designed to 
empirically test the validity of the deservingness approach. In a 
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study of attitudes regarding the (welfare) deservingness of 
migrants, Kootstra (2016) found that the native population 
employs a double standard in deservingness preferences, based on 
characteristics which are similar to those we had laid out here. 
Adult respondents from Britain and the Netherlands evaluated 
ethnic minority claimants who exhibited ‘unfavorable’ behavior or 
characteristics (for example, failing to look for work, contributing 
little to the welfare system or being born in a city) as less 
deserving than natives who exhibited the same behaviors. 
However, ethnic minority claimants who did not exhibit such a 
profile were considered as deserving as natives. Such findings 
strengthen our hypothesis that the population distinguishes 
between groups of migrants based on specific characteristics, 
thereby complicating the successful integration/inclusion of this 
group into local society. 
This essay fits in the ongoing debate on how to improve the 
integration of migrants. As mentioned, it illuminates challenges 
and opportunities for policymakers who struggle to meet their 
legal responsibilities to protect refugees, while simultaneously 
respecting public attitudes on this wedge issue. The public’s 
growing anti-Muslim bias and preference for migrants who can 
speak the language of the host country (Bansak et al., 2016; 
d’Haenens et al., 2019) points to a mounting challenge for solving 
the current crisis and successfully protecting and integrating 
migrants, given that most of them currently originate from 
Muslim-majority countries and may lack the desired language 
skills. Since asylum cannot be granted based on (a lack of) religion 
or ethnicity, policy makers must find alternative ways to 
harmonize both conflicting obligations. If the goal is to alleviate 
the social tensions of the current refugee crisis and generate 
greater acceptance of migrants, European policymakers have an 
opportunity to highlight migrants’ deservingness and vulnerability 
as well as their economic contributions to their destination 
societies (Bansak et al., 2016). 
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24.  Deservingness and Diversity: 
Deservingness Opinions among 
Majority and Minority Groups in 
Belgium  
Bart Meuleman 
24.1  Introduction 
While Wim is renowned for various key contributions to 
sociology and social policy, it is his work on deservingness that 
has generated most academic impact. Observing that policies 
throughout history (from early poor laws to contemporary welfare 
states) apply various logics of targeting, Wim hypothesized that 
also ‘ordinary citizens’ target their solidarity. Public opinion 
separates the deserving from the undeserving, thereby relying on 
five deservingness criteria: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity 
and Need (van Oorschot, 2000). By means of various survey-
based empirical studies, Wim convincingly showed that these 
criteria structure popular support for particular policy measures 
(van Oorschot, 2000, 2006; Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk, 2013) 
and that preferences for particular criteria are responsive to 
institutional, economic and cultural contexts (Jeene, van Oorschot 
and Uunk, 2014; van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2014; Laenen, 
Rossetti and van Oorschot, 2019). 
The wide appeal of the five deservingness criteria (later 
rebranded as the CARIN criteria; van Oorschot et al., 2017) can 
be explained by the theoretical parsimony and wide applicability 
of this approach. The CARIN criteria are essentially basic 
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principles of social justice that people apply to justify the 
conditionality of solidarity with particular social categories 
(Meuleman et al., 2020). As such, this framework is very helpful 
for understanding a wide array of social relations and 
distributional issues – from classical social policy questions to 
emerging debates on climate change or migration (for examples, 
see van Oorschot et al., 2017, and elsewhere in this volume).  
24.2  Deservingness in diverse societies 
In this contribution, I want to highlight one particular research 
line that is consistently present in Wim’s oeuvre and that has 
influenced my own research profoundly, namely the link between 
deservingness and ethnic diversity.1 Wim has repeatedly 
investigated – theoretically as well as empirically – the role of 
deservingness considerations in societies that are becoming 
increasingly diverse as a result of migration. This broader theme 
can be approached from various angles and inspires a host of 
relevant research questions. And for many of these questions, 
important lessons can be learned from Wim’s work.  
A first type of questions regards how majority citizens perceive 
the deservingness of ethnic minority groups and newcomers in 
society. Wim’s deservingness theory speaks directly to this issue 
by including identity as a CARIN criterion. For contemporary 
collective arrangements, the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
are primarily grafted onto national identities, rather than on local, 
religious, age or class groupings (van Oorschot, 2000: 37–38). The 
introduction of (national) identity as a redistributive argument is 
an example of how Wim extended the classical trinity of social 
justice (equality, merit and need) to be able to understand 
solidarity in globalizing societies. And the relevance of the identity 
criterion is beyond dispute, as many empirical studies show. 
Wim’s first systematic analysis of deservingness opinions showed 
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that illegal immigrants, asylum seekers and ethnic minorities 
figured at the bottom of the deservingness ranking in the 
Netherlands during the mid 1990s (van Oorschot, 2000). Concern 
for the wellbeing of immigrants is consistently and outspokenly 
lower than concern for the elderly across Europe, and the lower 
concern for immigrants is especially found among the lower 
socio-economic strata and countries with low welfare spending 
(van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007). The logic of identity is a 
constitutive element in the rapidly growing ‘welfare chauvinism’ 
literature that scrutinizes the reach of the solidarity circle: Do 
citizens have a preference for restricting the resources of the 
welfare state to their ‘own’ group, and why is this the case? Wim 
contributed significantly to this literature, showing that welfare 
chauvinistic views vary in prevalence across welfare regimes (van 
der Waal et al., 2013) and are rooted in need-based reasoning 
(Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012). Seeing immigrants as 
undeserving is furthermore strongly related to fears about ‘welfare 
magnetism’, that is, generous social protection attracts migration 
flows (van Oorschot, 2010). Wim’s extensive research provides a 
detailed and nuanced picture of the majority group’s 
deservingness opinions vis-à-vis minorities. On the one hand, the 
idea that minorities are undeserving is quite widespread among 
European populations, especially among the lower strata. Yet on 
the other hand, a diverse population (van Oorschot and Uunk, 
2007) as well as higher levels of income equality (van der Waal et 
al., 2013) are contextual elements that can temper these 
perceptions of undeservingness. 
In a second set of possible questions, minorities become the 
subject rather than the object of deservingness opinions: What do 
ethnic minorities and immigrants think about solidarity and 
redistribution? Also here, Wim provided important cues. Analysis 
of European Social Survey data shows that persons with an 
immigration background have a slightly stronger preference for 
government intervention compared to natives. Yet, this majority-
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minority gap can be largely explained by differential composition 
in socio-economic terms. At the country level, immigrants’ 
preferences regarding the role of government correlate strongly 
with the average native citizen, suggesting processes of cultural 
integration (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2015). Although welfare-
related beliefs of minorities are highly relevant for the 
sustainability of social protection, the available literature is quite 
sparse (this is mainly due to limited data availability). While we do 
have information on rather generic dimensions of welfare 
attitudes – such as preferences for the role of government or 
egalitarianism (Schmidt-Catran and Careja, 2017; Galle et al., 
2020) – very little is known directly on minorities’ deservingness 
opinions.  
In this chapter, I attempt to address this shortcoming by 
presenting empirical material from the Belgian National Elections 
Study (BNES; Abts et al., 2015).2 The BNES 2014 was hugely 
inspired by Wim’s work and brings together various research lines 
that shed new light on the issue at hand. First, we developed an 
instrument measuring the CARIN criteria in a more direct 
manner, that is as basic principles rather than through reference to 
target groups (see Meuleman et al., 2020). This instrument was 
fielded in 2014 among a probability-based sample of more than 
1800 Belgian voters. Second, we also included large part3 of this 
instrument in the Belgian Ethnic Minority Elections Study 
(BEMES; Swyngedouw et al., 2015) that we organized 
simultaneously among almost 900 Belgians from Turkish and 
Moroccan background living in Antwerp and Liège. The 
combination of both datasets makes it possible to answer a 
multitude of research question, such as: (1) Do minority groups 
distinguish similar criteria/principles in their deservingness 
assessments? (2) Do majority and minority Belgians give the same 
importance to the different criteria? (3) Do the criteria have 
similar causes and consequences in both groups? 
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24.3  Deservingness opinions of Turkish and Moroccan 
Belgians 
Table 24.1 displays 12 statements (5-point agree-disagree scales) 
used to measure support for the principles of Control, 
Reciprocity, Identity and Need (for a more detailed account of 
this instrument, see Meuleman et al., 2020). Rather than focusing 
on individual questions, I use these items to construct latent 
variables representing the principles. Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) shows that the selected items function as 
sufficiently valid and reliable indicators and the same factor 
structure is retrieved in both groups. Clearly, Turkish and 
Moroccan communities in Belgium adopt a pattern of 
deservingness logics similar to the majority group. In the 
particular case of identity – operationalized here in terms of the 
distinction between migrants and natives – this is a surprising 
finding. The principle that access to social protection should be 
restricted for newcomers stands out as a separate dimension in the 
attitudinal structure of the minority respondents as well (although 
not a very popular one – see later). What is more, the 
measurement parameters (loadings and intercepts) turn out to be 
equivalent across groups, meaning that this instrument is 
appropriate to make score comparisons across both groups.4 
A comparison of latent means (see Table 24.1) yields an 
interesting pattern. Compared to natives, Turkish and Moroccan 
Belgians put significantly less emphasis on the criteria of control, 
reciprocity and – especially – identity. Regarding three out of four 
criteria, the minority groups studied here are less conditional in 
their solidarity. This can probably be understood from the 
observation that some of these criteria are often used to exclude 
persons with an immigrant background (many have been born 
outside the country and thus have less complete track records of 
contributions, for example).  
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For the need factor, however, the means do not differ 
significantly between the majority and minority group. This could 
indicate that Turkish and Moroccan Belgians identify themselves 
stronger as persons in need. Finally, in both groups we observe 
quite similar patterns of positive correlations between the 
different deservingness criteria (although the correlations are 
stronger among the natives). This indicates that there is no trade-
off between criteria: Persons that employ one particular criterion 
to make solidarity conditional are also more likely to mobilize the 
other criteria (and especially the link between reciprocity and 
identity is strong). This pattern of intercorrelations legitimizes 
Wim’s practice of combining support for the different criteria into 
a single index of conditionality (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006).  
24.4  Causes and consequences of deservingness opinions 
In the deservingness framework, the CARIN criteria play a pivotal 
role between social structure and policy support. People’s 
deservingness opinions are informed by individual and contextual 
characteristics and form, in turn, the basis on which persons 
decide to endorse particular policy arrangements (van Oorschot 
and Roosma, 2017). Table 24.2 shows the results of a two-group 
structural equation model (SEM) testing the intermediary role of 
the deservingness principles. The approach is very similar to the 
analysis of Meuleman et al. (2020) but includes minority 
respondents as well. 
Table 24.2a displays the effects of various individual predictors 
of support for the criteria of control, reciprocity, identity and 
need. Among both groups, we see similar effects of socio-
economic status, although they are often less outspoken (and 
sometimes insignificant) among the minorities. Generally speaking, 
the higher educated have lower scores for the criteria, indicating 
that they are less conditional in their deservingness assessments. 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2   


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   



















































































Deservingness and Diversity 
 285 
The exception here is the control criterion, where no educational 
gradient is found. Benefit recipients put less emphasis on control, 
reciprocity and identity (although differences are often 
insignificant for the minorities). Yet this is not the case for the 
need criterion, that is equally popular among those with and 
without social benefits. Benefit recipients are thus relatively more 
supportive of conditioning on the basis of need than on other 
criteria (which is not surprising, as they largely overlap with the 
group of needy). The strongest predictor is relative deprivation 
(measured as an index of three items, see Van Hootegem et al., 
2018): those who feel that their social group is unrightfully 
disadvantaged compared to other groups put more emphasis on 
control, reciprocity and identity (but not need). This reaction of 
deprived respondents can be read as a way to correct the 
deprivation by excluding unrightful competitors. 
Table 24.2b shows how deservingness criteria influence support 
for government policies benefiting four specific target groups, 
namely the elderly, sick, unemployed and ethnic minorities. Some 
of these effects are consistent across both groups. An emphasis 
on reciprocity lowers support for policies favoring the 
unemployed (who are in the public discourse often blamed for not 
reciprocating). People who endorse the logic of identity are less 
supportive of government intervention that benefit ethnic 
minorities – this is the case for the majority and minority group 
alike. In the majority sample, those who emphasize the identity 
criterion are more supportive of government intervention 
favoring the elderly and the sick, which fits the logic of welfare 
chauvinism. Among native as well as Turkish and Moroccan 
Belgians, support for public pensions and healthcare are partially 
rooted in respectively control- and reciprocity-based thinking 
(which is harder to understand from deservingness theory). 
Besides these similarities, the majority group shows a number of 
additional significant effects, indicating that policy support is 
more firmly rooted in deservingness considerations for this group. 
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24.5  Conclusions 
This data exploration only provides preliminary conclusions 
regarding deservingness opinions among ethnic minority groups. 
Yet the results presented here show that the deservingness 
opinions of Turkish and Moroccan Belgians are structured along 
the very same criteria as the native group (although the levels of 
support for particular criteria differ). The deservingness criteria 
play a mediating role between social structural variables and policy 
support among minority groups as well, even if the relationships 
are generally weaker and less clear-cut than for the majority group. 
If anything, the results show that Wim’s deservingness criteria 
provide a very fruitful framework to approach welfare-related 
opinions of ethnic minority groups. In the foreseeable future, the 
work of Wim will continue to inspire scholars in this field, and I 
sincerely hope that he will find the time to enrich the academic 
debates with his insights. 
NOTES 
1. I got to know Wim when I started working as a postdoc under his 
supervision on the HumVIB Eurocores project ‘Welfare Attitudes in a 
Changing Europe’. At that point, I recently completed my PhD thesis on 
anti-immigration attitudes and was very happy to turn away from this topic 
and eager to dive into a new study object. It took me quite a while before I 
realized that precisely the work of Wim would stimulate me to continue 
working on diversity and broaden my perspectives. 
2. Wim values transparent research. Yet due to a lack of space I feel myself 
obliged to refer to external sources for detailed information on this data 
collection (much against our own recommendations, see Damian et al., 2019). 
3. The items measuring the attitude criterion were by accident dropped out of 
the BEMES questionnaire. So out of necessity, the CARIN framework is 
reduced to the CRIN criteria here. This once more illustrates how much there 
is to learn from Wim – with his hyper-organized way of working, this would 
most certainly never have happened to him. 
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4. There is one exception to measurement equivalence: For the second item of 
the identity factor, the intercept and loading differ across groups, indicating 
that the item is interpreted differently. This is understandable, given the 
contents of the item: it refers to cultural adaptation rather than more 
objective criteria (like being born in the country or having a job). 
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25.  Welfare Chauvinism across the 
Political Spectrum 
Tim Reeskens and Tom van der Meer 
25.1  Experimenting on welfare deservingness 
It goes without saying that Wim’s most seminal contribution to 
the social science scholarship is making the empirical study of 
welfare deservingness more popular, as summarized quite well by 
the title of his most cited journal article ‘Who should get what, 
and why’ (van Oorschot, 2000). The theoretical rigor undergirding 
the five deservingness-criteria, which he later has been calling the 
CARIN-criteria (van Oorschot et al., 2017), was outstanding and 
received little pushback since. By contrast, even though the 
empirical evidence that showed that the elderly are perceived as 
the most deserving because they rank highest on all five CARIN-
criteria, while the unemployed, but foremost immigrants are 
perceived as least deserving because they fall short on the same 
set of criteria, was convincing, over the years incremental 
empirical refinements have been proposed. 
Own research (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2017), published in 
Wim’s co-authored volume on welfare deservingness, showed the 
necessity to consider experimental research to get a better grip on 
the five CARIN-criteria that explain welfare deservingness. Our 
argument was that traditional social surveys, which Wim relied on 
repeatedly to explain why some groups are perceived as more 
deserving of welfare than others (for example, van Oorschot, 
2006; van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007; Jeene, van Oorschot and 
Uunk, 2014), are unable to completely pull apart the five CARIN-
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criteria. Immigrants, perceived as most undeserving of welfare 
provision, are for instance not a homogenous group. The 
implication is that assessing their perceived deservingness 
foregoes the fact that immigrants are not a homogenous group; 
there are immigrants with favorable as well as unfavorable 
deservingness criteria. Immigrants often accumulate disadvantages 
(the criterion of need) while evidently, they are culturally most 
distant (the identity-criterion), and they often failed making 
continuous contributions to the welfare state (low on reciprocity). 
Inspired by Wim’s research on perceived welfare deservingness, 
we showed that even if immigrants combine favorable criteria, like 
having been laid off because of a company reorganization to 
indicate no control over their unemployed situation or doing 
voluntary work as an example for reciprocity, they are never able to 
fully close the gap with natives (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019). 
By this, we have given new insights into welfare chauvinism, that 
is, the idea that natives favor welfare redistribution but not with 
non-natives (van der Waal et al., 2010; Kitschelt, 1997; Reeskens 
and van Oorschot, 2012), and contributed to a better 
understanding of Wim’s CARIN-criteria applied to the perceived 
deservingness of immigrants by studying variation among them, 
while they previously have been treated as a rather homogenous 
group. Still, the outcomes of our study can be deepened further, 
as we have not touched upon the question whether welfare 
chauvinism is widespread across large chunks of the population, 
or whether these opinions reflect political ideology. Put 
differently, is the perceived deservingness gap between natives 
and immigrants more common among voters of monocultural 
parties, or alternatively, does the electorate of multicultural parties 
favor natives over immigrants, too?  
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25.2  Theorizing the ideological divide 
In this short essay honoring Wim’s work, it will be repetitive to 
call the five CARIN-criteria by name; control, attitude, reciprocity, 
identity and need are by now in everyone’s social policy repertoire. 
In previous work, we already indicated the pervasiveness of 
identity as a criterion that defines perceived welfare deservingness 
(Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019). Nevertheless, Wim’s work 
also indicated that people would grant immigrants equal access to 
the welfare state, but only conditionally, particularly upon having 
made contributions to the welfare state or after having acquired 
citizenship (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012). The preferred 
conditionality of perceptions of immigrants’ access to welfare 
inspired us to set up a survey experiment in which favorable 
criteria (like making contributions to the welfare state) could be 
tested more clearly, something quite novel in this field.  
Political science research had earlier incorporated survey 
experiments to study what immigrant attributes make them more 
likely to be, by public opinion, welcomed to the US (Hainmueller 
and Hopkins, 2014). Although the study shows that higher 
educated immigrants in high status jobs who master the English 
language are preferred most, of greatest importance is what the 
authors refer to as ‘the hidden immigrant consensus’ (Hainmueller 
and Hopkins, 2014). The attributes that make immigrants more 
likely to be granted access to the US follow the same rank order 
for the Democratic as for the Republican electorate. 
The structuring influence of political preference on attitudes 
goes back to ‘The American Voter’ (Campbell et al., 1960), 
according to which partisanship serves as a ‘perceptual screen 
through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his 
partisan orientation’ (Campbell et al., 1960: 133). The Dutch 
political landscape is, however, more complex than the American 
distinction between Democrats and Republicans. Additionally, 
while political scientists distinguish between political left and right 
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(compare Lipset, 1959), working with Wim revealed his distaste 
against this crude continuum. In his empirical studies, he 
unraveled this scale into the economic and the cultural axis (see 
van Oorschot et al., 2012), with the former pointing to either 
favoring state intervention or alternatively laissez faire politics, 
while the latter separates those favoring multiculturalism from 
those favoring monoculturalism.  
In proposing expectations, these orthogonal axes are of 
primordial importance. On the one hand, it can be argued that 
differences on the economic axis will translate into clear 
redistributive policy preferences. Those who are in favor of state 
intervention (at the political left) will be of the opinion that 
welfare claimants should receive appropriate welfare provision, 
while those at the right would think that welfare claimants should 
rely on alternative resources (for example, personal accounts, 
friends and family, private insurances, or charity) instead of on 
government. On the other hand, the cultural axis will be more 
determining for the perceived deservingness of immigrants. We 
assume that the electorates of monocultural parties (at the right) 
would like to exclude immigrant welfare claimants from access to 
welfare because of the relative importance opposition to 
immigration has to them; on the opposite, those aligning to 
multicultural parties (on the left) are expected to perceive 
immigrants as (almost) equally deserving of welfare compared to 
native welfare claimants.  
In proposing these expectations, we should not be blind to 
Wim’s contribution to the study of the ‘new liberal’ or 
‘progressive dilemma’, too (compare Reeskens and van Oorschot, 
2014; see also Goodheart, 2004). The argument is that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile generous welfare provision 
for all with inclusive orientations towards immigrants. Particular 
parties at the left, who favor both, would therefore suffer 
disproportionally for taking this position (see also Koopmans, 
2010). If this dilemma holds among public opinion, we should 
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also diagnose welfare chauvinism among voters of parties that 
favor multiculturalism. Put differently, also voters of such parties 
would favor natives’ access to welfare provision over immigrants’ 
access. 
25.3  Setting up the experiment 
Although Wim is an expert on survey research, as he designed 
several over the course of his academic career, survey experiments 
are rather novel to him, with the exception of important 
contributions in the most recent welfare attitudes module of the 
European Social Survey 2016. Therefore, to design an experiment 
with great detail, we used Wim’s insights into the CARIN-criteria, 
and got further inspired by related studies on immigrant prejudice 
(for example Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) to make illogical 
combinations (for example a political refugee from Poland) 
impossible. More information on the empirical set-up of our 
study, fielded in the Netherlands in 2014, can be found in 
Reeskens and van der Meer (2017, 2019). 
In our study, we asked whether a fictitious unemployed welfare 
claimant with a number of characteristics should receive (a) more 
than 70 per cent of his latest income, 70 per cent, less than 70 per 
cent, or should receive no unemployment provision whatsoever. 
Because we wanted to identify the importance of the identity-
criterion relative to other relevant deservingness criteria, we were 
first and foremost interested in cultural distance. We distinguished 
between a fictitious native-born welfare claimant (Daan), a 
European welfare claimant (Riza from Kosovo), a welfare 
claimant from a former Dutch colony (Aaron from Surinam), a 
welfare claimant from a country with a history of labor migration 
to the Netherlands (Mohammed from Morocco) and welfare 
claimants from a most culturally distant Muslim country (Mullah 
from Afghanistan). That our endeavor was not unproblematic 
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either was presented in conference discussions later: colleagues 
pointed to the Muslim composition of Kosovo, and that Mullah is 
not a name but a title.  
In addition to the identity-criterion, the four other criteria – 
albeit less relevant for this present study – also entered our 
experiment. For control we looked at the reason for 
unemployment, as well as the reason for initial migration. We 
distinguished between actively looking for a new job and not 
looking as proxies for favorable attitudes. For reciprocity, we 
extended actively looking for a new job with doing voluntary work 
(that is, doing something in return for the community), as well as 
whether or not the welfare claimant had a consistent labor market 
trajectory. Also, we looked at the age of the fictitious welfare 
claimant, as Wim’s research continuously hints about the fact that 
the elderly are perceived as most deserving because they already 
made their duties to society. Need, last but not least, was 
unraveled in two elements, namely whether the claimant had a 
high or low salary, and whether he was childless, had two or had 
four children. Yet, these four remaining criteria are not part of 
this essay; the relative importance can be checked in two 
publications (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2017, 2019). 
Because we are mostly interested in whether the gap between 
the perceived deservingness of native welfare claimant Daan and 
of the native immigrant (whether that is Riza, Aron, Mohammed 
or Mullah) is equal across the political spectrum, we need to 
distinguish between the political parties the Dutch can align to. 
Here we first discern the Socialist Party (SP), which is the 
economically most leftwing party but rather ambivalent on 
cultural issues. The social-democratic Labor Party (PvdA) is 
somewhat more moderate than ambivalent in both respects. In 
the middle of the political spectrum, we consider the liberal party 
D66, which is economically rightwing, but progressive on cultural 
and ethical issues. Next, we consider the Christian Democratic 
Appeal (CDA), which is rather rightwing, in terms of economics, 
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culture and particularly ethics. Further to the right, we find the 
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), which is more 
outspoken rightwing on economic and cultural issues, but not on 
ethical issues. Finally, the Freedom Party (PVV) is conventionally 
positioned at the right of the Dutch party system due to its 
outspoken anti-immigrant discourse, although it is rather 
ambivalent in terms of its social policy agenda. Not all political 
parties that dominate the political spectrum nowadays have been 
considered in this experiment. Parties like Thierry Baudet’s Forum 
for Democracy, or the ecological party Green Left were left out 
because they respectively did not exist yet or were too small back 
then.  
25.4  The outcomes 
We present the findings of our study in a straightforward bar 
chart, for the reason that randomization of all attributes over 
vignettes, and the random assignment of vignettes to respondents 
allows simple statistical analyses (see Figure 25.1). Important to 
emphasize is that across the board (because all other criteria are 
randomized), immigrant welfare claimants receive lower levels of 
solidarity than native welfare claimants; findings that we already 
discussed in earlier publications and that align with Wim’s studies 
on welfare deservingness (van Oorschot, 2000; van Oorschot, 
2006; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012). Noticeable is that 
generally, people also do not categorically want to exclude 
immigrant welfare claimants from unemployment provision. That 
only applies to a minority of the native population. 
However, there is large variation across the electorates in 
welfare chauvinism (the differential access to welfare for natives 
and immigrants). The biggest distinction made is among the party 
members of Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom. We see that 70 per 
cent of Wilders’ electorate would grant unemployed Daan 70 per 
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cent or more welfare provision of his latest income. In case this 
unemployed person is of foreign origin, this drops to 40 per cent. 
This means that there is a deservingness gap of 30 percentage 
points between natives and foreign-born people.  
No other party electorate reports equally sizeable deservingness 
gaps. However, the left-wing SP, Christian-Democratic CDA, and 
conservative VVD voters report similar deservingness gaps of 
approximately 15 percentage points; nevertheless, the starting 
points are different. As a left-wing party, solidarity is on average 
rather high among the electorate of the SP. Almost 90 per cent 
perceives a native unemployed person as deserving of 70 per cent 
of his latest income. The gap of slightly more than 15 percentage 
points with immigrants implies that still a lion’s share of the SP-
electorate perceives immigrants as deserving of a generous 
unemployment provision. Lower levels of solidarity are present 
among the conservative electorates of the CDA and VVD, where 
respectively approximately 75 and 65 per cent of the electorates 
want to grant immigrants 70 per cent or less of the latest income. 
With a deservingness gap of 15 percentage points, this means that 
half of the VVD voters who received the immigrant vignette 
thinks the depicted immigrant should receive 70 per cent or more. 
Most egalitarian are voters of the social-democratic PvdA and 
the left-liberal D66, with deservingness gaps close to five 
percentage points. While voters of PvdA are generally in favor of a 
generous welfare state, they also favor immigrants to have an equal 
amount of welfare provision. Similarly, albeit the economically 
more conservative voters of D66 are slightly less in favor of state 
intervention, they still do not make major distinctions between 
native claimants and those of foreign origin. Yet, for the 
electorates of both parties, it needs to be said that there is 
somewhat more variation among support for the most generous 
position, namely granting welfare claimants more than 70 per cent 
of the latest income. Therefore, claiming that even among the 
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Figure 25.1  Perceived welfare deservingness of native and immigrant welfare 
claimants along electoral lines 
25.5  To conclude 
In this essay, we wanted to celebrate Wim’s scholarship by 
showing recent evidence on the perceived deservingness of 
natives and immigrants across the political spectrum. Using Wim’s 
CARIN-criteria, earlier studies have shown the relevance of 
identity as an important criterion for why immigrants are 
perceived as less deserving of welfare provision than native 
welfare claimants. However, less is clear about the extent to which 
such welfare chauvinist views exist among different parts of the 
electorate. In some of his studies, Wim preferred to unravel 
political left-right ideology into its economic and cultural axis. The 
importance of separating both dimensions is of particular 
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importance because of the peculiar Dutch party constellation 
where the economic and cultural axis do not always coincide. 
More precisely, we show that the economic and cultural axis 
work independently. On the one hand, voters of economically 
left-wing parties are also most in favor of generous welfare 
provision. On the other hand, we show that the cultural axis 
predicts solidarity with immigrants, as less solidarity is given by 
voters of monocultural parties. The result is that the largest 
welfare chauvinism is common among the voters of the right-
wing Party for Freedom (PVV), followed by the economically 
most left-wing, albeit somewhat monocultural Socialist Party (SP) 
voters. Less chauvinistic are voters of the social-democratic PvdA 
and the left-liberal D66, although they also have a slightly greater 
preference for unemployed claimants of Dutch than of foreign 
origin. 
The findings speak to Wim’s work. First, it shows that not 
everyone is equally favorable of granting immigrants unrestricted 
access to the welfare state. Rather, granting such access to welfare 
provision is conditional upon individual ideological dispositions. 
Embracing monocultural parties translates into perceiving welfare 
claimants as rather undeserving of welfare. Second, at the micro-
level, our study also nuances the ‘new liberal’ or ‘progressive 
dilemma’, as electorates of the left-wing parties do not show the 
most outspoken chauvinist positions, rather the opposite. While 
some chauvinism is present among the SP-voters, inclusive 
orientations are found among voters of the PvdA and the left-
liberal D66. The negative interpretation reads that welfare 
chauvinism is present across the political spectrum, even among 
the electorate of social-democratic and progressive parties, albeit 
at different levels. The positive interpretation reads that these 
voters are less likely to distinguish between welfare claimants by 
their native or foreign origin. This is relevant and remarkable in 
the light of ongoing discussions about the sustainability of welfare 
state solidarity in the age of migration. 
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26.  The Roots and Electoral 
Consequences of Welfare Populism 
Koen Abts and Peter Achterberg 
26.1  Introduction  
Wim van Oorschot has devoted much of his professional career 
to the analysis of social policy and how people think about the 
welfare state. Even though his research agenda has been, and 
undoubtedly remains to be, extremely diverse and productive, 
Wim has never really engaged with the political and electoral 
dimension of social policy and the welfare state, and to be more 
specific, with populism and populist voting behavior that now 
marks so many political cultures in the West.  
Of course, given the political nature of the object of his 
research, Wim has always had an eye for the importance of 
political background. In one of his most-cited papers analyzing 
European preferences for welfare deservingness, political stance is 
included. Yet, the study reveals that political stance does not relate 
particularly strong to welfare preferences (van Oorschot, 2006). In 
a more recent paper on welfare chauvinism, Reeskens and van 
Oorschot (2012: 126) recognize that ‘welfare chauvinism is a 
reflection of related political and cultural ideologies’, and decide to 
include authoritarianism in the analysis. Yet, an analysis of how 
welfare chauvinism is related to voting behavior is beyond the 
scope of the paper (see also van der Waal et al., 2013). Also, 
throughout his career, Wim has been sensitive to the idea that 
legitimacy of welfare policies is needed, and that if people 
increasingly see negative aspects of such policies – failing 
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administratively, benefitting undeserving people, making people 
lazy – in the long run, such policies are unsustainable (van 
Oorschot, 2010; van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012; Roosma et 
al., 2013, 2014). 
These critical responses to social policies among the general 
public that have been center stage in much of Wim’s work have 
also been reasons for populist parties to start criticizing social 
policies. These parties seem to be very critical about the 
unconditional and universal nature of welfare benefits; about 
giving benefits to (undeserving) immigrants; about the economic 
and moral consequences of the welfare state (Abts and Kochuyt, 
2013; de Koster et al., 2013; Van Hootegem et al., 2018). Hence, 
Wim’s research agenda is clearly focused on the same issues that 
may motivate people to vote in a particular, populist way.  
So, in this chapter, we investigate which types of subgroups in 
regard to welfare worldviews can be empirically distinguished in 
the general population, and whether or not a subgroup of welfare 
populists is present. In particular, we will explore which 
respondents embrace populist constellations of welfare attitudes – 
that is, supporting redistribution and at the same time being very 
critical of the universal and unconditional welfare state and its 
moral and economic consequences. Besides, we also investigate to 
what extent welfare populism is related to voting behavior. As a 
homage to Wim’s last country of employment, we focus our 
attention on the Flemish population.  
26.2  The logic of welfare populism 
Although Kitschelt (1995) suggested that Populist Radical Right 
Parties (PRRPs) are combining authoritarian appeal with a 
neoliberal pro-market position, most scholars argue that most 
PRRPs are neither right nor left. This is because PRRPs subscribe 
to both neoliberal and statist views on the state versus market 
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divide, and share a typical welfare agenda that: (1) advocates social 
closure based on the deservingness criterion of identity (welfare 
chauvinism); (2) proposes a selective distribution of welfare based 
on criteria of reciprocity and control (welfare producerism); and 
(3) criticizes existing welfare arrangements through the prism of a 
vertical antagonism between the people and the establishment 
(Abts et al., 2017). In general, we argue that PRRPs converge 
around a ‘welfare populist’ position that essentially entails support 
for social redistribution and extensive welfare entitlements, but 
simultaneously excludes non-natives from welfare provisions, or 
gives them only limited access, and strongly criticizes the actual 
functioning of the welfare state because of its unintended 
economic and moral consequences (Derks, 2006; de Koster et al., 
2013; Abts et al., 2017).  
From a sociological perspective, all welfare ideologies – 
including welfare populism – are taking a particular position in 
regard to the three main dimensions of the welfare state: agency 
and scope; redistribution design; and implementation and 
outcome (Roosma et al., 2013). First, agency and scope refers to 
the questions of whether the state or market needs to take care of 
distribution, and how much the welfare state should redistribute 
and in which domains. This dimension refers actually to the so-
called distributional conflict opposing a redistributive and 
collectivist left-wing pole to a neoliberal right-wing pole 
prioritizing limited state intervention and self-regulation of the 
markets. Second, the redistribution design captures questions 
about how collective welfare should be fairly distributed in terms 
of ‘who should get what, why and under which conditions’. 
Relying on heuristics of deservingness (van Oorschot, 2000, 
2006), different criteria (control, need, identity, reciprocity and 
attitude) are applied to determine whether or not some groups or 
individuals should be granted social rights. Third, the 
implementation and outcome dimension pertains to the questions 
of how efficiently and effectively welfare arrangements perform 
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both in terms of social redistribution and avoiding free riding 
behavior, where the legitimacy of the welfare state is conditional 
on the appropriate delivery of welfare services and on the absence 
of unintended economic and moral consequences (van Oorschot, 
2010).  
Taking these three dimensions into account, welfare populism 
is in favor of state intervention and social redistribution, but 
simultaneously formulates harsh institutional criticisms and hence 
demands a strong recalibration of the welfare state where the 
access to welfare benefits and services is not universal, but 
selective, conditional and restricted to their own people. Moving 
away from a universal leftist and neoliberal rightist framing of 
state intervention and welfare state, the position of welfare 
conditionality is based on identity and reciprocity – prioritizing 
the allocation of welfare resources to natives (welfare chauvinism), 
and to those who have contributed and are productive (welfare 
producerism). In this sense, the call for equality no longer takes 
the form of an inclusive and universalistic egalitarianism, but 
restricts social redistribution to the ordinary hard-working and 
responsible people who are cheated by the actual welfare state 
(Derks, 2006). In addition, welfare populism articulates an 
institutional critique on the implementation and outcomes of 
welfare arrangements. In particular, it argues that the 
malfunctioning welfare state does not help the common hard 
working people and those really in need, but benefits 
disproportionally those who are not (full) member of the ethnic 
community as well as free-riding and abusing welfare scroungers 
who do not contribute (enough) to the collective welfare, or are 
responsible for their own misery (Abts and Kochuyt, 2013; de 
Koster et al., 2013). 
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26.3  Welfare populism, social structure and voting 
behavior 
Using data from the Belgian National Election Study 2010, we try 
to answer two research questions. First, employing a person-
centered approach based on Latent Class Analysis, we investigate 
which types of subgroups in regard to welfare worldviews can be 
empirically distinguished in the Flemish population, and whether 
or not a subgroup of welfare populists is present. Our hypothesis 
is that there is a subgroup of welfare populists whose worldview is 
characterized by a combination of egalitarianism, exclusive 
solidarity and a radical welfare state critique focusing on its 
unintended negative economic and moral consequences. Second, 
we try to disentangle how the welfare profiles – particularly 
welfare populism – are structurally and electorally stratified.  
According to the self-interest argument and realistic conflict 
theory, individuals in more precarious positions – that is, the low 
educated and working class – are assumed to be more prone to 
embrace egalitarianism and government intervention (Achterberg 
and Houtman, 2009; Achterberg et al., 2011; van der Waal et al., 
2010), but may also be more likely to develop so-called welfare 
chauvinism (Mewes and Mau, 2012; Abts and Kochuyt, 2013) as 
well as welfare state criticism (van Oorschot, 2010; van Oorschot 
and Meuleman, 2012; van Oorschot et al., 2012; Van Hootegem et 
al., 2018). Besides, the relatively high-skilled population of the 
middle class is also bifurcated: the socio-cultural specialists are 
more likely to advocate universalist state interventionism as 
precondition of institutionalized individualism; while managers are 
more likely to support a producerist social policy promoting 
opportunity rather than equality as well as adhering to an ethics of 
individual responsibility based on conditional reciprocity (Abts 
and Kochuyt, 2013).  
In terms of electoral behavior in the Flemish party system, we 
argue that voters of the populist radical right party (Vlaams 
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Belang) are most likely to be welfare populist, although their 
position towards government intervention is not clear since this 
party is combining a neoliberal economic agenda with a populist 
welfare agenda. Political conflicts on social redistribution are 
dominated by the traditional left-right cleavage opposing the 
social democratic left party (sp.a) with its position of universal 
egalitarianism and strong interventionism, and its collectivist 
conception of the welfare state as universal and unconditional as 
possible; to the liberal right party (Open VLD) supporting less 
social redistribution, non-intervention, free market, privatization, 
individual responsibility and welfare retrenchment. Christian 
democracy (CD&V) positioned itself in the middle, trying to 
provide social harmony, rather than to redistribute as such, 
resulting in social closure strongly based on reciprocity, 
contribution and status retention. Finally, the Flemish nationalist 
party (N-VA) highlights the virtues of the market and opts for 
limited state intervention as it preaches firm austerity, more 
flexible working conditions and lower taxes. The nationalist party 
is also re-articulating the left-right conflict in terms of the 
distinction between productive and unproductive classes that is, in 
turn, explicitly communitarized (Abts et al., 2019). In our 
exploratory analysis, we want to investigate how our welfare 
profiles are linked to voting for these parties (as parties are 
emanating particular welfare ideologies). 
26.4  Data and methods 
To investigate the research questions, data from the Belgian 
National Election Study 2010 (BNES) is used. In order to 
measure our welfare profiles, the dataset includes items referring 
to four welfare-related attitudes, all measured by multiple Likert-
type items (five-point agree-disagree answer scale). First, the 
dimension of agency and scope is operationalized by the 
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constructs of egalitarianism and neoliberalism. Egalitarianism is 
measured by three items referring to the necessity to reduce class 
differences in society (q88_2), maintenance of the differences 
between high and low incomes (q88_3), and government 
intervention to decrease the income differences (q88_4). 
Neoliberalism is also operationalized by three items: society would 
be better off when the government would intervene less in the 
economy (q89_1); regulations for entrepreneurs should be 
reduced (q89_2); and the labor market should be more flexible 
(q89_3). Second, the dimension of the redistribution design is 
operationalized in terms of welfare conditionality based on 
identity and contribution. The construct of welfare chauvinism is 
measured by items referring to the conditionality of welfare 
benefits: social welfare benefits need to be reserved to those who 
contributed to the collective welfare (q119_1); and be reserved for 
only our own people (q119_2). Finally, the implementation and 
outcome dimension refers to welfare state criticism, which is 
measured by means of items referring to both unintended 
economic and moral consequences of the welfare state: too 
expensive compared to its accomplishments (q120_1); makes 
people lazy and irresponsible (q120_2); and welfare state functions 
should be left to the free market (q120_3). The measurement 
quality and dimensionality of the items is tested by means of 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (X² = 148.345; df = 38; RMSEA = 
0.049; CFI = 0.981; TLI = 0.973) (see Appendix 26A.1). 
Independent variables. Social-structural position is measured by 
means of four variables, namely gender (1 for men and 0 for 
women); age (64+ years as reference category); educational level (low; 
middle-low; middle-high; high); occupational status is based on the 
EGP social class scheme (4 classes).  
Statistical modelling. To estimate the welfare profiles, we make 
use of Latent Class Analysis (LCA). This approach identifies 
subgroups of individuals with a specific ideological worldview 
based on the particular way attitudes are connected with each 
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other. Particularly, LCA empirically constructs a typology of 
welfare ideologies by uncovering how preferences toward 
egalitarianism, neoliberalism, welfare chauvinism and welfare state 
criticism are linked to each other. After identifying the different 
latent classes, we regress (the most likely) class membership on 
structural characteristics and on voting behaviour in a multinomial 
regression model.  
26.5  A typology of four welfare profiles 
The four-class solution is the most parsimonious model with the 
lowest BIC and an entropy equal to 0.75. Table 26.1 displays the 
conditional probabilities and the class sizes of each of the four 
classes. Our LCA typology confirms that there is indeed a welfare 
populist class among the Flemish population. This welfare 
populism class (22 per cent) is outspokenly egalitarian, but has a 
very particularistic and conditional interpretation of equality, since 
welfare benefits need to be reserved for fellow citizens who have 
contributed and/or belong to our ‘own people’. This interpretation 
of equality is also embedded in a strong anti-establishment habitus 
referring to both a skeptical stance towards government 
intervention in the economy and an outspoken criticism on the 
functioning and consequences of the actual welfare state, as it is 
considered to be too expensive and to make people lazy and 
irresponsible. The second class is the best-fitting profile for 29 per 
cent of the respondents. This cluster reflects a position of 
egalitarianism and moderate conditionality of welfare benefits, but 
in contrast to the welfare populism class, a neutral opinion in 
regard to government regulation and the functioning of the actual 
welfare state. We call this class conservative particularism. The 
third class contains 19 per cent of the Flemish population. This 
so-called neoliberal class does not want further social 
redistribution and opposes a government that actively intervenes 
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Table 26.1  Class sizes and conditional probabilities of the four-class solution 
 Latent Classes 







Class size in % 21.7 29.1 18.7 30.5 100 
Answer categories Conditional item probabilities 
Egalitarianism      
Q88_2C: ‘class differences should be reduced’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.09 0.03 0.39 0.05 0.12 
Disagree nor agree 0.06 0.23 0.48 0.08 0.19 
Agree (completely) 0.85 0.75 0.14 0.86 0.69 
Q88_3C: ‘differences between high and low incomes should be maintained’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.82 0.72 0.05 0.85 0.66 
Disagree nor agree 0.05 0.26 0.56 0.11 0.22 
Agree (completely) 0.13 0.03 0.40 0.04 0.12 
Q88_4C: ‘the government should intervene to decrease income differences’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.15 0.08 0.70 0.14 0.23 
Disagree nor agree 0.13 0.33 0.30 0.15 0.22 
Agree (completely) 0.72 0.59 0.02 0.72 0.55 
Neoliberalism      
Q89_1C: ‘the government should interfere less with economy’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.70 0.35 
Disagree nor agree 0.06 0.72 0.40 0.23 0.36 
Agree (completely) 0.81 0.10 0.36 0.07 0.30 
Q89_2C: ‘regulations for entrepreneurs should be reduced’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.72 0.35 
Disagree nor agree 0.11 0.70 0.30 0.18 0.34 
Agree (completely) 0.76 0.12 0.46 0.09 0.32 
Q89_3C: ‘labor market should be flexible: employers should be able to hire and fire easily’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.68 0.40 
Disagree nor agree 0.13 0.50 0.26 0.15 0.27 
Agree (completely) 0.58 0.22 0.50 0.17 0.33 
Welfare chauvinism      
Q119_1C: ‘only those who contributed to collective welfare should benefit from social security’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.11 0.08 0.23 0.41 0.21 
Disagree nor agree 0.09 0.30 0.20 0.16 0.19 
Agree (completely) 0.81 0.63 0.58 0.43 0.60 
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Table 26.1  (continued) 
 Latent Classes 







Class size in % 21.7 29.1 18.7 30.5 100 
Answer categories Conditional item probabilities 
Welfare chauvinism (continued)    
Q119_2C: ‘social security should be reserved for our own people only’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.18 0.13 0.27 0.59 0.31 
Disagree nor agree 0.12 0.38 0.30 0.15 0.24 
Agree (completely) 0.70 0.50 0.44 0.26 0.46 
Q119_3C: ‘all groups in society should be able to benefit from social security’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.42 0.24 0.34 0.18 0.28 
Disagree nor agree 0.17 0.47 0.22 0.14 0.25 
Agree (completely) 0.41 0.30 0.45 0.68 0.47 
Welfare state critique     
Q120_1C: ‘the welfare state is too expensive compared to what it delivers’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.66 0.38 
Disagree nor agree 0.13 0.56 0.37 0.19 0.32 
Agree (completely) 0.64 0.20 0.35 0.15 0.31 
Q120_2C: ‘the welfare state makes people lazy and irresponsible’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.25 0.32 0.32 0.71 0.43 
Disagree nor agree 0.22 0.52 0.29 0.18 0.31 
Agree (completely) 0.53 0.17 0.39 0.11 0.27 
Q120_3C: ‘tasks of welfare state should be left to the free market’ 
Disagree (completely) 0.53 0.54 0.61 0.96 0.68 
Disagree nor agree 0.21 0.44 0.28 0.03 0.23 
Agree (completely) 0.26 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.09 
Notes: AIC = 25194.541; BIC = 25694.245; LRT-test = 381.903; Entropy = 0.754. 
to decrease income differences in society. These respondents also 
oppose strong government regulation in the economy and labor 
market, while asking for more welfare conditionality, thereby 
resulting in an ambivalent position to the welfare state. The fourth 
class – labeled as progressive universalism – compromises the 
largest subgroup (31 per cent) and has a profile that is dissimilar 
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to the other three classes, that is, a combination of a strong 
preference for egalitarianism, universal welfare provisions and 
government intervention combined with a positive attitude 
towards actual welfare state performance. 
26.6  The social and electoral stratification of welfare 
populism 
How are these welfare profiles related to structural characteristics 
and voting behavior? Because the dependent variable is 
categorical, we make use of a multinomial logistic regression 
analysis. In our approach, we determine whether a particular 
predictor has a significant effect on our LCA typology (see L²/df) 
and report the parameters of the executed multinomial logistic 
regression. Although logits and the odds ratios are reported in 
most studies, we present net-percentages controlling for all other 
predictors in the model (Kaufman and Schervish, 1986: 722–730). 
Table 26.2 reports the conditional probabilities to belong to the 
different LCA classes for each response category of the 
independent variable. The effect can be interpreted by evaluating 
the deviation of the conditional probability compared to the 
overall probability in the sample.  
Gender, education, occupation and age have an effect on the 
four welfare profiles (see Table 26.2). To begin with, the results 
confirm the hypothesis that individuals in more precarious 
positions – that is, the low educated and (un)skilled workers – are 
more likely to combine a strong criticism on the welfare state with 
a very particularistic and conditional interpretation of equality. 
Having a lower educational level for instance increases the 
likelihood to have a welfare populist profile, while it decreases the 
likelihood to have a progressive universalist profile. People with a 
low educational level and (un)skilled workers as well as those who 
are 65+ years old are overrepresented in the welfare populist class. 
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Besides being more likely to belong to the welfare populist class, 
the unskilled and skilled workers as well as non-active people are 
also more prone to adhere to a conservative particularist profile. 
Being self-employed and young, on the contrary, increases the 
probability of being in the neoliberal class, while skilled and 
unskilled workers are almost absent in this profile.  
Table 26.2  Conditional probabilities (row net-percentages) to belong to a 
welfare profile (estimated based on a multinomial logistic 
regression) 





Proportion in population 23% 30% 18% 28% 











Education (L²=24.62; df=9; L²/df=2.74**)   
Low level 
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Notes: Naegelkerke R² = 0.21; AIC = 2924.46. 
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These results indicate an interesting duality among the working 
class: they want more redistribution, but at the same time ask 
more conditional solidarity without nevertheless taking a 
neoliberal stance. Finally, in line with the expectations, in the 
progressive universalist class we find more highly educated 
people, managers and non-manual employees, while self-
employed, low educated and young people are less likely to be 
progressive leftist. Overall we can conclude that structural 
characteristics are important to explain the differences in welfare 
worldviews: individuals in lower social class positions have a more 
pronounced welfare populist worldview, while they are less likely 
to have a progressive universalist worldview. People in higher 
positions, in contrast, are more often progressive universalists. 
As expected, there is also a strong relationship between welfare 
profile and voting behavior. Table 26.3 shows the internal 
heterogeneity of the different party electorates. While the 
conservative particularists (40 per cent) are overrepresented 
among the Christian-democratic party electorate, individuals with 
a neoliberal worldview constitute a small minority among those 
who vote for CD&V (13 per cent). For the liberal party Open 
VLD it is exactly this subgroup with a neoliberal socio-economic 
profile who are strongly represented among its electorate (40 per 
cent). Here it are especially the progressive universalists who are 
significantly underrepresented (16 per cent). In line with our 
expectations, the welfare populists (39 per cent) are strongly 
overrepresented among the electorate of the radical right party 
Vlaams Belang, while the progressive universalists are much 
scarcer among its voters. In regard to the leftist parties, both the 
social-democratic sp.a and the green party Groen especially gain 
electoral support from people with a progressive universalist 
profile. Logically, both parties are nevertheless far less likely to 
attract voters with a welfare populist and neoliberal profile. 
Finally, the Flemish-nationalist party N-VA – which became the 
largest party in the Flemish party system in 2010 with 28 per cent 
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of the votes – is able to attract all different welfare profiles 
proportionally. In essence, the internal composition of the N-VA 
party electorate in regard to the socio-economic worldviews 
reflects the distribution of the general population.  
Summarized, at the level of party electorates, we observe a re-
organization of the right in the Flemish party system based on 
welfare opinions: radical right (welfare populism); liberal party 
(neoliberals) and Christian-democrats (particularistic conservatism) 
as opposed to the progressive universalism of the left, while the 
right-wing nationalist party N-VA is attracting both welfare 
populists, neoliberals and particularistic conservatives. Although 
there is certainly not a one-on-one link and all welfare profiles are 
to some degree represented among the different electoral 
constituencies, it is clear that the different welfare profiles in part 
divide the political spectrum. 
Table 26.3  Conditional probabilities to vote for a political party (column 
net-percentages) (estimated based on a multinomial logistic 
regression) (controlled for gender, education, occupation, age) 
 CD&V N-VA Open 
VLD 
Sp.a VB 




















































Notes: R² = 0.28 (only structural characteristics), R² = 0.36 (structural characteristics + 
socio-economic worldview typology). 
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26.7  Conclusion 
This chapter highlights three major findings. First, there is ample 
evidence of welfare populism in Flanders. About 22 per cent of 
the people are very egalitarian, but combine such egalitarianism 
with both anti-establishment attitudes and very reserved opinions 
about whom should actually profit from economic redistribution 
provided by the welfare state. Second, we found this – rather 
‘remarkable’ – populist combination of opinions to be prevalent 
among the lower educated and people within (lower-ranked) 
working class positions. Third, welfare populist views are reason 
for people to vote for radical right-wing parties. These findings 
shed light on two discussions.  
The first is the discussion about the idea that people in lower 
stratified positions should be seen as a progressive force (for 
example, Lipset, 1981; Nieuwbeerta, 1996; Achterberg, 2006). 
While much research effort is devoted to finding non-economic 
reasons for people in such positions to be conservative (for 
example, anti-immigration attitudes, authoritarianism, and the 
like), it is now apparent that also within the economic domain, 
people in lower stratified positions can embrace rightist opinions 
and can have conservative policy preferences about welfare 
institutions, economic redistribution and the like (see also 
Houtman et al., 2009; Abts and Kochuyt, 2013). Secondly, for 
close followers of the work of Wim van Oorschot, these findings 
about the intricacies of welfare attitudes might not come as a 
surprise. Central to much of Wim’s work have been issues related 
to such welfare populist opinions. Yet, the analysis presented 
above kind of closes the argument, and shows how welfare 
populism has vast electoral consequences. The reasons why Wim 
has never ventured into the realm of voting behavior will be a 
subject of debate and speculation for years. Perhaps he never 
came around doing it. Perhaps his identity as a sociologist of 
social policy never triggered him to venture in this field of political 
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sociology. Yet, the analysis above does show that Wim’s work has 
wider relevance. And it will remain relevant long past the date he 
started enjoying his well-deserved pension benefits!  
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Standardized Factor Loadings of Measurement 
Model (CFA) 
 







Q88_2  0.75 -- -- -- 0.56 
Q88_3 -0.83 -- -- -- 0.69 
Q88_4  0.71 -- -- -- 0.50 
      
Q89_1 -- 0.80 -- -- 0.64 
Q89_2 -- 0.85 -- -- 0.72 
Q89_3 -- 0.60 -- -- 0.36 
      
Q119_1 -- -- 0.68 -- 0.46 
Q119_2 -- -- 0.75 -- 0.56 
      
Q120_1 -- -- -- 0.66 0.44 
Q120_2 -- -- -- 0.68 0.46 
Q120_3 -- -- -- 0.70 0.49 
Correlations 
between factors Egalitarianism 
Neo-
liberalism Chauvinism WS criticism  
Egalitarianism 1     
Neoliberalism -0.22 1    
Chauvinism  0.02 0.33 1   
WS criticism -0.27 0.54 0.50 1  




27.  Determinants of Attitudes towards 
Eco-Social Policies: Theoretical 
Reflections 
Adeline Otto and Dimitri Gugushvili 
27.1  Introduction 
As not only global warming itself, but also some of the policies 
addressing it, are expected to disproportionally affect vulnerable 
people, several scholars (Degryse and Pochet, 2009; Gough, 2017) 
argue that the transition to low-carbon societies will have to be 
accompanied by strengthened traditional social policies as well as 
so-called eco-social policies. In the light of current discussions 
about the legitimacy of redistributive social benefits, this is, 
nevertheless, likely to give rise to yet another societal and political 
debate on what risks should be socialised, who should be helped 
during the transition to low-carbon societies and why.  
Welfare attitudes literature has traditionally focused on self-
interest and ideological preferences as two important determinants 
of welfare opinions. In addition, having closely worked with Wim 
for several years and being greatly inspired by his seminal 
contribution to welfare opinion research, we know that popular 
support for specific social policies also depends on how deserving 
the recipients of various social benefits are perceived to be by the 
wider public (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006). Given the social aspect 
of eco-social policies, it is intuitive that self-interest, ideology and 
perceptions of welfare deservingness will also be relevant in 
relation to the new policies. However, the theoretical approaches 
have been developed and tested on the basis of income support 
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benefits and services targeted at groups experiencing traditional 
social risks such as old age, sickness and unemployment. We argue 
that social risks triggered by climate change are very different in 
nature, which makes it more difficult to predict how the public 
will react to specific eco-social policies. Hence, we call for critical 
rethinking and empirical investigation of present ideas about the 
determinants of public support with regard to eco-social policies.  
The current chapter is structured as follows. First, we elaborate 
on direct and indirect social risks resulting from climate change, 
and the groups that are most exposed to these risks. In the second 
step, we explain what eco-social policies as response to these risks 
are and what factors are expected to influence their popular 
support. Third, we critically review these determinants from a 
theoretical point of view. In the last section, we sum up the main 
points and identify a set of overarching research questions that 
need to be addressed as part of the broad research agenda 
concerning the legitimacy of eco-social policies.  
27.2  Climate change and social risks 
The welfare state is often considered as a social risk management 
mechanism (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Gough, 2017). Old age, 
sickness, work injury and unemployment are considered 
traditional or first-generation social risks, which emerged after 
industrialisation and urbanisation processes in Western economies 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Second-generation 
social risks result from post-WWII developments such as 
deindustrialisation, globalisation, changing demographic structures 
and the proliferation of non-standard employment patterns. They 
refer to the challenges of having to balance paid work and family 
responsibilities, and becoming frail while lacking family support. 
With regard to employment, the challenge includes lacking the 
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skills necessary to gain access to an adequately paid and secure job 
(Bonoli, 2005; Taylor-Gooby, 2004).  
With regard to climate change, Johansson and colleagues 
suggest that the issue might require a reconceptualisation of social 
risks ‘in a manner that goes beyond the work-welfare nexus and 
the post-industrial welfare state’ (2016: 96–97). Depending on the 
projected rise in global temperature and the location, the direct 
risks from climate change include floods, droughts, heavy storms 
and rainfalls, heatwaves, water stress, wildfires, and deforestation. 
These, in turn, will affect people’s health, living and working 
environment, their employment and economic prosperity, with 
low-income groups in both affluent and developing countries 
experiencing the greatest likelihood or predisposition to be 
adversely affected, while also having less ability to respond to 
disturbances (Gough, 2017; IPCC, 2014). 
Indirect social risks are generated by some of the policies 
addressing global warming. For example, several scholars 
highlight the regressive effects that various climate policies may 
entail (Gough, 2017; Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi, 2019; 
Zachmann et al., 2018). This means that the groups most affected 
by but least responsible for contributing to global warming – 
often vulnerable and lower-income households – may pay 
disproportionally more for the reduction of emissions through 
higher energy bills or could contribute disproportionally high 
proportions of their income to the financing of climate change 
adaptation or mitigation policies (for example, carbon taxes, 
subsided retro-fitting of private homes and installation of solar 
panels). In the context of what can be termed ‘third generation 
eco-social risks’, some authors even speak of a new eco-poverty or 
eco-exclusion (Fitzpatrick, 2011). However, it is important to note 
that the risks stemming from global warming are not limited to 
low-income groups; they can also adversely affect people on 
middle-income, especially those exposed to traditional social risks.  
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Many of the risks described above are not entirely new and 
most of the developed welfare states have been addressing them 
to varying degrees and with different policy instruments. 
However, as the scope of these measures increases in line with the 
severity of global warming, they will add extra stress to existing 
budgetary constraints and aggravate distributional conflicts in 
welfare states, thus triggering new legitimacy discussions about 
which risks should be socialised, who should qualify for what type 
of support and why. Additionally, in contrast to old and new 
social risks, social risks emerging from climate change are 
diffused, multifaceted, more complex and far less visible in the 
short-term (Gough et al., 2008). As a consequence, it is much 
harder to clearly identify the specific social categories affected. In 
the remainder of this contribution, we refer to the ‘eco-socially 
vulnerable’ as the main risk group. Under this term, we imply 
people whose living and working environment and financial 
circumstances expose them to a higher risk of being particularly 
affected by climate change on the one hand, and (regressive) 
climate policies on the other.  
27.3  The challenge of gaining public support for eco-
social policies 
Institutional and individual capacity and resilience are essential 
when trying to understand whether and to what extent the 
impacts of climate change translate into social risks. Hence, 
several scholars (Johansson et al., 2016; Koch and Mont, 2016; 
Schaffrin, 2014) discuss the need to increase this capacity and 
resilience, with some of them (Degryse and Pochet, 2009; Gough, 
2017) calling for traditional as well as new eco-social policies to 
limit the increase of, and even reduce, existing social inequalities 
in the transition to low-carbon societies. Eco-social policies can 
take different forms. For example, support for the retro-fitting of 
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energy-efficient housing improvements, CO2-neutral social 
housing, support for small-scale energy cooperatives, social 
employment in the circular economy, quality public transport 
infrastructure in low-income neighbourhoods, a (social) climate 
tax shift, taxing high-carbon luxuries as well as social or rising 
block tariffs, smart metering and energy saving advice for low-
income households. 
According to Schaffrin (2014), governments’ efforts to 
implement traditional as well as eco-social policies for the eco-
socially vulnerable will depend not only on the specific risk, but 
also on the country context, especially with regard to present 
levels of social need and existing social policies. Other contextual 
aspects that could influence the support for eco-social policies 
include the affluence of the country (Franzen and Meyer, 2010; 
Inglehart, 1995), the extent to which it is expected to be affected 
by climate change (Inglehart, 1995; McCright et al., 2016) and 
underlying redistributive justice principle in welfare regimes 
(Clasen and van Oorschot, 2002). 
While some countries may be better positioned than others to 
embark on an eco-social agenda, the extent to which governments 
will complement traditional welfare measures with new eco-social 
policies is nevertheless likely to be influenced by public opinion 
about the appropriateness of these measures. In this respect, it is 
intuitive that traditional divisions in welfare preferences – 
reflecting self-interest, ideological predisposition and perceived 
welfare deservingness – will reassert themselves. However, with 
the new eco-social risks going beyond the work-welfare nexus, it 
seems appropriate to reconsider how far existing theories can help 
us to obtain an insight into the potential support basis for eco-
social policies. We turn to this issue in the next section. 
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27.4  Self-interest, ideology and deservingness perceptions: 
to what extent can they help understand public 
support for eco-social policies? 
In terms of self-interest, scholars investigating support for public 
social policies posit that people with a low income, a precarious 
labour market situation or other disadvantages are more in favour 
of redistribution through social transfers and services than the 
better-off (Svallfors, 1997; van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012). 
By contrast, socioeconomic divisions in ecological policy 
preferences work in the opposite direction: because of less 
awareness of global warming hazards and higher concern for 
satisfying immediate needs, low-income groups are less in favour 
of climate policies than high-income groups (Franzen and Meyer, 
2010). In the face of opposing divisions in relation to the two 
aspects of eco-social policies, we expect that the decisive factor 
will be whether the new policies complement existing social 
policies or will be used as an alternative. The latter includes, for 
example, subsidies for retro-fitting dwellings at the expense of 
reduced social cash transfers. If there is no trade-off, the eco-
socially vulnerable have no reason to oppose eco-social measures, 
as they can only benefit from them. In other cases, they may, 
however, prefer traditional financial support to address their 
immediate needs.  
With regard to normative and ideological factors influencing 
welfare and climate policy legitimacy, existing literature suggests 
that individuals’ support for public welfare policies usually reflects 
strong social justice principles and ideas of egalitarianism 
(Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989), 
while support for climate policies is less associated with concerns 
for differences in living standards and only partly linked to social 
justice issues (Clayton, 2018; Kvaløy et al., 2012; Otto and 
Gugushvili, 2020). Understanding support for eco-social policies 
is likely to require examining the type of policy, how it is framed 
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and what other policies it is flanked by. The more that eco-social 
policies are perceived as purely compensatory by nature, the less 
likely they will attract the support of those who care little about 
egalitarianism and the ability of low-income groups to make the 
transition to a low-carbon society. Conversely, the more these 
policies focus purely on dealing with climate change without 
addressing (new) inequalities, the harder it may be to gain support 
from those who care about social justice.  
Further, deservingness perceptions play an important role in 
terms of supporting social benefits for specific societal groups. 
According to van Oorschot (2000), perceptions about the 
deservingness of welfare benefit recipients are a function of five 
criteria used by the general public: control, attitude, reciprocity, 
identity and need (the so-called CARIN criteria). While 
undeniably a very useful heuristic tool concerning traditional, first-
generation and second-generation social risks, welfare 
deservingness theory also needs to be reconsidered in relation to 
third-generation eco-social risks. This is particularly true for the 
need, control, reciprocity, and identity criteria. 
With regard to the need criterion, the public may mainly 
consider two different forms: first, the inability to meet the extra 
costs (irrespective of the amount) caused by global warming and 
some climate policies; and second, the actual volume of additional 
spending required. Most social scientists would agree that, 
relatively speaking, the lower-income groups tend to face the 
highest need in terms of additional climate risk-related expenses 
taking a disproportionately large proportion of their income. 
However, this may not necessarily be true in relation to all low-
income groups and all types of extra expenses. For example, fuel 
taxes are likely to disproportionately affect low-income drivers 
living in rural areas (or on the outskirts of big cities), but not in 
urban areas where people on low incomes mainly use public 
transport. If the majority of the public views the need in absolute 
(the amount of extra costs incurred) rather than relative terms 
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(what proportion of income the extra costs account for), the eco-
socially vulnerable will not necessarily score high on the need 
criterion. However, the perception of need might also depend on 
the exact type of risk. Where climate change makes whole areas 
uninhabitable, this easily relates to both the inability to meet extra 
expenses and the actual amount of extra spending, and it is likely 
to give rise to yet two more types of needs: infrastructure and 
medical assistance. Based on existing research (Jensen and 
Petersen, 2017), victims of random events like climate change-
related loss of housing and ill-health can be expected to be seen as 
deserving as long as help is not limited to a societal group that is 
perceived as particularly low-deserving (for example unauthorised 
economic migrants). 
In terms of the control criterion, current social risks to some 
extent allow the question of whether benefit recipients are or were 
responsible for their situation of neediness. For example, could 
they have taken a low paid and less pleasant job or invested more 
time in vocational training? However, it becomes much more 
difficult to hold low-income groups responsible for living in 
more-polluted or more-flood-exposed areas, for not being able to 
finance the installation of solar panels or afford retro-fitting a 
house to save energy, for not having access to use public transport 
or for being unable to cycle or run a more fuel-efficient car when 
commuting from rural areas to work in cities. Where eco-social 
benefits take the form of compensation for income, energy 
poverty or social housing, this might nevertheless be different. 
Here, existing stereotypes are very likely to play an important role, 
with those on low incomes being blamed for their situation and 
with cooperation and gratefulness being decisive factors in 
support for the receipt of benefits. In this context, the attitude 
criterion in terms of the gratefulness of the benefit recipient might 
play an important role, with more grateful individuals being 
perceived as more deserving of the benefit. However, as in 
relation to traditional beneficiaries of the welfare state, this 
Determinants of Attitudes towards Eco-Social Policies 
 327 
criterion will be rather difficult to measure in the case of the eco-
socially vulnerable.  
Concerning the reciprocity criterion, people appear to be more 
inclined to support benefits for individuals who are perceived as 
having contributed before the social risk occurred or intend to do 
so in exchange for their benefit. The question that could be asked 
here is to what extent this criterion applies to the social risks 
emerging from climate change or climate policies. Should people 
have paid into a climate insurance or just transition fund in order 
to qualify for support? What would contributions look like after a 
risk occurred? Does contributing before and after alter the 
support for eco-social policies (see the chapter by Bonoli in this 
volume)? One expected outcome could be that the more these 
benefits resemble a form of compensation, the more individuals 
might judge the eco-socially vulnerable on the basis of what they 
do in return for the benefit. For example, where unemployment is 
the result of ‘brown industry’ decline, benefit recipients might be 
expected to be willing to retrain for employment in other sectors.  
Further, given the complexity of social risks emerging from 
climate change or particular climate policies, it is much more 
difficult to describe or clearly define who exactly the eco-socially 
vulnerable are (Gough et al., 2008). Therefore, concerning the 
identity criterion, it might be hard to analyse individuals’ 
deservingness perceptions based on the extent to which they can 
identify with or feel close to the potential benefit recipient. Our 
supposition is that where eco-social policies have a strong 
compensatory character and are meant to satisfy basic needs, we 
will find that the deservingness of the eco-socially vulnerable is 
comparable with the low-level deservingness of the unemployed, 
migrants and poor people in general (van Oorschot, 2006). This 
could be related to the stereotypes associated with particular 
policies (see the contribution by De Tavernier and Draulans in 
this volume), with marginalised groups being perceived as lazy, 
taking less responsibility and being less self-reliant.  
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Moreover, there is also a need to consider compensation as a 
potential additional deservingness criterion. This criterion has 
largely escaped the attention of welfare deservingness researchers 
for the simple reason that advanced welfare states have not (or at 
least have not been thought to have) inflicted relevant harm on 
specific social groups for which compensation would be needed. 
With the increase in global warming, this assumption is changing 
and welfare opinion research needs to take stock of the 
developments. At this point, it is hard to speculate how important 
this criterion will be compared to the other criteria. However, as 
the discussion above shows, it will certainly matter whether eco-
social policies are seen as compensation for damage or as 
compensation for the inability to cope with eco-social risks. In the 
former case, the perceived deservingness is likely to be high 
whereas in the latter, the eco-socially vulnerable will probably be 
viewed as equally low-deserving as people receiving means-tested 
social assistance. 
27.5  Conclusion: the need for new research 
Throughout the current chapter, we have argued that the need for 
eco-social policies is likely to become more pressing in the coming 
years, as the eco-social risks caused by global warming and some 
of the policies aimed at it intensify. There are multiple factors that 
will influence the extent to which these measures are endorsed by 
governments in advanced welfare states. While not necessarily the 
most decisive aspect, public opinion is likely to play a role in 
shaping the ambition of a government’s eco-social agenda. The 
existing welfare attitudes literature provides some useful insights 
into potential divisions in preferences regarding eco-social 
measures. However, as we have demonstrated, this body of 
literature may need to be reconsidered in relation to the 
qualitatively different third-generation eco-social risks. As a 
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starting point for narrowing this knowledge gap, we propose a set 
of broad research questions. These include the following: 
1. How deserving are the eco-socially vulnerable in comparison 
with the traditional beneficiaries of developed welfare states 
(that is, the elderly, families with children, the unemployed, 
single parents, social assistance recipients and migrants)? 
2. Do people explicitly or implicitly use the CARIN criteria in 
relation to the eco-socially disadvantaged, and if so, what is 
the relative importance of each of the five criteria? 
3. What other criteria do people refer to when evaluating the 
welfare deservingness of beneficiaries of eco-social policies? 
Do people consider compensation as a distinctive 
deservingness criterion? 
4. Do people feel that eco-social policies should be 
unconditional or do they expect the beneficiaries to 
reciprocate, for example, by demonstrating eco-friendly 
behaviour, such as limiting their use of electricity and fuel? 
5. If faced with a trade-off between traditional welfare and new 
eco-social policies, what preferences do people have and 
how do they justify them? 
6. To what extent does public support for these policies 
influence their design and implementation in national 
contexts? 
7. Cross cutting each of these questions: what are the divisions 
between the main socio-economic groups and their values, 
and ideological and social justice preferences?  
8. Also cross cutting each of these questions: how are the 
perceptions influenced by the country context (for example, 
affluence, exposure to the adverse effects of the climate 
change, type of welfare regime)? 
To help answer these questions, we recommend using various 
methodological approaches. Given that at present one can only 
hypothesise how the traditional divisions and welfare 
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deservingness criteria will play out in relation to eco-social 
policies, at the initial stage priority should be given to exploratory 
analyses by means of qualitative research. The empirical evidence 
generated from these qualitative studies can in turn be used to 
guide both traditional large-scale surveys and factorial vignette 
studies. 
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28.  Homeownership and Social Policy 
Preferences  
Thomas Lux and Steffen Mau 
28.1  Introduction 
In the early 1980s, Ralf Dahrendorf, a key figure in social 
liberalism, formulated his thesis on the ‘end of social democracy’ 
(1983, own translation): The social-democratic project – not just 
as a party programme but as a programme defining an entire 
epoch – had been realised across the board in Western societies 
during the 20th century. Nowadays, our social consensus aims to 
establish social equity, comprehensive access to social welfare as 
well as co-determination. Never before in human history has the 
majority of the population had this many opportunities to lead 
prosperous lives equipped with a range of possibilities. At the end 
of the century, Dahrendorf wrote (1983: 16, own translation) that 
‘we are all (almost) social democrats’. Today, more than 30 years 
later, doubts are justified as to whether the idea of an 
unchallenged, irreversible triumph of social democracy is indeed 
valid. Although the welfare state is still viewed positively by the 
majority (van Oorschot et al., 2012), these sentiments have been 
challenged and attacked by neoliberal ideas. Faith in the 
capabilities of the free market and in the supremacy of 
competition has embedded itself within many Western societies, 
underpinning key political strategies in the reorganisation of a 
wide variety of fields, including social policy, the labour market as 
well as the education sector (Amable, 2011). This raises the 
question of why ‘in the rich countries of the West, the long turn 
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to neoliberalism encountered remarkably weak resistance’ 
(Streeck, 2014: 31). Furthermore, why was there an increasing 
tendency towards agreement and even an active willingness 
among a broad range of social strata to support the neoliberal 
reform agenda? 
In addressing these questions, ideological and cultural factors 
can be identified which have increased the popularity of market 
solutions, not just among economic and political elites but also 
among ordinary citizens. In this contribution, we point to 
additional structural factors underpinning the susceptibility of the 
population to market-oriented approaches. We posit that society’s 
commitment to the social equity model waned partially as a result 
of the widespread increase in wealth and assets during the long 
period of post-war prosperity, thus leading to a greater affinity for 
market approaches. Expanding on Mau (2015), we argue that the 
middle classes in particular lost their ties to the social democratic 
model of social equity due to extensive collective gains in wealth 
and upward social mobility. Therefore, the success of the 
neoliberal turn cannot exclusively be understood as a result of 
widespread ‘false consciousness’. Rather, it can also be interpreted 
as a consequence of the transformation of social interests. 
This proposition rests on the assumption that a long-term 
socio-structural change affecting attitudes and orientations has 
taken place. This assumption cannot be verified directly, though, 
since the data required for a long time-series analysis is not 
available. The proposition is, however, underpinned by a micro-
model of attitude change that can be verified empirically. This 
model assumes that a changing or growing asset portfolio can lead 
to changing preferences concerning welfare state benefits. Put 
succinctly, we thus hypothesise that an increase in assets, whether 
in the form of stocks and shares, residential property, inheritance 
or other types of wealth, would contribute to people relying less 
on state-managed social security and more on market-oriented 
investment strategies. We will examine this hypothesis using data 
Homeownership and Social Policy Preferences 
 335 
from the German Socio-Economic Panel and by looking at the 
relationship between property acquisition and the attribution of 
responsibility for financial security in old age. 
28.2  Attitudes towards the welfare state and the affluent 
majority class 
The social democratic theory of democratic capitalism assumed 
for a long time that economic inequalities could be limited by the 
wide distribution of political co-determination rights. The 
argument was that in a majoritarian democracy, ‘there will be a 
‘natural’ tendency in all segments of the population, and in 
particular the less privileged ones, to make active use of the 
political resources that are granted to them as political rights’ 
(Offe, 2012). In a responsive political system, there should be a 
democratic demand for welfare policy interventions. Research has 
focused extensively on the issue of political support for welfare 
state institutions and their legitimacy (Mau, 2003; Taylor-Gooby, 
2008; Svallfors, 2006; van Oorschot et al., 2012). In this context, 
Wim van Oorschot (2000, 2006) was among the key scholars 
suggesting that welfare legitimacy also depends on people’s 
deservingness perceptions of needy groups, with elderly people as 
well as sick and disabled people usually seen as much more 
deserving than unemployed people and immigrants. Yet, in the 
overall evaluation of welfare state consequences, the public of 
most Western countries thinks that the positive social 
consequences outweigh the negative ones (van Oorschot et al., 
2012). Another important contribution has been made by the 
thesis of legitimacy through beneficiaries or ‘beneficial 
involvement’, which posits that the available basket of 
interconnected welfare state benefits acts to bind interests while 
creating potential sources of support. At least until the mid-1990s, 
it appears that the more extensive and comprehensive the 
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activities of the welfare state were, the more positive the attitude 
profile of the population, with the groups that benefited most 
having particularly supportive attitudes (for example, Coughlin, 
1980; Goodin and Le Grand, 1987; Kluegel and Miyano, 1995).  
According to these findings, there is limited cause for concern 
in relation to the social model. However, past developments 
challenge this notion. The welfare state has been subject to 
considerable pressure, not just as a result of fiscal problems but 
also due to increasing levels of dissatisfaction and a lack of active 
support. The neoliberal project resonated to a certain degree on a 
societal level and appealed to a significant proportion of the 
population (Prasad, 2006). Crouch (2013: 23) summed up this 
change in attitudes and political concepts with an ironic remark 
stating ‘We Are All (Partly) Neoliberals Now’. Since the late 
1980s, it is fair to say that in most Western European countries 
there has been a certain level of support for political projects that 
promise tax cuts, that increase tolerance for social inequalities, 
that aim to shrink the state and that seek to increasingly subject 
public service providers to competition (Mau, 2015). Even left-
wing and social democratic parties in Europe showed sympathy 
for neoliberal reform ideas and actively helped to implement 
them, not least because they believed that their constituents would 
accept this (Mudge, 2008). 
These considerations beg the question of why populations were 
so receptive to, or at least passively accepting of, market-
strengthening reforms. Furthermore, why did those who profited 
strongly from the available basket of social policy benefits allow 
themselves to be swayed by rampant state scepticism? One answer 
given in the literature is that neoliberalism is a highly 
accomplished ideological programme that succeeds in 
encouraging individuals to act against their own structural 
interests. This is the (classical) theory of false consciousness as 
triggered by ideological hegemony, which posits that ‘middle class 
and poor people are being diverted, largely by design, from 
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looking after their own economic interests into caring about other 
concerns’ (Milanović, 2016: 202). Above all else, this line of 
argumentation shifts a state of ideological delusion to centre stage. 
Although such arguments are quite plausible, they are only part 
of the explanation. The success of the neoliberal turn can also be 
seen as a consequence of transforming interests. Widespread gains 
in wealth, collective upward social mobility, the growth of a 
materially saturated middle class as well as processes of 
individualisation and pluralisation have changed the social 
foundation on which societal demands for social equity are based 
(Mau, 2015). While these developments have benefited large parts 
of the population, especially the middle classes (Mau, 2012), they 
have also led to a loosening of the commitment of some sections 
of the population to the interventionist project. More pointedly, 
this thesis implies that precisely because the large majority class 
profited substantially from the collective gains made during the 
social democratic era they have become alienated from it. The 
better off they became, the more receptive they were to moves 
towards economic liberalisation and processes of financialisation.  
An important indicator of this change are shifts in income and 
investment portfolios. At the risk of oversimplifying, one may 
conceptualise the middle class in the early social democratic era as 
a class that almost exclusively drew its income from work and 
relied on collective social security provided by the state, while 
today the middle class also satisfies status interests by means of 
capital income, life insurance, private savings and family asset 
transfers (Mau, 2015). It has been argued that wealth – when 
available – increasingly assumes a ‘security function’ for the 
middle class (Korom, 2017). This does not change them all into 
rentier capitalists, yet many among them were and are involved in 
accumulating, expanding and passing on assets as well as partaking 
in investment-focused market behaviour. Thus, many of these 
individuals find themselves occupying the threshold between the 
middle and the ‘affluent classes’ (Veblen, 1899 [2009]) and are 
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directly involved in financialisation processes, for instance, 
through the expansion of private retirement saving, (credit-
financed) property ownership and shares in investment funds. 
Although the literature refers to differences in attitudes 
between different socio-structural groups (Jæger, 2006; Svallfors, 
2006), as yet there are hardly any systematic references to 
questions of financialisation, asset accumulation and capital 
ownership. Approaches to the investigation of attitude differences 
that use classical variables to describe status, such as occupation, 
income and education, dominate. Previous studies have shown 
that it is primarily the lower classes who strongly affirm the 
welfare state while the upper classes, although not rejecting it 
outright, are more reserved (Svallfors, 2006). Furthermore, there 
are associations between these status variables and opinions 
regarding the principles that ought to determine the orientation of 
the welfare state:  
‘Equity is relatively more preferred among the “haves” in society, i.e., 
people with higher income and educational degrees, while a 
redistribution based on need is especially favoured by “have-nots”, 
i.e., people with lower educational level, with lower income, people 
on benefit and the longer-term unemployed’ (Reeskens and van 
Oorschot, 2013: 1191).  
Although these approaches have delivered important insights, 
aspects such as asset accumulation, investment and retirement 
provision strategies as well as familial management of existing 
resources, all of which underwent significant changes over time, 
are currently overlooked.  
Given this background, we intend to examine the relationship 
between homeownership and attitudes towards social policy. With 
this, we investigate alternative determinants of welfare attitudes 
that go beyond the 'conventional' socioeconomic characteristics. 
For the vast majority of the population, homeownership is the 
most important financial asset. Over the past 30 to 40 years in 
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Europe, there has been a general increase in homeownership 
(Doling and Ford, 2007). In Germany, a country with a 
comparatively low rate, homeownership increased from 38.8 to 46 
per cent between 1993 and 2010 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011: 
294, 2012: 155). We suspect that homeowners and purchasers 
(even after controlling for the influence of other important 
factors) will have a closer affinity to the market and a more 
sceptical attitude towards the state than people who rent. In terms 
of welfare state preferences, we refer to the preferred type of 
provision for old-age financial security because the ownership or 
purchase of property – as a form of private provision or insurance 
– should have an effect in this area. We chose the years 1997 to 
2002 for our investigation period. During this period, the 
neoliberalisation of German society accelerated, thus making it 
particularly relevant to our question. This acceleration can be 
seen, for instance, in the intensification of discussions regarding 
the introduction and strengthening of private pension insurance 
(Nullmeier, 2003).  
28.3  Data 
For our analysis, we use the balanced longitudinal sample of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1997 to 
2002 (Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005). In 1997 and 2002, the 
GSOEP participants were asked who, in their opinion, should be 
responsible for financial security in old age (possible answers: only 
the state, mainly the state, both state and private individuals, 
mostly private individuals, only private individuals). With regard 
to homeownership status, we distinguish between households that 
were (1) renting their place of residence from 1997 to 2002, or (2) 
owners of their place of residence from 1997 to 2002, or (3) 
renting in 1997 and then, between 1998 and 2001, becoming 
owners of their place of residence (and staying that way). In 
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addition, we include age, gender, family status, residential area, 
education status and net equivalised income as control variables. 
28.4  Results 
Our results show that, over time, the proportion of respondents 
who ascribe responsibility for financial security in old age in 
Germany exclusively or primarily to the state has decreased. While 
43.1 per cent of respondents held this view in 1997, only 39.5 per 
cent did so in 2002. At the same time, the proportion of 
respondents who consider both the state and private individuals 
to be responsible increased from 48.5 to 53.4 per cent. In this 
respect, we are actually dealing with a trend towards market or 
private solutions in the field of old-age financial provision. 
However, this does not imply a strengthened preference for 
radical market solutions. The percentage of respondents who 
consider private individuals to be mainly or solely responsible has 
not increased, but rather has decreased slightly (from 8.4 to 7.1 
per cent). 
Looking at the preferences for state or individual responsibility 
in the relevant groups (in 2002), our expectations are confirmed: 
Property buyers and owners1 attribute responsibility for financial 
old-age provision to the state far less frequently than tenants (37.8 
and 34.4 per cent versus 44.9 per cent). They also favour mixed 
responsibility more frequently (54.8 and 56.3 per cent versus 50.3 
per cent) and they prefer radical market solutions more often (7.4 
and 9.2 per cent versus 4.8 per cent). These differences are also 
reflected in linear regression models2 after controlling for age, 
gender, marital status, housing region, education, and net 
equivalised income (see Table 28.1). In 2002, respondents who 
purchased property between 1997 and 2001 had a significantly 
stronger preference for private responsibility for old-age financial 
provision than those who were tenants during the whole 
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investigation period. The same holds true for respondents who 
were homeowners during the whole investigation period. 
Table 28.1  Preferences for state or individual responsibility for financial 
provision in old age in Germany in 2002  




Homeowner status (ref: permanent tenant) 
 
   
  Permanent owner 0.161** (0.000) 0.124** (0.000) 0.093** (0.000) 
   Property buyer 0.141** (0.000) 0.073+ (0.057) 0.063+ (0.089) 
Control variables    yes  yes  
Preference in 1997     0.233** (0.000) 
Constant 2.451** (0.000) 2.348** (0.000) 1.788** (0.000) 
Number of cases 7988  7988  7988  
Adjusted R2 0.009  0.041  0.099  
Notes: P-values in brackets. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  
 GSOEP 1997–2002, own calculation. Higher values indicate a stronger 
preference for private responsibility. Control variables: age, gender, region, 
marital status, education, net equivalised income. 
Where the preference for state or private responsibility in 1997 is 
included in the regression model as an independent variable, the 
coefficients can be interpreted as group differences in changes of 
preferences over time (given a comparable starting level for the 
preferences in 1997) (Finkel, 1995). The results of this model 
show that people who buy residential property and those who are 
homeowners throughout the entire investigation period tend 
significantly more strongly towards private responsibility over 
time than people who continuously rent. 
28.5  Conclusion 
We started by presenting possible arguments to explain why large 
segments of the population acquiesced to neoliberalism rather 
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than acting as a bulwark against it. The success of the post-war 
economic and growth model alone means that many households 
today can no longer be regarded as purely dependent on 
employment. At the end of a long period of prosperity, many 
households in the mid- and upper-middle classes have 
accumulated significant assets that they utilise, invest in and 
extend, thereby contributing to status reproduction. Therefore, it 
does not suffice to deduce the attitudes of these groups towards 
state welfare provision purely from their role as employees or 
social benefit recipients. Instead, questions of asset accumulation, 
financialisation and private strategies for financial provision also 
have to be considered. Given this background, we conducted an 
illustrative analysis examining whether the macro-level 
interrelations between collective resource accumulation on the 
one hand and a weaker (welfare) statist orientation on the other 
hand come into play when we take a closer look at the question of 
buying residential property. Our results do not only show that, at 
the start of the new century, homeowners had a weaker statist 
orientation than people who rent, but also that the general trend 
towards market solutions was stronger among property owners 
and buyers. 
All of this certainly does not imply that broad swathes of the 
population have entirely abandoned their belief in the role of the 
state as a corrective and compensatory authority. That is not the 
case. However, collective upward social mobility and its 
concomitant market interests have created enhanced opportunities 
for replacing the once professed ‘politics against the markets’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1985) of the social democratic project with the 
‘politics for the markets’ of the neoliberal project. It can be 
assumed that the growth in wealth and privatised pension 
provisions were a precondition for growing reservations about the 
redistributive ambitions of the state. However, it should be 
clarified that we have only examined one determining factor 
among many and that we cannot derive any monocausal 
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explanation from it which excludes other factors such as 
ideological or cultural change towards a greater market 
orientation. With regard to the interplay of factors, our findings 
suggest that socio-structural changes are at least a marginal 
condition for social groups becoming responsive to certain 
ideological changes. In this sense, a shift in attitudes towards 
convictions of market affinity would depend on the interaction of 
socio-structural and ideological transformations. 
NOTES 
1. Both groups come disproportionately frequently from middle and upper 
income groups. 
2. Additionally calculated ordinal regression models yield very similar results. 
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29.  ‘It’s Only Cheating if You Get 
Caught’.1 Welfare Regimes, 
Enforcement Perceptions, and 
Public Tolerance towards Tax and 
Premiums Evasion 
John Gelissen 
29.1  Introduction 
In Wim van Oorschot’s academic work, the quest for 
understanding how the sociological notion of solidarity shows its 
different faces in welfare beliefs of the Dutch and European 
publics, and in social policy of European nations, has been a 
consistent impetus for his empirical research endeavors. When I 
was working on my PhD project on the explanation of cross-
national differences in welfare attitudes, to me, one of the most 
lucent definitions on this topic was van Oorschot’s definition of 
solidarity:  
‘a sociological concept referring to a situation in which individuals 
contribute to the common interest of the collectivity they are a 
member of, even if this runs against their direct self-interest.’ (van 
Oorschot, 2000, 2014).  
This definition was particularly important for my subsequent 
research because van Oorschot showed how the various reasons 
why people support welfare could be derived from sociological 
theories on social solidarity (van Oorschot, 1999). Such theories 
allow inferring why and under what conditions individuals are 
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willing to contribute to the common good even if doing so would 
go against their personal interests. In particular, van Oorschot 
identified four different reasons for solidary behavior, based on 
the work of several key sociological theorists.  
First, from Mayhew (1971), he identified the importance of 
emotional ties and identification. For example, people may feel 
solidary with groups such as their family because of affection and 
identification, but they may also cherish feelings of belonging and 
identification with other social groups such as ethnic groups, 
religious communities, regional populations, or even nations.  
Durkheim (1893 [1964]) and Parsons (1951) pointed him to the 
importance of culturally-based beliefs that stress the moral 
obligation in individuals to contribute to the common good. Here, 
the fact that group members share some fundamental cultural 
characteristics can promote feelings of responsibility and support 
for the collective.  
Hechter (1992), Weber (1921 [1978]), and Durkheim stressed 
that solidarity could also result from rational calculation grounded 
in self-interest, highlighting that ‘warm feelings’ are not always 
sufficient for solidarity to occur. Here, one may think of people 
who pay premiums to a collective health care scheme because they 
value high-quality health care while anticipating they may need it 
in the future should they fall ill.  
Finally, Parsons and Hechter emphasized the importance of 
institutional role obligations and enforcement because the 
possibility of free-riding behavior demands control of 
contributory obligations, and, if necessary, sanctioning in the case 
of individuals not honoring their obligations vis-à-vis the 
collective. In other words, for some individuals, not contributing 
to the common good is a meaningful or rational action alternative 
and for these individuals, enforcement of compliance to 
contribute to the common good – that is, enforced solidarity – is 
necessary.  
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These insights from van Oorschot’s work allowed me to 
theoretically embed my empirical research on welfare attitudes in a 
rich sociological tradition of theorizing about social solidarity. In 
his empirical research on welfare attitudes, van Oorschot has 
explicitly addressed the first three reasons for contributing to the 
common good – identification, moral convictions, and self-
interest (for example van Oorschot, 2000). Here I want to add to 
this work by theoretically and empirically focusing on the aspect 
of enforced solidarity in welfare states. Although sociological 
theory stresses the importance of control and sanctioning 
mechanisms for promoting solidarity – especially in circumstances 
when other solidarity-promoting mechanisms are absent – welfare 
attitudes research has not extensively studied this aspect until 
now. This lack of attention is surprising because the extent to 
which people accept dodging the payment of necessary taxes and 
premiums to uphold welfare state provisions can be seen as an 
indicator of the legitimacy of the welfare state. Besides, 
differences in levels of acceptance of taxes and premiums evasion 
between countries may also relate to differences in the 
effectiveness of the operation of the welfare state institutions of 
these countries to enforce compliance. In the remainder of this 
contribution, I will address some of these issues by answering the 
following questions: 
1. How tolerant are European citizens about behaviors that 
seek to evade tax and premium contributions that are 
necessary to finance (welfare) state efforts? 
2. Do public perceptions about (a) the stringency of control for 
enforcing contributing to the common good, (b) sanctioning 
of evasion, and (c) risk of being detected relate directly to 
such tolerance beliefs?  
3. Do welfare regime differences explain differences in 
tolerance levels towards tax and premiums evasion? 
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29.2  Hypotheses 
The literature on compliance with the law stresses that social 
control mechanisms and credible risks of sanctions aim to 
persuade rational-choice individuals that – while otherwise 
worthwhile – illegitimate behavior is not worth taking the risk 
(Jackson et al., 2012: 1051). Jackson and colleagues propose the 
instrumental compliance mechanism, which holds that an 
individual responds in a self-interested way to institutional 
demands to gain a reward, or avoid sanctioning, or both. The 
better the institutional compliance mechanisms are developed, 
and, equally important, the more citizens perceive these 
compliance mechanisms as working adequately through 
procedural fairness, effectiveness and representing the 
communities’ moral values, the higher the legitimacy of such a 
system and the higher the willingness to support such institutions 
by complying to its arrangements (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). 
Also, Hechter (1987) contends that the better formal control and 
sanctioning mechanisms are in place within a group, and the 
members of the group perceive these as such, the higher the level 
of group solidarity will be (Hechter, 1987). From this we derive 
the first hypothesis (H1a), which proposes that people who 
perceive (a) strong control for enforcing compliance to pay taxes 
and premiums, (b) strict sanctioning, and (c) high risk of being 
detected will generally be less tolerant towards tax and premiums 
evasion than people who believe that such institutional deterrence 
mechanisms are less well developed.  
However, an alternative hypothesis could also be formulated 
that expects an opposite effect of perceived quality of control and 
sanctioning on the tolerance towards tax and premiums evasion. 
Most people abide by the law and meet tax and premium payment 
obligations not only because of the fear of sanctioning and self-
interest but also because of normative compliance (based on a felt 
moral obligation, commitment) or compliance based on habit or 
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routine (Bottoms, 2001). However, even though the majority of 
the group members may strongly endorse such compliance 
motivations, they may perceive the working of the institutional 
arrangements for control and sanctioning as failing, which is also 
expressed in a low level of public tolerance for tax and premiums 
evasion. On the other hand, people may perceive control and 
sanctioning actually as too strict, which may promote public 
tolerance about tax and premiums evasion. Formulated 
alternatively: if people perceive too weak control and sanctioning, 
they may actually want some improvement of these deterrence 
mechanisms, as expressed by a low level of support for tax and 
premiums evasion, whereas when deterrence mechanisms are 
perceived as too strict, the level of support for tax and premiums 
evasion may actually be high (H1b).  
Because control and sanctioning arrangements are institutional 
characteristics of welfare states which presumably differ between 
welfare regimes, I further expect that tolerance levels towards 
evasive behaviors will also differ between regimes (H2): in 
comparison to Social-democratic welfare states, citizens who live 
in countries that belong to other types of welfare regimes (Liberal, 
Conservative, Hybrid, Mediterranean, Baltic and Post-communist 
welfare regimes) are more tolerant towards tax and premium 
evasion. Social-democratic welfare states have the highest social 
expenditure levels in Europe and presumably demand strong 
levels of solidarity from its citizens, which results in low levels of 
tolerance about tax and premiums evasive behaviors. In less 
developed welfare states institutional enforcement to contribute 
to the common good may be less strongly developed, which will 
result in higher levels of tolerance in these countries. 
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29.3  Data, operational definitions, and method 
Data – The special Eurobarometer 402 (Wave EB79.2) was 
fielded in April-May 2013. This survey included a module on 
undeclared work and legitimacy of tax and premiums evasive 
behavior. Data of the following 28 countries are analyzed: France, 
Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, 
Sweden, Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Croatia. Sample sizes for most countries were 
around N = 1000, but smaller for Luxemburg, Malta and Cyprus 
(around N = 500), and larger for Germany (N = 1499) and Great 
Britain (N = 1306).  
Operational definitions – To measure the dependent variable 
tolerance towards tax or premiums evasion I use the following 
question: ‘Now I would like to know how you assess various 
behaviors. For each of them, please tell me to what extent you 
find it acceptable or not (1 = absolutely unacceptable; 10 = 
absolutely acceptable). Examples of statements in the original 6-
item battery are: ‘Someone receives welfare payments without 
entitlement’; ‘A private person is hired by a private household for 
work and he or she does not report the payment received in 
return to tax or social security institutions although it should be 
reported’; ‘A firm hires a private person and all or a part of the 
salary paid to him or her is not officially registered’. For each 
respondent we calculated the average score across the six items. 
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 0.869. 
Welfare regime types – Countries are assigned to a welfare regime 
type as follows: Liberal: Great Britain, Ireland; Social-democratic: 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland; Hybrid: Belgium, the Netherlands; 
Conservative: France, Germany, Luxemburg, Austria; 
Mediterranean: Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece. Baltic: Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania; Post-communist: Czech Republic, Hungary, 
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Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia; other: 
Malta, Cyprus. For the Western European countries I base this 
classification on own work and for the Eastern European 
countries on Fenger (2007). 
Perceptions of lack of control and lack of sanctions – Respondents 
were asked what reasons people have for doing undeclared work. 
We constructed two dummy variables, one for the situation when 
people indicated lack of control by authorities as a first or second 
reason, and one for the situation when people indicated that 
sanctions are too weak.  
Risk perception of being detected when doing undeclared work – 
Respondents were asked the following question: ‘People who 
work without declaring the income risk that tax or social security 
institutions find out and issue supplementary tax bills and perhaps 
fines. How would you describe the risk of being detected in (OUR 
COUNTRY)? (1)Very high – (4) Very small. Scoring of this 
variable was reversed and the category ‘Very small risk’ is the 
reference category.  
Self-report of ever having done undeclared work – This is a dummy 
variable with categories (0) no, and (1) yes. Note that this variable 
is most likely biased due to eliciting socially desirable answers, 
leading to an underestimate of the occurrence of having done 
undeclared work.  
Socio-demographics – Educational attainment was measured at the 
age in which a respondent completed full-time education, with 
those still studying being assigned their current age. People’s 
financial situation was measured by the following question: 
During the last twelve months, would you say you had difficulties 
to pay your bills at the end of the month? (1) Most of the time (2) 
From time to time (3) Almost never/never. People’s occupation is 
indicated by three dummy variables: (1) self-employed (ref.) (2) 
employed (3) not working. Finally, I include the respondent’s age 
and his or her sex (0 = males; 1 = females). 
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Methods – I estimate random intercept regression models to 
estimate the effects of individual characteristics and regime 
dummies on the tolerance towards tax and premiums evasion. 
Level-1 and Level-2 R-squared values according to Snijders and 
Bosker (1999) are reported for each model to see how each set of 
variables adds to the explanatory power of the models. 
29.4  Results 
Figure 29.1 shows the differences in average tolerance towards tax 



















Figure 29.1  Mean tolerance towards tax and premiums evasion for 28 
European countries (range: 0–10) 
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We see, first of all, that across all the countries tolerance towards 
evasive behavior is relatively low. However, despite of these 
overall low levels of tolerance, some interesting patterns can be 
distinguished. Levels of tolerance are almost lowest in the Social-
democratic welfare states Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, as well 
as in Great Britain, which is the prototype of a European liberal 
welfare state. On the more tolerant side of the spectrum we see 
that two former USSR-type welfare states show the highest level 
of tolerance, followed by a group of Post-communist European 
type of welfare states such as Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Poland. In the middle of the distribution we find a mixture of 
countries from Conservative, Hybrid, Mediterranean and Post-
communist regimes. We also note the somewhat surprising higher 
tolerance level in the Netherlands, whereas citizens of Greece and 
Spain appear to be somewhat less tolerant towards tax and 
premiums evasion. Presumably, because citizens in latter countries 
have recently been confronted with very stringent policy 
interventions due to severe governmental budget deficits, people 
are of the opinion that everyone should share the burden by 
paying taxes and premiums. 
Next, Table 29.1 shows the results of four sequential multilevel 
models in which differences in individual tolerance towards tax 
and premiums evasion are explained. Model 1 allows us to 
estimate the extent to which differences in tolerance scores are 
attributable to between-country differences. The intraclass 
correlation for this model equals 0.101, which indicates that 10 
per cent of differences in tolerance scores is attributable to 
between-country differences. Next, Model 2 partially reproduces 
the findings from the visual inspection of Figure 29.1. We see that 
in comparison to citizens of Social-democratic welfare regimes, 
citizens of Baltic welfare states are on average much more tolerant 
towards tax and premium evasion. Also citizens of Hybrid and 
Post-communist welfare states are on average more tolerant 
concerning evasive behavior.  
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Table 29.1  Multilevel regression of tolerance towards tax and premiums 
evasion on welfare regime types, perceptions of solidarity 
enforcement, and social-demographic variables (unstandardized 
regression coefficients) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Welfare regime: Social-democratic Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Liberal  0.458 0.541 * 0.363 
Southern  0.456 * 0.490 * 0.269 
Hybrid  0.865 *** 0.850 ** 0.756 ** 
Conservative  0.449 * 0.450 * 0.323 
Baltic  1.506 *** 1.364 *** 1.191 *** 
Post-communist  0.807 *** 0.793 *** 0.618 ** 
Other  -0.187 -0.065 -0.269 
Weak control (0 = no; 1 = yes)   -0.292 *** -0.268 *** 
Weak sanctions (0 = no; 1 = yes)    -0.261 *** -0.254 *** 
Perception of risk: very small     Ref.  Ref. 
Fairly small    0.017 0.020 
Fairly high    0.039 0.030 
Very high    -0.284 *** -0.301 *** 
Done undeclared work (0 = no; 1 = yes)   1.282 *** 1.151 *** 
Gender (0 = male; 1 = female)      -0.135 *** 
Age      -0.011 *** 
Education      -0.007 ** 
Problems paying bills: most of the time     0.000 
From time to time      0.075 * 
Almost never/never      -0.150 *** 
Employment status: employed       Ref. 
Self-employed      0.092 * 
Not working      0.066 ** 
Intercept 2.420 *** 1.818 *** 1.855 *** 2.694 *** 
R-squared level-1  0.073 0.118 0.135 
R-squared level-2  0.718 0.699 0.703 
N level-1 24625 24625 22331 21535 
N level-2  28 28 28 
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Small, although significant differences also exist between the 
citizens of the Mediterranean and Conservative welfare states on 
the one hand, and citizens of the Social-democratic welfare states 
on the other, with somewhat higher levels of tolerance in the 
former countries. The welfare regime classification explains about 
7 per cent of the variance in individual tolerance differences, and 
72 per cent of the variance in between-country differences in 
tolerance. The pattern of differences between welfare regimes 
alignes with hypothesis 2, but it remains to be seen whether these 
differences remain once we control for compositional differences. 
Model 3 adjusts the average tolerance scores for the countries 
for individual-level differences (that is, compositional differences) 
in perceptions about the stringency of control for enforcement of 
compliance, sanctioning of evasion, and risk of being detected. 
These effects are also controlled for whether or not a person has 
reported that he or she has done undeclared work. We now see 
that some effects of the regime dummy variables either weaken 
(Hybrid, Baltic, and Post-communist regimes) or become stronger 
(Liberal and Mediterranean regimes. Except for the dummies for 
Malta and Cyprus, all regime dummy variables are significantly 
different from the Social-democratic regime. We find positive 
evidence for hypothesis 1b, because the findings indicate that 
individuals who perceive weak control and weak sanctions show 
lower levels of tolerance than those who do not, controlling for 
differences in perceived risk of detection and performance of 
undeclared work. In comparison to those who perceive a very 
small risk of detection, those who perceive a high risk of detection 
are on average less tolerant towards evasive behavior. We also see 
that individuals who report that they have done undeclared work 
are more tolerant towards evasive behavior than those who 
refrained from doing so. Adding the individual-level variables now 
increases the individual-level explained variance with 4.5 per cent. 
Level-2 explained variance decreases slightly, which is presumably 
the result of the fact that one or more of the added individual-
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level variables show no between-country variation in average 
scores. 
The final Model 4 additionally adjusts for compositional 
differences due to socio-demographic characteristics. Once these 
characteristics are controlled for, there remain only significant 
differences between the Social-democratic regime type on the one 
hand, and the Hybrid, Baltic and Post-communist type on the 
other hand, with the latter regimes showing on average higher 
levels of tolerance towards evasive behavior, a pattern that is still 
partly in accordance with hypothesis 2. Effects of perceptions of 
control and sanction levels, of having done undeclared work, and 
the difference between those who anticipate little risk of detection 
and those who assess a large risk of detection change only slightly 
once we control for the social-demographic characteristics of 
respondents. Women are less tolerant about evasive behavior than 
men, and with increasing age and education, tolerance becomes 
lower. In comparison to people who have problems footing the 
bill most of the time, those who (almost) never have financial 
problems are less tolerant. Finally, self-employed persons and 
persons who are not working show higher average levels of 
tolerance of tax and premium evasive behavior than employed 
persons. 
29.5  Welfare regimes, enforcement perceptions, and 
public tolerance towards tax and premiums evasion: 
conclusions 
Wim van Oorschot’s theoretical analysis of sociological principles 
for promoting solidarity and the application of these principles to 
empirical welfare research provides students of welfare attitudes 
with a solid conceptual framework for studying the motivational 
foundations of public views on welfare legitimacy. In this 
contribution, I zoomed in on one of these motivational factors, 
‘It’s Only Cheating if You Get Caught’ 
 359 
namely, institutional role obligation and enforcement. To this end, 
I explored cross-national differences in public beliefs about the 
legitimacy of behaviors that potentially undermine welfare 
solidarity, and I related it to public perceptions about control and 
sanctioning of illegitimate welfare behavior and the degree to 
which different types of welfare states demand contributing to the 
common good.  
I have found that tolerance towards tax and premiums evasive 
behaviors is generally low across European welfare states, which 
can be seen as good news, as maintaining a modern welfare state 
requires considerable tax revenues or premium contributions by 
its citizens. The generally low levels of tolerance for illegitimate 
welfare behaviors also suggest that the institutional deterrence 
mechanisms that Western European and Eastern European 
welfare states have developed or are currently developing to 
enforce solidarity are to a large extent considered as legitimate by 
their citizens. However, important differences in levels of 
tolerance exist between countries. To some extent these 
differences could be explained by welfare regime type: As 
expected, the citizens of Social-democratic welfare states are least 
tolerant of illegitimate behaviors, whereas Eastern European 
welfare states show higher levels of tolerance. However, 
compositional differences were also important for explaining 
variation in tolerance levels. Interestingly, individuals who 
perceive limited control and weak sanctioning are less tolerant 
about solidarity-undermining behaviors. Presumably, this finding 
reflects people’s awareness that welfare solidarity requires some 
enforcement. 
Reliable estimation of the extent of illegitimate welfare 
behaviors poses a challenge to empirical welfare research in its 
own right. We also lack encompassing cross-national comparative 
information about the institutional arrangements for enforcing 
welfare solidarity and their effectiveness (Jorens et al., 2015). 
Once such data become available, we can open the black box of 
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regime types and more systematically assess the importance of the 
extent of illegitimate behavior and of such solidarity-enforcing 
arrangements that undergird the legitimacy of the welfare state. 
Wim van Oorschot’s theoretical and empirical contributions to 
the study of welfare legitimacy are invaluable for this future 
research. 
NOTE 
1. According to Al Bundy, Married… with Children, 1993. 
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30.  On Solidarity in Europe: Evidence 
from the 2017 European Values 
Study 
Loek Halman and Inge Sieben 
30.1  Introduction 
Wim van Oorschot has a ‘weakness for the odd and peculiar’ (van 
Oorschot, 1994: 7). With this argument, he justified and defended 
his doctoral thesis on non-take-up of social security benefits. In 
our view, Wim’s ‘weakness’ is broader. It concerns not only the 
odd and peculiar, but also issues of social security in general and 
solidarity in particular. Looking at his scientific career it seems 
safe to conclude that solidarity is a recurring theme in his 
publications and teaching activities. Therefore, we address the 
topic of solidarity in this Liber Amicorum. 
30.2  Background  
During the preparatory phase for the third wave of the European 
Values Study (EVS) to be fielded in 1999, scholars working on the 
new questionnaire expressed a strong wish to include the issue of 
solidarity. This topic was not handled in the first two waves of the 
EVS project and it was considered a serious omission that in a 
European project on values, solidarity – being one of the 
founding values of the European Union – was missing. It was 
therefore decided to include measurements of solidarity in the 
third EVS wave. 
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Not having an expert on this topic on board in EVS, it was 
more or less obvious to approach Wim for advice, as he was (and 
is) a renowned scholar on welfare state issues and solidarity. The 
fact that he worked in the same faculty of Social and Behavioral 
Sciences at Tilburg University, although in another department 
(Department of Social Security) was convenient. In addition, he 
already developed a tool for measuring attitudes on social welfare 
in the Netherlands in another Dutch project on values: the 
SOCON project, a collaborative survey project with Nijmegen 
University on social and cultural developments in the 
Netherlands.1 The items in that project, proposed by Wim, 
addressed people’s expectations on the future use of benefits, 
attitudes towards misuse of social provisions, attitudes towards 
causes of poverty, and attitudes towards rights and duties of 
beneficiaries (Eisinga, 1999: 39–40, and 269–277).  
The EVS asked for different measures of public opinion, not 
so much on the welfare state and issues of the use and misuse of 
social provisions (topics that relate strongly to Wim’s dissertation), 
but with a more direct link to solidarity.  
30.3  On solidarity 
Most European welfare states with their system of social 
protection are grounded on the idea of solidarity, or ‘the basic 
understanding that everyone is assumed to make a fair financial 
contribution to a collectively organized insurance system that 
guarantees equal access [to social security provisions]’ (Ter 
Meulen et al., 2001: 1). The modern welfare state, social security, 
and solidarity thus are closely linked concepts. This also appears 
in the way solidarity is conceived by those who consider solidarity 
as ‘the preparedness to share one’s own resources with others, be 
that directly by donating money or time in support of others or 
indirectly by supporting the state to reallocate and redistribute 
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some of the funds gathered through taxes or contributions’ 
(Stjerno quoted by Lahusen and Grasso, 2018: 4). Hence, 
solidarity refers not only to financial contributions, but can also be 
linked to volunteering, membership and support of voluntary 
associations. This is very much in line with what Wim considers 
solidarity to be. For him, solidarity implies more than the degree 
to which people are willing to support and pay for social 
expenditures. In his lemma on solidarity in the Encyclopedia of 
Quality of Life and Well-Being Research (van Oorschot, 2014), he 
describes solidarity as ‘a sociological concept referring to a 
situation in which individuals contribute to the common interest 
of the collectivity they are a member of, even if this runs against 
their direct self-interest’.  
Solidarity thus is about the willingness of people to contribute 
to collective interest, and not (only) to their own well-being. It 
refers to the preparedness to contribute to the common good and 
to let collective interests prevail. Solidarity can be defined as a 
state of relations between individuals and groups which makes it 
possible that collective interests are served. Essential is that 
people experience a common fate because they feel a mutual 
sense of belonging and responsibility or because they share utility, 
meaning that people need each other for the realization of their 
life opportunities (van Oorschot, 2002: 34).  
Conceived in this way, people’s degree of solidarity with 
individuals and groups of individuals depends upon the extent to 
which these individuals and groups are considered to be deserving 
of solidarity. As van Oorschot and Komter (1998: 11) state: 
‘solidaristic behavior boils down to acting in the interest of the 
group and its members’. Group-boundedness and reciprocity are 
important features in this respect. Solidarity ‘is tied to an 
(imagined) community or group, whose members are expected to 
support each other in order to fulfill the mutual rights and 
obligations associated with group membership’ (Lahusen and 
Grasso, 2018: 4). Support depends, more than upon the type of 
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contribution, upon the extent to which certain (groups of) 
individuals are perceived to be deserving. It is well-established that 
solidarity with various groups is differentiated and conditioned by 
the expected neediness of (groups of) individuals which is strongly 
influenced by patterns of mutual empathy and identification, and 
moral convictions and perceived duties.  
These differentiations and conditions are specified in a theory 
of deservingness (van Oorschot, 2000). According to this theory, 
there are five criteria to assess the deservingness of (groups of) 
individuals and the decision to support them:  
1. Control: the extent to which individuals are perceived to have 
control over their lives and can be considered to be 
personally responsible for their own situation. If individuals 
need support in circumstances that can be ‘blamed’ on their 
own behavior or choices, they are more responsible, and, 
hence, less deserving.  
2. Attitude: deservingness depends on the attitude of people in 
need towards support; grateful, compliant and conforming 
individuals are regarded as more deserving. 
3. Reciprocity: individuals who have contributed to the group 
earlier or who are likely to contribute in the future deserve to 
be supported. 
4. Identity: the degree to which one can identify with the needy 
people; individuals who are more like us and who are close 
to us are regarded as more deserving than individuals who 
are dissimilar and at a greater distance.  
5. Need: the level of necessity of support may differ between 
(groups of) individuals; the higher the need, the more 
individuals are considered to be deserving of solidarity.  
These CARIN deservingness criteria (van Oorschot et al., 2017) 
were used as a starting point for developing a measurement on 
solidarity in the EVS surveys. 
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30.4  Measuring solidarity in Europe 
In the EVS, opinions on solidarity are measured in two 
dimensions.2 The first dimension indicates social spatial solidarity, 
and is mainly linked to the fourth criterion (identity) of the 
deservingness theory outlined above. As we saw earlier, the degree 
of solidarity in a social system is a function of the willingness of 
the individual members of that system to contribute to the 
common good. That is, solidarity depends on the degree to which 
individuals can and will contribute to encourage the interests of 
the collectivity. A prerequisite for concrete contributions, that is, 
of actual solidaristic behavior, is that individuals feel a personal 
responsibility for the conditions and interests of the collectivity 
and its members. Solidarity thus seems to refer, first of all, to the 
relations between the members of a collectivity, and not to 
relationships outside of it. Solidarity therefore is at the same time 
including (for in-group members) and excluding (for out-group 
members). A first important issue when studying solidarity thus is: 
what do people regard as their collectivities, as the groups to 
which they feel they belong? Or, in other words, who do they 
regard as in-group members, and who as out-group members? 
Since individuals are members of different collectivities, a second 
issue is how strong their bond with specific collectivities is. The 
literature in this respect suggests a universal relation between 
proximity and intensity of solidarity: the more socially and/or 
geographically close (a group of) individuals are to us, the higher 
the intensity of solidarity we display. These ideas are picked up in 
the EVS question: ‘To what extent do you feel concerned about 
the living conditions of … (a) People in your neighbourhood; (b) 
The people of the region you live in; (c) Your fellow countrymen; 
(d) Europeans; and (e) All humans all over the world.3 The answer 
categories range from 1 ‘very much’ to 5 ‘not at all’. Please note 
that for our analyses in the next section, we recoded these 
categories so that a higher score implies greater solidarity. 
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The second dimension assesses the deservingness of needy groups in 
society, and refers to all CARIN criteria outlined in the 
deservingness theory. In contemporary European societies, 
several distinct groups are the subject of socio-economic and 
socio-cultural policies, such as the poor, the elderly, migrants, etc. 
Due to space constraints, only four needy groups4 were discerned 
in the EVS question: ‘To what extent do you feel concerned about 
the living conditions of … (a) elderly people in [COUNTRY]; (b) 
unemployed people in [COUNTRY]; (c) immigrants in 
[COUNTRY]; and (d) sick and disabled people in [COUNTRY]’. 
Again, the original answer categories range from 1 ‘very much’ to 
5 ‘not at all’ and we recoded them in reverse order: a higher score 
now implies greater deservingness. 
Both questions have been included in the EVS surveys since 
1999 and were analyzed by scholars, including Wim and the first 
author of this contribution. For example, in close collaboration 
with Aafke Komter and Dick Houtman, a report was written for 
the Dutch Ministry of Health, Wellbeing and Sport about Dutch 
solidarity with deprived persons and Europeans (van Oorschot, 
Komter, Houtman and Halman, 2001). Together with Wil Arts, a 
chapter on solidarity among Europeans with people of basic 
target groups of welfare policies, that is, the socio-economically 
weaker and (potentially) neediest social groups was published 
(Arts, Halman and van Oorschot, 2003). In this contribution, we 
will analyze these items in the most recent EVS wave to 
investigate solidarity and deservingness in contemporary Europe 
and to explore whether there are important new developments in 
Europeans’ opinions on this topic. 
30.5  Solidarity in contemporary Europe 
We confine our empirical study in this contribution to some 
descriptive analyses of the findings from the latest EVS survey in 
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2017. As the fieldwork of this wave has not been completed yet 
(at the time of writing), we employ the second pre-release of the 
dataset (EVS, 2018), including thirty European countries. More 
information about the data and the European Values Study can be 
found at www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu. 
30.5.1 Social spatial solidarity 
The first dimension concerned social spatial solidarity. The 
expectation was that solidarity would be less with geographically 
and socially distant groups and stronger with groups of individuals 
who are more nearby. As Figure 30.1 shows, this idea is not 
exactly confirmed in all countries: the rank orders are not in all 
countries reflecting the idea that individuals who are more nearby 
deserve more support than individuals who are more at a distance. 
In some countries, Georgia and Norway for instance, more 
people are concerned with their fellow countrymen than with 
individuals in their neighbourhood or region. In most countries, 
people appear less concerned with Europe than with the world as 
a whole. Only in Austria, Denmark and Hungary, the patterns are 
as expected: people in these countries show more concern with 
other Europeans than with human kind. All in all, the figure 
seems to reveal that a strong European identity has not yet 
developed and that most Europeans are more inclined to be 
solidary with people who are more nearby, in the neighbourhood, 
region or nation. In this respect, it may be not so unexpected that 
Russians and Azerbaijani are least solidary with other Europeans. 
However, the figures do not reveal that inhabitants of the first 
member states of the EU are more concerned with fellow 
Europeans than people in countries that entered the EU more 
recently, or who are not a member of the EU at all, such as 
Switzerland and Norway. In fact, the Swiss and Norwegians 
express higher levels of concern for Europeans than the Dutch or 
the French. 
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30.5.2 Deservingness of needy groups 
The second dimension of solidarity in EVS referred to the 
deservingness of specific needy groups in society: the elderly, the 
unemployed, immigrants, and sick and disabled people. Figure 
30.2 shows that here the rank orders are more or less consistent 
with what Wim observed earlier (van Oorschot, 2008). They 
follow the expected pattern based on the five CARIN criteria of 
the deservingness theory. Solidarity is highest with groups of 
elderly and sick and disabled people, who are more likely to meet 
these criteria. Solidarity with the unemployed and with (especially) 
immigrants is at a lower level. This once again substantiates Wim’s 
conclusion ‘that the underlying logic of deservingness has deep 
roots’ (van Oorschot, 2008: 279). The rank orders of solidarity 
with these different social groups is remarkably stable over the 
countries. In all countries, individuals feel quite equally concerned 
about the living conditions of the elderly and sick and disabled 
people.  
When comparing countries, Wim noted a typical pattern for 
Central and Eastern Europe where the distance between 
immigrants and the other groups is relatively large, whereas the 
distance between the other groups is relatively small (van 
Oorschot, 2008). We find more or less similar results, although 
less pronounced. Today, many Western European countries also 
display a wider difference between immigrants and unemployed 
on the one hand and elderly and sick and disabled on the other, 
and the differences between unemployed and immigrants are 
wider than between elderly, and sick and disabled. Looking more 
in detail at the most deserving needy group, we see that although 
solidarity with elderly is generally high in Europe, it is not so 
much the case in The Netherlands, Hungary and Estonia where 
less than half of the respondents appears to be concerned with 
elderly in their country. People in Georgia appear to be very 
solidary with the older people in their country; here the percentage 
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amounts to more than 90 per cent. Germans are almost equally 
concerned about their elderly, closely followed by people in 
Albania, Spain and Austria. It is not so easy to explain this by 
welfare state arrangements or pension systems, because these 
countries differ widely in pension schemes and elderly care 
provisions. Future research might explore these country 
differences in more detail, providing more severe tests of not only 
structural, but also cultural explanations. 
30.5.3 Conditionality  
According to Wim (van Oorschot, 2008), it is far from clear 
whether people differentiate between the deservingness of certain 
groups of needy people and why that should be the case. In other 
words, to what extent does the degree to which one is solidary 
depend upon or is conditioned by the characteristics of the needy 
groups? He explored this conditionality by analyzing if and how 
certain personal characteristics were associated with different 
levels of conditionality. To measure this conditionality, we follow 
Wim and take ‘the sum of absolute differences between 
respondents’ answers to the […] question. People who were 
equally concerned about the living conditions of all four groups 
(either at a high or at a low level) had a zero score on 
conditionality. The conditionality score of people whose solidarity 
differed for the groups concerned was some figure above zero. 
The higher the score, the more conditional the people, that is, the 
more they differentiated among the needy groups’ (van Oorschot, 
2008: 276). Figure 30.3 shows that conditionality appears highest 
in Czech Republic, closely followed by Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and 
Russia, whereas it is lowest in Estonia, Switzerland, Sweden, 
Armenia and Norway. A clear pattern, as distinguished by van 
Oorschot (2008) between the four major regions in Europe 
(North, East, West, South) does not seem to appear. It, again, is 
rather difficult to interpret the pattern.  
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There seems to be more heterogeneity in conditionality within 
regions in contemporary Europe than before, but we need more 
advanced models to assess this in more detail. 
30.6  Conclusions  
In this contribution, we explored two dimensions of solidarity 
measured in the EVS, which Wim helped to develop: a social 
spatial dimension and a dimension on the deservingness of 
different needy groups in society. The results of the latest EVS 
data collection in 2017 confirm more or less the ideas of the 
deservingness theory. Solidarity is indeed different to specific 
groups in society, and appears to be conditioned by the kind of 
needy groups. We also revealed important differences between 
countries. Addressing cross-national and national varieties in 
people’s levels of solidarity with different social spatial and needy 
groups is one of the tasks for future researchers. 
If we follow Wim in his passion for ‘a weakness for the odd 
and peculiar’, we would like to point out our finding that solidarity 
overall is at a high level in Europe. The idea that solidarity is 
waning, already brought up by Wim, together with Aafke Komter, 
in 1998, has its roots in the individualization of societies. 
However, van Oorschot and Komter (1998) found no evidence 
for this: there are no strong theoretical arguments nor empirical 
evidence to assume a decline in solidarity. Our descriptive analyses 
on EVS 2017 lead to a similar conclusion: Solidarity still is high. 
But the question remains: why? 
NOTES 
1. See https://www.ru.nl/sociologie/onderzoek/onderzoeksprojecten/socon/ 
achtergrond-socon-enquete/ (accessed 5 April 2020). 
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2. In 1999, the EVS questionnaire included some more items related to 
solidarity, for example on the reasons for solidaristic behavior. These items 
were no longer included in the subsequent waves. 
3. In 1999 and 2008, an additional item was added to this list: ‘Your immediate 
family’. This item was dropped in the 2017 wave, because almost all 
respondents indicated to be concerned about their immediate family. 
4. In 2008, children in poor families was added; this item was again dropped in 
2017. 
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31.  Solidarity: a Reflection on Concept 
and Practices  
Antoon Vandevelde 
31.1 Introduction  
Throughout his career, Wim van Oorschot has argued for a more 
egalitarian society and for the preservation and expansion of 
generous systems of social security. On European campuses this 
is not so controversial. When I explain in class the ethical 
principles that underpin our social security system, I never meet 
any opposition or discontent from our Belgian students. 
However, when I explain the same things to US-students, this 
often ends in heated debates including comments like this: ‘Do 
you mean that everybody should be obliged to pay for health 
insurance? And what if I do not care? I am young. The risk that I 
get serious health problems is relatively small. What if I prefer to 
save privately for the case of bad health, injury or bad luck? What 
if I choose to take some risk?’ I do not think that there is more 
altruism in Europe than in the United States. However, these 
feelings are channeled through totally different institutions and 
give rise to very different intuitions in both contexts.  
In this essay, I want to explore the notion of solidarity. Once 
upon a time, this was the third value of the French revolution: 
next to freedom and equality, there was fraternity. I will start with 
my personal definition of the concept of solidarity, I will justify 
this definition by comparing it to alternatives and I will defend the 
necessity of strong forms of solidarity in our current society.1 
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31.2 A conceptual clarification  
I define solidarity as the willingness to share with people we do not know 
personally, but whom we consider to be equal to ourselves on the basis of some 
common feature allowing identification. Solidarity refers to an actual or 
virtual community. We are children under the same God, brothers 
and sisters belonging to the same family, or members of the same 
nation, or victims of the same type of exploitation or oppression, 
fighting the same struggle against injustice. These are the most 
evident communities in which solidarity develops. According to 
Karl Marx, the solidarity of the working classes was based on the 
common position of wage labourers within capitalist structures 
(Marx and Engels, 1848 [1969]). Marx was well aware of the fact 
that this was not evident, but he was convinced that in the long 
run this objective basis of solidarity would translate into subjective 
solidarity and into participation to class action: ‘Die Klasse an 
sich’ would become a ‘Klasse für sich’.2 
Solidarity is directed towards anonymous others, people like 
me, different in many respects but equal in at least one respect 
that matters highly. For example, the claim of a right to work 
united underclasses during the French revolutions of 1830 and 
1848. Typically, this notion of solidarity beyond the boundaries of 
family and clans developed during social struggles in the 19th 
century, at times of demographic explosion yielding the 
development of big towns, big factories, huge bureaucracies and 
the first malls. Baudelaire was the poet of the birth of mass society 
with its typical anonymity, and Walter Benjamin (1983) has 
illustrated it abundantly in his Passagen-Arbeit.  
Sociologists like Tönnies, Durkheim and Mauss have theorised 
a notion that developed in a predominantly urban context, often 
as a correction of rough individualism and harsh capitalism. In 
doing so, they referred to forms of sociality that have existed in 
premodern societies and whose fading away they regret. However, 
I want to restrict the concept of solidarity to the specific type of 
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community that can exist between people who do not know each 
other personally, as it arose with the birth of mass society in 19th 
century industrialising countries. This is also the context in which 
the term itself has been coined. One can make conceptual 
distinctions in a different way, but I think it is better to use more 
precise ‘thin’ concepts, rather than ‘fat’ ones embodying all 
possible types of social bonds.  
Solidarity is different from loyalty. This applies in two 
dimensions. First of all, we are loyal towards our friends. Hence, 
loyalty is particularistic. It is often directed towards persons with 
whom we have (or imagine to have) a personal relationship. 
Second, loyalty does not necessarily imply equality as is the case 
with solidarity as I define it here. It also applies to relationships of 
hierarchical subordination. We can be loyal to our boss or to our 
subordinates. This means, we trust them and we will not betray or 
abandon them. We do not develop feelings of solidarity towards 
God nor towards our pets. Solidarity with superiors is possible 
when both inferiors and superiors are rendered equal, for instance 
by a common threat. Think, for example, of a firm threatened by 
bankruptcy. Sometimes, employees and employers will then join 
the same movement of resistance against banks wanting to cut 
credit lines. In general, however, people feel love, fear, admiration 
or humility towards their superiors, and they display a (somewhat 
condescending) compassionate attitude towards pets and servants. 
Clearly, this is a different constellation than the moral feelings 
connected to solidarity. Nevertheless, there is one point in which 
solidarity and loyalty converge: in principle both stances exclude 
envy. We love our friends, admire our superiors, and when we 
fight a common struggle we tend to forget our jealousy.  
Solidarity is founded on the ability to see similarities and to 
identify with others on the basis of more or less abstract features 
we share with them. Hence, solidarity presupposes some 
communality: common interests, ideas, values, descent or 
structural position. Historical evidence suggests that it is easier to 
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develop solidarity on the basis of particularistic criteria. As we 
have seen in post-World War II Eastern Europe, nationalism has 
often been more powerful than communism in mobilising social 
energy. Recently, identity struggles seem to have marginalised 
social democracy. Indeed, solidarity is less evident with the 
criterion of identification becoming more abstract and more 
universal, the most abstract criterion of course being our common 
humanity. It seems to be easier to mobilise people on the basis of 
ascriptive criteria like family, descent, ethnicity, clan or nation 
than on the basis of chosen objectives. But then again, the chosen 
membership of a club or an association can be more inspiring 
towards solidarity than more-anonymous social settings. It seems 
to be natural that we care more about our children, relatives and 
friends than about people at a greater distance, but of course we 
know how inhumane and dangerous situations can get when even 
the idea of common humanity is narrowed down to the 
community of ‘people like us’.  
Solidarity can be triggered by forward looking or by backward 
looking criteria. It can be developed on the basis of adherence to a 
common project, such as, for example, the desire for a classless 
society, or it can arise from the common indignation about past 
injustices. Probably, again, the latter motivation is more powerful 
than the former. Hence, communist and populist leaders tend to 
instrumentalise nationalist feelings and the resentment about the 
victims of past oppression to strengthen their appeal to the 
general public. Of course, the social psychology of mass 
movements is highly complex and dependent on circumstances. 
Many people become anxious, parochial and pessimistic as they 
feel threatened by the influx of refugees and migrants. Solidarity 
within the in-group then develops together with distrust in 
outsiders. And common plans for the future are more mobilising 
in an optimistic society that believes in the possibility of human 
progress than in a society that is predominantly turned towards 
the past.  
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31.3 Who are ‘we’?  
There is a simple test permitting to assess solidarity: ask people 
who exactly they mean when they are talking about ‘us’. Of 
course, the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ depends largely on 
the context of action. The identity of most people is layered and 
circumstances determine what layer gets mobilised. In this respect, 
we find a puzzling analysis in a book published in 2004 by the 
American economist Alberto Alesina, together with Edward 
Glaeser: Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: a World of Difference. 
The authors ask the question of the origin and causes of the 
difference between the American and the European welfare state, 
the latter being more generous than the former. After all, 
European migrants determined the basic structures of the US. 
How come that people with more or less the same religious and 
cultural background founded a different type of society 
characterised by a minor degree of socially organised solidarity? 
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) investigate various hypotheses. In the 
end, they conclude that there is only one plausible explanation. In 
most European societies, poor people did belong to the same race 
and spoke the same language as the middle income class and rich 
people. The poor were considered to be ‘people of us’, vulgar and 
stupid sometimes but waiting for emancipation, social and cultural 
elevation. By contrast, in the US, the underclass was black. They 
did not belong to the circle of concern of the white majority. Of 
course, cosmopolitanism – and even national citizenship – become 
void if the rich abandon the poor to their bad fate and if they 
refuse to contribute financially to the education, the health care 
and the social security of the destitute. What was missing in the 
US was a community of fate between the wealthy and the poor.  
During the first decades after the Second World War, Europe 
has largely been able to avoid this societal segmentation. 
However, recently, things have started to change. Increasingly, in 
Europe, the underclass is of foreign descent and has different 
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religious beliefs and culture. Hence, identification becomes less 
evident, and, here also, we witness a widening gap between 
insiders and outsiders. Now that it becomes fashionable to 
proclaim the failure of multiculturalism, a restriction of strong 
forms of solidarity to ‘our own people’ is not far away anymore. 
For a long time, we were convinced that cultural heterogeneity 
would soon fade away in the second generation of migrants and 
that their contribution to the creation of wealth in our countries 
would be sufficient to integrate them in our communities, but 
probably we have been too optimistic. Anyway, the claim of 
universal solidarity based on our common humanity as we find it 
in many national and international human rights bills is empty as 
long as we do not aim at institutions that permit people to escape 
the worst forms of destitution.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, the problem of the definition of the 
relevant community for redistribution and for the realisation of 
justice has been neglected by ethicists and political philosophers. 
Take the famous three principles of justice defended by John 
Rawls (1971): a maximal set of equal human rights, equal 
opportunities and the difference principle. In the actual world, 
human rights only have a meaning where they have been 
translated into civil rights. People need citizenship in order to fully 
enjoy the respect due to humanity and to be able to benefit from 
the principle of equal opportunity for people with equal talents in 
the labour market. And finally, consider the famous difference 
principle. Inequalities can be justified if and only if they are to the 
maximal advantage of the worst off. But who are the worst off? 
Do we refer to the global poor? Or do we limit our scope to our 
fellow citizens? And what about legal and illegal foreigners present 
on the national territory? Rawls’ Theory of Justice published in 
1971, revitalised normative political philosophy. It stimulated a 
tremendous quantity of literature on the concept of justice, but it 
took some time – until the years 2000 – to understand that the 
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question of the scope of solidarity was as important as the precise 
definition of what justice means.  
31.4 Solidarity, egoism and altruism  
A long time ago, extreme proponents of market liberalism have 
argued that the wealthy should favour poverty relief or a negative 
income tax, not for ethical reasons, but for their own security and 
because the view of beggars in the streets is extremely unpleasant. 
Clearly, this was meant as a justification of philanthropy or of a 
minimal form of redistribution on a purely egoist basis. However, 
this kind of motivation falls outside my definition of solidarity. 
What lacks here is a community of fate, a commitment to people 
we consider under some important respects as equals. After all, 
personal security could also be guaranteed by severe repression or 
by the deportation of all beggars outside the centre of our towns. 
Solidarity involves a willingness to share and is therefore more 
than self-interested redistribution.  
An interesting question is whether a social insurance scheme 
presupposes solidarity. This seems to be the case when people in 
poor areas start up systems of mutual assistance. In Africa, for 
instance, there are innumerable small-scale initiatives of people 
pooling savings for the funding of funerals and other unexpected 
big expenditures. Sometimes, participants have in turn a right to 
draw from the common fund for small investments. What has 
been called ‘des tontines’ is often organised at street level or 
around a pub. This makes the enforcement of the rules of the 
game rather easy because of the omnipresence of social pressure. 
Nevertheless, in this case, the anonymity condition that I outlined 
earlier as a key criterion of solidarity is not fulfilled.  
When insurances develop into a more encompassing system, 
risks are pooled among people who no longer know each other 
personally. Insurances organise transfers from lucky to unlucky 
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people on the basis of the sensible pursuit of self-interest. Those 
who are not hit by the risk for which they insured are lucky, but 
this also means they become net contributors to the system. They 
have paid a premium without getting money in return. Those who 
are unlucky become net receivers of money. Of course, this 
system is only sustainable as long as individual risks are not 
predictable. Only general statistic information is to be available for 
all actors on the insurance market. In a strict insurance logic, 
those who are a priori known to have more chance to be hit by 
the risk will have to pay higher premiums or will be refused as a 
client by insurance companies. Transfers only take place between 
people whose risk is a priori considered to be the same. Now, is 
this solidarity? I assume it is not. Certainly, it is not altruism. One 
pays insurance premiums out of self-interest, not in order to help 
others. One wants a benefit or an allowance in case one loses his 
or her regular income, or in case that he or she is confronted with 
huge unforeseen expenditures. But again, what lacks is a 
community feeling. Premium payers are totally indifferent towards 
the fate of the co-insured. Sometimes, the transfers organised by a 
pure insurance system are called a thin form of solidarity, but 
certainly it does not fall under the definition I propose in this text.  
And yet: (strong) solidarity, or solidarity as I defined it above, 
can be integrated into an insurance system. This is possible for 
two reasons. First, we speak about income solidarity in the case 
where some categories of people are covered by an insurance 
system for which they did not pay the (full) actuarial premium. 
And, second, we speak about risk solidarity if people who we know 
to be more vulnerable to a certain risk are integrated into the 
insurance without having to pay an additional premium. Of 
course, this increases the burden on the wealthy and the middle 
income classes. As such, this arrangement can no longer be 
sustained by pure self-interest. Why would we permit poor 
outsiders to be covered by an insurance system they cannot 
afford? The idea here is that any contributor could have been in 
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the situation of any recipient. One could have been so poor that 
one is unable to insure against the most basic risks. This is an 
example of ethics mobilising imagination. Maybe we could invoke 
here the idea of life-course solidarity based on enlightened self-
interest: I do not need any solidarity now, but I could need it later 
on in my life. Eventually, we could invoke the principle of mutual 
help here: if someone is in a very bad situation and another 
person can help him or her with relatively few costs and risks for 
her or himself, this person has a strong ethical obligation to do so. 
Here, solidarity in the strong sense of the term as I defined it 
above is necessary. The fate of the person in need does not let the 
contributing person indifferent.  
Also, strong and weak solidarity entertain a different relation to 
reciprocity. Weak forms of solidarity presuppose actual reciprocity, 
whereas strong solidarity refers to something like the Rawlsian veil 
of ignorance: I am highly skilled and I am convinced that I will 
never have an unemployment problem. Despite this, I contribute 
to the unemployment insurance scheme. If I am a sensible person, 
I know that I could have been in a more vulnerable situation or 
that, once upon a time, my children could be less lucky than I am. 
Or, on a more sophisticated level, I beware of the temptation of 
what ancient Greeks called hubris, the idea that I am invulnerable 
to bad fate. We know that so many wealthy and powerful people 
wrongly overestimate their capacities and suppose that they are 
akin to the gods. Probably, the participation of many highly skilled 
people in such a scheme is not wholehearted but imposed. Hence, 
the importance of a pedagogy that explains to all members of 
society, and especially the young generations, the rationale of the 
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31.5 Solidarity and democracy 
In Western European societies, actual social security systems are a 
blend of insurance and solidarity. They have a twofold function. 
They are a safeguard against bad luck and they preserve the 
poorest (members of society) from the worst hardship. The 
former goal is especially important for middle income classes, the 
latter for the poorest. What balance we should strike between 
both goals is an eminent matter for political debate and 
democratic decision-making. When democracy is purely defined 
by majority voting, the interests of the middle income classes will 
probably prevail. Mostly, the poor form a minority and when 
there is no compulsory voting like in Belgium, they tend to vote 
less than middle class people. As Amartya Sen (2000) has 
convincingly shown, in a deliberative democracy with a lively 
public debate there is a chance that the voice of the poor or of 
their representatives is better heard. Here, scandals, images of 
extreme destitution and bad luck highlighted by mass media can 
easily mobilise the imagination and stimulate solidarity.  
Some philosophers advocating a responsibility-sensitive 
conception of justice argue that solidarity is only possible and 
sustainable when free ridership or opportunism are minimised and 
even excluded.3 Actually, this is true, but it concerns more the 
implementation of solidarity within society than its very definition. 
One should be wary of self-fulfilling prophecies. When the stakes 
are set too high, then solidarity becomes impossible. If we require 
general compliance for engaging in solidarity, then this could 
mean that we are hypocritical and that we do not want at all to 
engage in any particular form of solidarity. However, for public 
policy purposes it is important to know that most people are 
strongly influenced in their preferences and actions by what (they 
think) their peers do and think. The more people participate in a 
solidarity project, the more others will feel obliged to join them 
because they are willing to do their share of the effort. If the 
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general feeling is, however, that others do not or will not comply, 
they tend to opt out themselves.4 A public policy that is successful 
in urging compliance to social obligations also increases the 
perceived legitimacy of solidarity.  
All this is utterly important because we know that in the 
following years we will need solidarity on an unprecedented scale. 
In most wealthy countries, real income will increase only slowly – 
except if we are willing to accept mass immigration. We should 
not expect economic growth of more than 1 per cent per year.5 
However, the growing old age dependency rate, the increasing 
cost of new types of health care, the increasing number of 
migrants and refugees that will knock on our door and in whose 
education we will have to invest in the short term, and climate 
action: all this means that we will have to devote most of the 
increase of personal income to objectives strongly inspired by the 
notion of solidarity as I have spelled it out in this contribution. If 
we refuse to do so, we will find ourselves in a harsh type of 
society that is at odds with the best of our ethical traditions.  
NOTES 
1. I present here my personal ideas on the subject which I have developed more 
extensively in my book on Het Geweld van Geld, Lannoo Campus, 2017.  
2. For an extensive analysis of Marx’ position, see Bude (2019: 57–76). 
3. Frank Vandenbroucke (2020) argues that solidarity is only possible when bad 
luck is due to circumstances and not to one’s own fault. In reality, it is hard to 
make this distinction in any detail. This issue has been subject to a harsh 
controversy in the literature on luck egalitarianism, initiated by Elisabeth 
Andersen (1999: 283–337).  
4. See Jon Elster (1990) on the fairness motive.  
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32.  A Privileged Career 
Wim van Oorschot 
Earlier this year the group of PhD-students of the Centre for 
Sociological Research at KU Leuven asked me to have a 
conference call (yes, covid times) with them to talk about my 
career as a professional in academia. They were interested in how 
things were ‘in the old days’, what was changed since then, how I 
had coped with these changes, and how I experienced things as 
they are nowadays, that is, in the present academic world.  
It was certainly not the intention of the young colleagues, but 
at the time I found the request a bit odd. What old days, and why 
me? But then it reminded me of the fact that, indeed, I had many 
years of academic work behind me and therefore should not be 
surprised that younger colleagues saw me as one of ‘the oldies’ 
who perhaps could say something interesting (or funny) about the 
history of their academic world. Even more, the request reminded 
me of the fact that within a few months I would retire. A fact that 
occasionally crossed my mind, but I never paid much attention to 
it, since work kept me busy with other things. The request for the 
conference call made me more directly aware of it.  
Some time after the call took place I was again vividly and 
undeniably reminded of my ‘pensionable age’ when over a nice 
diner the staff of my Social Policy and Social Work Team 
informed me that they and other close colleagues had prepared a 
Liber Amicorum at the occasion of my retirement. It was a 
complete surprise for me, but an extremely pleasant one. I had 
hoped for a Liber, of course. There is no need to deny that. But 
when I found out that it was actually produced, with contributions 
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from so many beloved colleagues from all over Europe, I was 
truly impressed and deeply thankful.  
However, paraphrasing what economists usually contend, there 
is no such thing as a free diner. In this case they were right, the 
message of the Liber came with an invite: would I be willing to 
also contribute a bit by way of an epilogue? The contents of it 
would entirely be at my own choice and liking, and no long text 
was expected (a kind way of warning me not to get too 
enthusiastic and irresponsibly challenge the total word count of 
the book?). They had chosen the right moment, since in the nice 
atmosphere of the diner, and surrounded by the expectant faces 
of my colleagues, I felt I could not refuse. Also, would it not be 
my last chance to say something nice, and perhaps interesting, 
before I would retire and fade away into oblivion? So, I said yes, 
but started wondering immediately what my short epilogue would 
be about.  
Since my Leuven colleagues have proven to be fully capable 
themselves of entering new directions and frontiers of research, I 
did not feel challenged so much to give a last farewell by way of 
sketching out lines for future research. Also, a final, more distant 
reflection on my academic work of the past did not seem 
warranted. In my perception, in the choice of my research 
subjects and questions, I have not been driven by a grander theory 
or schema of things, nor did I have an ultimate, singular scientific 
goal in mind. On the face of it, I would say that I just focused on 
different issues and questions that interested me at the time. 
Although the causes, manifestations and consequences of social 
inequality have always been my major curiosity (and the basic 
motive to take up the study of sociology whilst being employed as 
a horticultural consultant at the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture), I 
would find it difficult to say why I was alternately interested in 
such specific phenomena as non-take-up, disability policies, labour 
market policies, benefit recipiency, and deservingness attitudes. 
On second thought, however, were I forced to admit to a 
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common thread in my work, I would try and save my skin by 
saying ‘solidarity’. I have studied solidarity as it is organized 
through the welfare institutions and policies in our European 
societies, and solidarity as a societal value on which these 
institutions are created and maintained. A focus on solidarity is 
not peculiar for those with a curiosity for social inequality, since is 
not solidarity the fundamental weapon in the combat against 
social inequality?   
So, if not sketching lines for future research, and if a reflection 
on a common thread in the trajectory of my research only leads to 
the conclusion that I was driven by a basic curiosity, not by a 
grand theory or an ultimate goal, what would then be the content 
of the epilogue that I promised to my dinner companions? 
After some thought I realized that the young colleagues of the 
Centre for Sociological Research had given me a hint with their 
conference call. Apparently, early career researchers are interested 
in how academia was back then, in what had changed, and how 
things compare to the situation they are in now. Could I not focus 
my epilogue on this? I immediately sympathized with the idea, 
since it linked up with the attention I have had throughout my 
career for the position of young colleagues in the field. So yes, I 
could.  
For assuring its substantive development and future academic 
and social significance it is absolutely vital for each field of study, 
in this case comparative social policy, that young scholars are 
introduced and welcomed to it in a way that motivates and 
inspires them. This is mainly the reason why I tried to contribute 
to this where possible, for example by organizing (always in 
cooperation with other colleagues) workshops, seminars, stipends 
and summer schools for early career researchers, in the context 
(and funding opportunities!) of EU COST Actions, EU Networks 
of Excellence, ESPAnet, EDAC, the Departments of Social 
Security Studies and Sociology of Tilburg University, and the 
Social Policy and Social Work Team at KU Leuven. But my 
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attention for the position of young colleagues has not only been 
out of concern for the future of our field of study. There is also a 
more personal touch to it as I see how they have to operate in a 
much more complex and demanding academic environment 
compared to when I was a young scholar. In comparison to their 
situation I feel that I have had an extremely advantaged career 
start. Let me briefly explain this. 
After my graduation in Sociology at Tilburg University in 1984 
I was appointed as Universitair Docent (Assistant Professor) with 
full tenure right from the start. This was not exceptional back 
then, it happened to many starting academics. At the time I did 
not have a PhD, not even a single publication, just a Master’s 
degree (but with a cum laude, I have to admit that). There was no 
formal expectation of completing a PhD in the future. It was clear 
that it was better to write a PhD-thesis if one had the ambition of 
ever becoming a professor, but whether or not to do it was left to 
the personal discretion and ambition of the Docent. Compare that 
to the situation nowadays, where an appointment as Universitair 
Docent depends on having completed a PhD, having published a 
series of articles in international peer-reviewed journals, having 
gone through a series of post-doc positions, and having been 
successful in the acquisition of research funds. Even then the 
competition is stiff, since with the strong internationalization of 
academia in the past few decades competitors come from all over 
the world.  
Once in the job, the fact that in my ‘old days’ there was no 
strong pressure, formal or informal, to write a PhD-thesis is in my 
view also an advantageous factor, compared to the time and 
output pressures that are exerted upon PhD-students nowadays. 
Myself, at least, it gave the peace of mind that I would be free to 
follow my own research ideas and inclinations, allowing me not to 
panic so much when I recognized I was on a dead-end street, 
when the collection of data took more time than expected, when 
the necessary funding was not immediately available, when a 
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journal editor kept on waiting with sending their decision on a 
paper submission, et cetera. I experienced this more relaxed 
attitude to the PhD-thesis I as a sign of academic freedom, 
granted to me at a degree higher than what is allowed or possible 
nowadays for PhD students (as well as for colleagues in more 
senior academic positions!).  
What also made academic life much easier compared to now, is 
that in the early years of my career at Tilburg University (as 
elsewhere) there were no formal demands as to what kind of 
publications, nor how much of them, one should produce each 
year (talking about academic freedom…). Of course, those who 
produced more tended to have a higher academic status, but there 
was little or no pressure for others to have a substantial output. 
But entering the 1990s, this changed rapidly. The ‘publish or 
perish culture’ that we knew from the US soon became a reality in 
Dutch academia. Before, academics were left free to choose to 
publish either in Dutch or in English, in journals with either a 
more professional, policy or academic orientation, in national or 
international journals, to publish journal articles, book chapters, 
edited volumes or monographs, et cetera. There was no central 
registration of such output and colleagues knew little (but 
gossiped quite a bit) about each other’s productivity and 
contribution to science.  
This all changed more or less overnight, certainly in the context 
of Dutch social sciences in which I was working. It would take a 
study in itself to understand and explain what drove the change, 
but I assume it was a combination of a growing population of 
researchers increasing the demand for and competition in funding, 
in a period of a general retrenchment of the Dutch welfare state. 
But also of a neo-liberalism related emphasis on competition and 
individual responsibility, as well as of New Public Management 
types of idea about steering professionals by setting fixed budgets 
and quantified targets. Within a few years’ time the yearly output 
of individual academics was quantified and counted. At Tilburg 
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University, where I was working at the time, a point system was 
introduced in which some types of publications were given a 
higher number of points than other types. The highest number 
was given to international, peer reviewed articles in high impact 
journals. Less points were given for books, chapters in books, and 
to all publications in Dutch. Each year one’s output was measured 
with the point system, made public within the department (to 
stimulate those who lagged behind?), and at faculty level one’s 
personal score was translated into a percentage of working time 
one was allowed to spend on research or should spend on 
teaching. I remember that scores in the highest regions allowed 
research time of 70 per cent, with lower scores allowing for 50 per 
cent and 20 per cent. For me personally, in the beginning, the 
output quantification system felt advantageous. I cannot deny that 
I sensed a kind of recognition now that it was clear to all in the 
department and faculty that I was actually quite productive. I 
found it rather pleasant that my academic status was now less 
depending on ‘gossip in the corridors’, among members of ‘old 
boys networks’, but instead based on ‘facts’ (in parenthesis since 
the system had a uni-dimensional, quantitative conception of what 
could be counted as evidence of academic production and merit).  
However, soon the system showed to have a series of 
unintended (though not unforeseeable) effects on the work of 
academics, and on the scientific and social outcomes of Dutch 
social sciences in general. I will not go into these here, but just 
mention a little anecdote to illustrate what was going on. In those 
years I happened to be the editor of the Dutch Tijdschrift Sociale 
Wetenschappen (Journal of Social Sciences). Within a few years after 
the introduction of the output measurement system we had to 
close down the journal because of a lack of submissions. The 
reason being that in the point system one could not earn output 
points with publications in Dutch. Suddenly then, Dutch policy 
makers, interest groups, and the general public had no direct 
access any more to the fruits of Dutch social sciences. Of course, 
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in the meantime some of the sharpest problems of the particular 
point system that I described have been remedied, but I am sure 
that by now all social scientists in Europe recognize this trend 
towards quantification of their output, and of increasing output 
demands. Acknowledging that academic freedom cannot mean 
freedom to be unproductive, the more general problem is of 
course, how to evaluate the productivity of researchers, as well as 
how to evaluate and value academic work more broadly. This 
issue has turned into a science itself, but most national and EU 
research councils still regard simple quantitative information 
about a researcher’s publications as the most important indicator 
of their academic status and rigor. So, the advice we tend to give 
to early career researchers is indeed: publish as much as possible, 
in peer-reviewed international journals. A totally different message 
as I was given in my early days.   
It is not only that I feel advantaged concerning the start of my 
career, I have always felt particularly privileged as well that 
throughout my career I could benefit from the European Union 
(EU) introducing its measures for stimulating EU wide academic 
networking and cooperation, in research as well as education. In 
the early days of my career I visited a number of Annual 
Conferences of the British Social Policy Association (SPA), 
because in the Netherlands there was, and still is, no such thing as 
an academic social policy curriculum, nor was or is there a 
national association in the field. At the SPA conferences I 
experienced what it felt like being a few days among people with 
whom one can share expertise and passion. Each time I came 
home with loads of new thoughts and inspiration for future work 
(and with a larger network). For me, it was especially the EU 
COST Actions and Networks of Excellence (NoE) that I took 
part in that gave me the opportunities to be in such kind of 
inspirational contexts, but then in an EU wide setting. The COST 
and NoE meetings we had over the years created a highly 
inspiring context of cooperation with impassioned colleagues 
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from all over Europe, leading amongst others to the establishment 
of ESPAnet. Of course, these possibilities offered by the EU still 
exist, and are available to early career researchers nowadays, but 
‘back then’ I think we all felt like being pioneers in a new and 
exciting world of EU comparative research, making us, certainly 
me, feel privileged to be part of it. 
There is of course much more to tell after a career of 36 years 
in academia, and anecdotes abound, but there is a thin line 
between being a respected elderly colleague and ‘that old bore’. 
So, let me end my short contribution here by expressing my 
deeply felt belief that any researcher can only be as good as the 
colleagues one is surrounded with. There are the colleagues whose 
previous research findings and theories have been the source of 
inspiration and thinking of one’s own work. ‘Standing on the 
shoulders of giants’, as Isaac Newton said on his death bed, may 
be a bit of an exaggeration in social sciences, but it reflects well 
the gist of the argument. And there are the more immediate 
colleagues with whom one cooperates and has cooperated 
throughout the years. Individual curiosity and ambition will help, 
of course, but it is only in working together with others that 
research ideas can be implemented and lead to scientific progress.  
That I have been allowed to cooperate in all these years with so 
many excellent, inspiring and pleasant colleagues (young and old, 
academic and admin) is perhaps the most important reason why I 
feel I had a privileged career.   
Finally, Carla, throughout our life together your love and 
support have been the true foundations of my work. 
 
 
 
